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ABSTRACT
This research investigates the complexities of artistic 
authorship under the production conditions of the web. It is 
driven by a fascination with the possibilities of expanding the 
authorial sphere of the artwork to include the productive 
capacities of other subjectivities, entities and processes. I 
offer the neologism ‘extra-subjectivity’ to reflect on this 
emerging form of production, in which the ultimate 
manifestation of the artwork often exceeds the author’s 
intentions.  
As well as the written thesis, it comprises seven artworks that 
represent a distinctive approach characterized by playfulness, 
humour and the use of generative computational processes. 
Several early works explore my authorial agency in relation to 
algorithmically generated variations of texts, including William 
Blake’s poem The Fly and the song Puff the Magic Dragon. 
Later, algorithmic generation is combined with the 
appropriation of content shared on social media, as in Infinite 
Violets, which displays variations of a Shakespearean verse 
along with images from Flickr.  
I draw on digital sociological methods to create a hybrid 
approach in which the web is understood as an evolving 
medium made up of digital objects and devices that can be 
repurposed for art practice. This approach underpins Flickr 
Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase, which uses images 
programmatically accessed through Flickr’s application 
programming interface to remake a Marcel Duchamp painting 
for the web. 
Selfie Portrait displays Instagram photographs tagged with 
‘Selfie’ alongside users’ biographical information, which drives 
the ‘Copyright Episode’, an extended account of the legal 
contexts surrounding web-based art practices. Here, I 
demonstrate how such practices are entangled socially, 
ethically and legally with the distinct production conditions of 
the web. I argue that authorship is a question of responsibility 
as well as ‘ownership’, which is why ethics are as important as 
the law. 
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Prologue
This practice-led research represents an attempt to come to 
terms with and articulate the enactment of my authorial 
agency, first in relation to generative computational 
processes, and then under the techno-social production 
conditions of the web. At its core is my fascination with the 
generative possibilities inhering in artworks whose authorial 
sphere is opened out to include the productive capacities of 
other subjectivities, entities and processes.  
While developing the proposal to begin my doctoral research, 
I conceived of the term  ‘extra-subjectivity’ to articulate my 
experience of seven years of being part of Jackson Webb, a 
two-person collaborative art practice, which I had 
conceptualized as an autopoietic, ‘thinking’ entity.1 Rather 
than collaboration just involving human inter-subjectivity, I 
proposed that it generated a productive capacity outside or 
beyond the two subjectivities involved – i.e. ‘extra-subjectivity’. 
Early in the research process however, Jackson Webb 
                                                
1	  Jackson	  Webb	  was	  a	  collaboration	  between	  myself	  and	  artist	  Mark	  Jackson,	  
from	  2003	  to	  2010.	  A	  selection	  of	  Jackson	  Webb’s	  works	  can	  be	  found	  at	  
www.jacksonwebb.com.	  
amicably disbanded, leaving me with a research proposal 
about collaboration, but no one to collaborate with. In the 
absence of another human collaborator, I proposed to 
consider computer programs as another form of ‘other’ with 
which to produce artworks. This reframed the project as an 
investigation into what kind of ‘extra-’ might be generated 
through interactions between a human and a computer 
program, rather than between humans. Was a form of extra-
subjectivity possible ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the artist when they 
inaugurated a computational system to generate an artwork?  
As I embarked on a series of computer-generated artworks to 
explore this, and concurrently undertook a review of relevant 
practice and literature, it became evident that my research 
questions needed to be situated, not in relation to offline 
computational processes or cybernetic systems, but to the 
techno-social context of the web. Framing this shift as a 
necessity perhaps implies a kind of duty, and it certainly 
appeared to me that there was an ethical imperative to 
apprehend and understand the changing production 
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conditions of the web that were emerging as the context for 
my work. But transitioning towards the web as a location for 
my practice was also driven by an increasing fascination with 
forms of cultural production I encountered online. They 
instilled a desire to resist the categories ‘art’ and ‘artist’ 
(understood as part of Michel Foucault’s (1969) concept of the 
author function), and join a broader field of cultural 
production independent from the commodity-driven 
validating mechanisms of the art system. I wanted to be part 
of the emerging, energetic and seemingly autonomous 
practices I saw on Tumblr, YouTube and other web platforms.  
In June 2012, I attended the Digital Methods Initiative (DMI) 
summer school, titled Reality Mining and the Limits of Digital 
Methods. Launched by Richard Rogers in 2007, the DMI 
comprises a research programme at the University of 
Amsterdam, a wiki (Digital Methods Initiative, 2009), as well as 
annual summer and winter schools (Rogers, 2013: 7).2 
                                                
2	  The	  summer	  school	  is	  an	  intensive	  two-­‐week	  training	  programme	  supported	  
by	  technical	  and	  design	  staff,	  as	  well	  as	  nine	  dedicated	  servers	  that	  store	  tools	  
and	  data.	  Participants	  learn	  methods,	  undertake	  research	  projects,	  and	  
produce	  reports,	  tools	  and	  graphics	  that	  are	  shared	  on	  the	  DMI	  wiki.	  
Here, I was introduced to ‘digital methods’, digital social 
research techniques that ground claims about cultural change 
and societal conditions in online dynamics.3  This was 
transformative for my practice, and helped develop my 
understanding of the web as a medium rather than a tool, or 
a device for dissemination. 
Having ‘arrived’ at the web as a medium and location for my 
practice, I began to use processes of automated data 
collection to access user-generated content (images) from 
social media application programming interfaces (APIs), 
incorporating these into my artworks. Following this, new 
legal and ethical implications for my practice arose, and I 
sought legal advice to clarify my position. This in turn gave 
rise to the ‘Copyright Episode’, an in-depth look at the effects 
of copyright law and social media terms of use on my ability 
to make artworks. 
I include this narrative style prologue here both to give a 
sense of the ‘causal’ arc of the research, and to foreground 
my willingness to be led by the shifting imperatives that 
                                                
3	  The	  phrase	  ‘digital	  methods’	  in	  this	  thesis	  refers	  specifically	  to	  the	  set	  of	  
research	  methods	  set	  out	  by	  Rogers	  (2013).	  In	  keeping	  with	  Rogers’	  writing,	  
the	  phrase	  is	  not	  capitalized,	  unless	  used	  as	  part	  of	  a	  name	  or	  title.	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emerged along the way. This is not to minimize my own 
agency in steering the course of the research, but rather to 
introduce one of its central tensions: between wanting to 
retain and relinquish authorial control over what is produced 
in my practice. The thesis traces a shift, along its arc, from my 
initial impetus to resist the author function to my acceptance 
of it as playing an inevitable, necessary, even desirable role in 
the existence, circulation and reception of my works.  
It also reflects a sustained wrangle over what ‘extra-
subjectivity’ could describe.  
As the prologue suggests, I ‘arrived’ at rather than started out 
with a set of research questions. Although modified 
throughout, in their final iteration these can be expressed as: 
How can using the web to produce art contribute to a new 
paradigm for understanding the artist’s authorial agency? 
How can ‘extra-subjectivity’, a conceptual tool that I have 
developed, be used to describe and reflect on the artist’s 
authorial agency in relation to the techno-social production 
conditions brought about by the web?  
Production conditions as context 
As the research developed, the techno-social production 
conditions of the web emerged as both a medium and a 
context. Mark Andrejevic (2013: 125) notes that under these 
conditions, ‘much has been made of the de-differentiating 
force of interactive technologies’, which is purported to have 
collapsed traditional dichotomies between mass and 
interpersonal communications, consumption and production, 
and amateur and professional practices, as well as between 
‘commercial/political, private/public, users/producers, 
artistic/standardised, original/copy, 
democratising/disempowering’ (Institute of Network Cultures, 
2013b: n.p). Alan Kirby (2009: 52) notes that cultural 
producers no longer occupy fixed roles, and that functional 
titles such as ‘reader, author, viewer, producer, director, 
listener, presenter, writer’, are disrupted and given ‘new, 
hybridized meanings’. Jose Van Dijck (2009: 41–42) notes that 
nomenclature for describing cultural producers has been 
characterized by portmanteaux words that mirror these 
collapsing dichotomies, such as ‘prosumer’ and ‘produser’. 
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‘Social Media’ has been defined and conceptualized by 
scholars in many ways. Despite their different emphases, 
however, Christian Fuchs (2014a: 37) notes that they all 
describe ‘forms of online sociality: collective action, 
communication, communities, connecting/networking, co-
operation/collaboration, the creative making of user-
generated content, playing, sharing’. Forms of production 
with their origins in reuse, such as Lawrence Lessig’s ‘remix 
culture’ (2008), Stefan Sonvilla-Weiss’s ‘mashup culture’, (2010) 
Henry Jenkins’ ‘convergence culture’ (2006) and Aram 
Sinnreich’s ‘configurable culture’ (2010), reflect the fact that 
cultural forms themselves are now ‘amalgams of other media’ 
(Sinnreich, 2015: 227). There is, however, suspicion over the 
logic of de-differentiation, which takes on a ‘different cast’ 
when ‘transposed into the economic realm’ (Andrejevic, 2013: 
129). Here, increasingly ‘participatory’ consumption can be 
rendered productive as it provides inputs ‘into the production 
of the very goods being consumed’ (Andrejevic, 2013: 129). 
Under our current networked production conditions, Angus 
Phillips (2014: 18) notes that authorship has been framed as 
‘democratized’; Amy Robillard and Ron Fortune (2016: 10) 
state it is ‘distributed’, and Kirby (2009: 1) states it is 
‘anonymous, social and multiple’. At the same time, questions 
of authorship are also questions of legality and regulation, 
deeply intertwined with matters of intellectual property, 
copyright, and the contractual obligations set out by 
technology companies. Global debates about the increasing 
scope and reach of copyright law have been growing for over 
a decade, with academics such as James Boyle (2008) and Neil 
Weinstock Netanel (2008), and activists Cory Doctorow (2008; 
2011; 2014) and Lawrence Lessig (2004; 2007; 2008; 2010) 
arguing that copyright law has become oppressive and 
extreme as a result of developments in digital culture. While 
copyright law is being extended in scope and reach in the 
digital age, large amounts of personal information are being 
exploited for commercial gain, leading to what Andrejevic 
describes as the current paradox of authorship: 
If popular and scholarly discourses have, in the 
postmodern era, called into question the authority of 
the author, economic, commercial, and legal 
discourses are working hard to secure the notion of 
authorship as a bulwark against the affordances of 
digital media. (Andrejevic, 2013: 125) 
This research is carried out in the interstices of what Cynthia 
Chris and David A. Gerstner (2013: 11) describe as the 
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‘contested terrain’ of authorship, which is ‘an identity that is 
produced by media industries and creative imagination as 
much as it is contained by the legal discourses that regulate 
authorship’. 
The production conditions brought about by the web are in 
constant flux, presenting the challenge of keeping up with 
terminological, technological, legal and regulatory change.  
Changes to relevant copyright legislation are ongoing, and 
social media terms of use are subject to revisions at any time. 
The Instagram API terms of use were updated on 1 June 2016, 
just months before my submission date, which caused Selfie 
Portrait to cease functioning as it was originally designed. 
The term ‘post-Internet art’ emerged and took hold during the 
research period, and the proliferation of artworks and 
momentum in this field continues. 
As with other terms in the field, ‘web-based art’ is contestable. 
I use it to describe practices that intentionally engage with the 
Internet as a site, medium or subject matter, rather than a 
means of display. ‘Web’ is used as shorthand for the Internet, 
reflecting the fact that although there is a technical distinction 
between the Internet and the web, the terms are synonymous 
in everyday usage. The term points beyond a technical 
definition, such that web-based art could describe works that 
do not use a browser, although my own works submitted are 
browser-based. In my own practice, being ‘web-based’ 
involves making art ‘with’ the web. The preposition ‘with’ can 
be understood in two senses: firstly to indicate an instrument 
used to perform an action, and secondly to indicate going in 
the same direction, or working alongside something. As an 
instrument, the web offers digital objects and devices, such as 
images, hashtags and APIs that artworks can be made ‘with’. 
As a medium, the web is a territory artists can operate 
alongside, working ‘with’ it in this broader, perhaps more 
profound, sense. 
Methodology  
In this research there was a recursive relationship between 
the production of the artworks, the development of practical 
methods, theoretical engagement, and reflective writing. I 
conceive of these elements as acting on each other, reflecting 
the essential recursiveness of practice-led research. The 
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methodological, contextual and theoretical constructs 
required in doctoral research are understood as permeable 
structures, which produce and are produced by practice. This 
permeability also indicates that the distinction between 
‘methods’ and ‘theory’ is somewhat blurred: the development 
of extra-subjectivity is methodological and theoretical; the 
adoption of digital methods is practical, but also has a 
contextualizing function – and digital methods themselves are 
underpinned by a certain sociological orientation. 
The artworks acted as a series of experiments that helped me 
reflect on my authorial agency in relation to other entities and 
people who contributed to the artworks’ production. The 
concurrent process of contextualizing the work in relation to 
other practices and theoretically engaging with my key terms 
inevitably influenced my thinking and in some senses steered 
the direction of the practice. However, the artworks remain 
discrete, with their own logic – there is no sense in which I 
attempted to express theory ‘in’ the works. Recourse to the 
notion of recursivity helps to hold the elements of the 
research in suspension, acknowledging them as distinct 
modes that form its relational conditions. As I am the ‘subject’ 
producing and accounting for this research, it could be 
considered as grounded in my ‘experience’. Importantly, 
however, following Joan W. Scott, my experience per se is not 
presented as authoritative evidence for what is known. For 
Scott, it is important that experience itself is historicized, 
rather than presented as ‘uncontestable evidence and as an 
originary point of explanation’ (Scott, 1991: 777). In the 
context of ‘writing the history of difference’ (Scott, 1991: 773), 
she argues that if historians take a subject’s account of ‘what 
he or she has lived through’ as uncontestable evidence, they 
risk naturalizing the difference of the identity of the person 
giving the evidence. By taking their identity as self-evident, the 
historian fails to critique the ways in which its difference is 
constructed (Scott, 1991: 777–779, paraphrased). 
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To properly enact this critique, they must 
attend to the historical processes that, through 
discourse, position subjects and produce their 
experiences. It is not individuals who have experience, 
but subjects who are constituted through experience. 
In light of this definition experience becomes not the 
origin of our explanation, not the authoritative 
(because seen or felt) evidence that grounds what is 
known, but rather that which we seek to explain, that 
about which knowledge is produced. To think about 
experience in this way is to historicize it as well as to 
historicize the identities it produces. (Scott, 1991: 779–
780)  
This research is in itself an historical process that positions 
me as a subject and produces my experience. This experience 
is that for which an explanation is sought, and about which 
knowledge is produced. Critical self-reflection on my 
experience of producing the artworks led me to become a 
particular subject. The enactment of my artistic agency, 
informed by these reflections, fed back into both the 
production of my subjectivity and of the research. 
Theoretical armature 
Although my aim was not to reach a philosophical definition or 
totalizing theory of ‘extra-subjectivity’, I undertook an 
investigation into how subjectivity has been theorized to 
inform the development and use of the conceptual tool that is 
‘extra-subjectivity’.4 In this research, the production of 
subjectivity is understood as a complex interaction between 
pre-established social protocols, personal intervention and 
the lived experience of being a subject. By emphasizing 
experience, I move away from post-modernist theories to 
align myself with the notion that subjectivity is ‘more than the 
sum total of combined discursive positions’, as described by 
Lisa Blackman, John Cromby, Derek Hook, Dimitris 
Papadopoulos and Valerie Walkerdine (2008: 7). This 
acknowledges the fact that the research itself is more than 
the sum of its discursive parts, and involves the experience of 
being a subject recursively producing and produced by the 
research. It also foregrounds my emphasis on the humanness 
                                                
4	  One	  of	  the	  challenges	  was	  that	  ‘subjectivity’	  is	  entangled	  with	  the	  related	  
concepts	  of	  ‘self’	  and	  ‘identity’,	  but	  as	  the	  research	  evolved	  to	  focus	  on	  
authorship	  and	  agency,	  theoretically	  engaging	  with	  these	  concepts	  was	  
outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  research.	  The	  relationship	  between	  subjectivity	  and	  
identity	  is	  designated	  as	  an	  area	  for	  future	  research	  in	  the	  conclusion.	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of subjectivities ‘behind’ user-generated content, which was 
important when attending to their authorial ‘rights’, and 
attempting to invest a socially responsible ethic into my 
practice.  
In line with Olga Goriunova (2012) I resist post-Marxian 
discourses that frame subjectivity as a commodity good, as 
they tend to designate all forms of production as experiments 
of late capitalism, and thus eclipse the possibility of forms of 
agency outside dominant modes of operation. 
Jason Read’s (2010) conception of 
the simultaneous non-identity of the manner in which 
subjectivity is produced and the manner in which 
subjectivity is productive, not just in terms of value or 
wealth, but its general capacity to produce effects 
(Read, 2010: 115, italics in original) 
helped me construct the conceptual tool of ‘extra-subjectivity’, 
which embodies a ‘both’ or ‘and’ logic.  
As a key term in discussions of subjectivity, the (somewhat 
entangled) concept of ‘agency’ is central to the theoretical 
armature of the research. The sociological perspectives of 
Anthony Giddens (1979), Christian Fuchs (2014a) and Jason 
Read (2010) contribute to my understanding of agency as a 
form of effective intentionality. These scholars emphasize a 
recursive relationship between social subjects and social 
structures, which are both enabling and constraining. 
Giddens’ emphasis on the agent’s perspective rather than the 
constraints of social structures, resonates with my belief that 
although my practice is constrained to a degree by the 
structural elements of the web, it also offers the potential for 
a high degree of agency in relation to these constraints. 
Although agency can involve the productive capacities of non-
human agents, this research focuses on human agency as a 
form of effective intentionality.  
The question of authorship – a key feature of the artist’s 
agency – was central, and I have already introduced some of 
the issues for authorship brought about by the production 
conditions of the web. In this thesis authorship is seen as a 
‘practice’ that shifts in relation to the conditions and 
subjectivities with which the artworks are produced. Although 
I acknowledge suggestions that non-human entities such as 
computer operating systems and programming languages 
can ‘author’, as in Judd Ethan Ruggill and Ken S. McAllister 
(2013: 138–139), I locate authorship in the artist’s subjective 
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capacity as a cultural producer who is accountable and 
responsible for what they produce. Like agency, authorship 
involves effective intentionality; negotiating the claim of 
authorship around my artworks is an enactment of my 
agency. I use the phrase ‘authorial agency’ to identify what is 
unique about my agency as an artist, i.e. that it is specifically 
authorial. 
The concept of the author function was a recurring touch 
point both in coming to terms with the signifying function of 
my own proper name, and in developing a socially 
responsible ethic in my practice. 
In relation to issues of copyright raised in the artwork Selfie 
Portrait, the significance of asserting my authorship lies not 
only in my capacity to ‘author’ something and thus claim it as 
my own, but also in how that claim of ownership makes me 
responsible for the consequences of its production. 
Thesis structure 
The structure of the thesis reflects the arc of the research, 
with four central ‘Practice Chapters’, in which I discuss the 
different subjectivities, agencies and authorial relations 
deployed in the production of the artworks. The works 
presented in Practice 3: Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a 
Staircase and Practice 4: Selfie Portrait were the most involved 
and complex, which is reflected in the relative length of the 
chapters that address them.  
The Methodology chapter (Chapter 1) is positioned at the 
outset of the thesis to foreground the role of ‘extra-
subjectivity’ as a conceptual tool used to come to terms with 
how my authorial agency was enacted in my practice. Here I 
present the methodological function of the term, trace how 
my understanding and use of it evolved throughout the 
research, and discuss its limitations and terminological 
problems. I also outline a series of other methods adopted in 
order to carry out the research and address my research 
questions: I introduce ‘digital methods’, and rationalize my 
appropriation of them following my attendance of the 2012 
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Digital Methods Initiative Summer School. I note that the 
digital methods distinction between the ‘natively digital’ and 
the ‘digitized’ encouraged me to consider what a natively 
digital artwork might be, and discuss how technical and 
theoretical aspects of digital methods were adapted from 
their sociological context and re-purposed for my practice. I 
discuss my use of APIs and the programmatic appropriation 
of user-generated content, which allowed me to investigate a 
particular set of legal and ethical implications. 
Finally, I outline how I explored the relations between my 
artistic agency and that of other people who contributed to 
the works with varying degrees of authorial intentionality. 
Particular attention is given to the ongoing working 
interaction between myself, and Arthur Webb, who 
programmed the submitted artworks.  
In line with convention, the Literature and Practice Reviews 
(Chapters 2 and 3) are also presented near the start of the 
thesis, and as such may appear as positioning devices. 
However, despite their location in the thesis’ structure, both 
chapters evolved alongside the practice. The Literature 
Review is organized around my key terms, ‘subjectivity’, 
‘agency’ and ‘authorship’, which helped me to construct ‘extra-
subjectivity’ as a conceptual tool and to develop the 
theoretical armature of the research.  
The Practice Review provides another contextual armature, 
with emphasis placed on artworks and practices that helped 
me address my research questions. The section on 
Cybernetics and Generative Art relates to Practice 1: The 
Generative Phase. Here I briefly discuss early computer art 
and the language of cybernetics, then focus on Tristan Tzara 
and William Burroughs’ generative approaches to text, which 
were attempts to offer alternatives to prevailing formal 
artistic and literary conventions. I look at current web-based 
text generators, whose rhetorical effects seek to critique the 
social construction of language. 
Florian Cramer’s concept of second-order poiesis contributed 
to my rejection of the notion that deploying a computational 
system would eclipse my authorial agency from the 
production of an artwork. Cornelia Sollfrank’s net.art generator 
provided a bridge between Practice 1 and Practice 2: 
Transitioning Towards the Web, as it situates computational 
generativity in the context of the web, provoking salient 
    12 
questions of authorship, originality and copyright. 
Considerations of Net Art, Surf Clubs, Tumblr and Joe 
Hamilton’s Hypergeography relate to Practice 2, providing a 
contemporary context that informed my shift towards the 
web as a techno-social space for cultural production. 
Consideration of artistic strategies of ‘high appropriation’ 
relate to Practice 3 and Practice 4. These are paradigmatically 
different from the practices of appropriation of the Pictures 
Generation, or those described by Claire Bishop (2012) and 
Nicolas Bourriaud (2002a). They demand distinct questions 
about the implications of (often programmatically) 
appropriating items of culture created by a wide range of 
people belonging to online communities, including non-
artists. 
Practice 1 maps how, in the early stages of the research, the 
production of a series of computer-generated works, Topic 
Generator (see Figs. 2.3 and 2.4), 
39,063,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Flies, After William 
Blake (see Figs. 2.7 and 2.8) and Infinite Puffs (see Figs. 2.9 and 
3.0), enabled me to explore the ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ aspect of 
extra-subjectivity by considering whether a form of effective 
intentionality is possible ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the artist when 
they inaugurate a computational system to generate an 
artwork. 
Practice 2 captures the shifting territory of the research, as I 
began to combine computer generation with the use of 
corporate social media platforms. Through 1000 Truly Original 
Ideas (see Fig. 3.1) I discuss the affordances and constraints 
imposed by using Tumblr, and consider the value of likes, 
comments and reblogs as a form of audience attention. 
Infinite Violets (see Figs. 3.2–3.4) made more significant and 
systematic use of user-generated content from the photo-
sharing site Flickr, which prompted consideration of the 
relative degrees of authorial intentionality expressed in the 
use of images and text. I discuss the adoption of Creative 
Commons licences to address the issue of attribution and 
ownership, and provide an account of how the work was 
exhibited in a gallery space, which anticipated later enquiries 
into the need for web-based artists to configure both online 
and offline iterations of their work.  
Practice 3 focuses on Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a 
Staircase (see Figs. 3.6 and 3.7), which represents a significant 
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turning point in my practice, as it was the first piece that I 
consider to be ‘natively digital’ in DMI terms. 
This work deploys an automated technique of data collection 
to access images through the Flickr API, which expands the 
authorial sphere of the work to include viewers who 
intentionally interact with it and Flickr users whose work is 
included without their knowledge. It is distinct amongst the 
other submitted works, in that it offers the ‘viewer’ the 
opportunity to contribute to the work. I draw on Beryl 
Graham and Sarah Cook (2010), Bishop (2006a; 2006b), Dave 
Beech (2008) and Kirby (2009) to discuss the role of the viewer 
in the work, exploring terms that could describe their activity: 
‘interaction’, ‘participation’ and ‘collaboration’. The work was 
exhibited in Block 336 Gallery, London, and I discuss how 
reformatting the work for a physical space created different 
conditions of ‘production’ for the viewer, for whom interacting 
with and contributing to the work became a public act. 
Finally, I discuss the role of hashtags as an essential material 
aspect of the work. I suggest that the work appropriates social 
process of user-classification, which produces unexpected 
and uncontrollable formations within the work. 
Practice 4 discusses Selfie Portrait (see Figs. 4.6–4.8), which 
programmatically accesses and displays Instagram images 
tagged #selfie, along with the biographical details of the 
people who posted them. This work re-focused my attention 
on the production of subjectivities, and the term ‘extra-
subjectivity’, as selfies are representations of selves. I discuss 
my intentions to counter Andrew Keen’s argument that selfies 
are narcissistic (Keen, quoted in The Current, 2013: 04:40), and 
to reflect (on) them as representations of human 
subjectivities rather than ‘just‘ digital objects or data. I 
contend that selfies are events as well as objects, since they 
‘take place’ temporospatially, in a techno-social context. I 
examine the expressive properties that reflect my intentions 
in the work: its contemplative pace, ongoing duration, and the 
aesthetic reframing of selfies outside Instagram. I discuss the 
works’ display on an iPhone as part of an exhibition, which 
highlights the different levels of control the artist has over the 
viewing conditions in a gallery as opposed to in the context of 
mobile media. I contend that the discursive contextualization 
of the work plays a more significant role than the mode of 
display in influencing how it is encountered. 
    14 
Selfiecity, a project led by Lev Manovich (2014), provided an 
opportunity to compare the collection and re-presentation of 
large collections of selfies in the contexts of art and media 
visualization. I suggest that as a digital sociological endeavour, 
media visualization is oriented towards ‘findings’, whereas art 
is oriented towards reimagining the social realm. 
The personal information and metadata associated with a 
selfie, some of which is intentionally authored and some of 
which is not, is part of its materiality and medium specificity. 
My involvement with the DMI enabled me to see both the 
selfies and this data as ‘digital objects’ that can be 
manipulated or repurposed. However, I also saw selfies as 
representations of human subjectivities, which highlights the 
‘both’ or ‘and’ logic of extra-subjectivity. 
Chapter 4: ‘The Copyright Episode’ is an account of how I 
negotiated the legal and ethical implications of using the 
Instagram API to access and display other people’s selfies. It 
begins with an overview of recent literature on intellectual 
property, copyright and digital cultural production, then 
details the legal advice given to me by Own-it, University of 
the Arts London’s intellectual property advice service, and 
Angus McLean, a solicitor from the London–based law firm 
Simmons & Simmons acting on behalf of UAL. Mr. McLean’s 
advice covered both copyright and contractual laws 
pertaining to my use of images in Selfie Portrait, as well as 
potential defences to copyright infringement and levels of risk 
associated with the artwork. Following this, I discuss the 
development of my own ethico-legal approach within a 
broader context of individuals and online communities 
developing their own ethical frameworks for determining 
legitimate uses of other people’s cultural productions. These 
frameworks are evolving in the face of a legal and regulatory 
system that is not equipped to deal with the affordances of 
digital cultural production. I describe my attempt to develop a 
‘permission bot’ that would automatically request permission 
to use any selfie included in Selfie Portrait. Instagram blocked 
this attempt on the basis that such a bot would not comply 
with their requirements for usage of the API. 
A note on format 
Representing web-based works in print presented a particular 
challenge: Should the browser window be included? Which 
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browser should be used? Should I use screenshots, or try to 
achieve a higher image resolution by ‘re-staging’ the works for 
print? To try and remain faithful to the artworks and the 
medium in which they are commonly viewed, I have used 
screenshots. These were taken on a standard iMac Desktop 
computer, which means that the resolution of the images is 
lower than what may be expected in a print document. I have 
included the browser window, as this is an aesthetic element 
that viewers would normally encounter online. By providing 
links to the artworks at the beginning of the thesis, I hope 
readers will be encouraged to encounter them in their 
‘natural habitat’, as well as seeing them reproduced on the 
page. Special permission was granted to submit the thesis in 
landscape format, as it made conceptual and graphic sense to 
reflect the screen format in the printed document.5 
                                                
5	  Many	  of	  my	  bibliographic	  sources	  were	  found	  online.	  As	  well	  as	  electronic	  
journal	  articles	  I	  have	  drawn	  on	  online	  artworks,	  websites,	  blog	  posts	  and	  
online	  magazine	  and	  newspaper	  articles.	  This	  reflects	  the	  field	  in	  which	  I	  am	  
working,	  where	  the	  status	  of	  references	  can	  be	  debatable.	  This	  presented	  a	  
challenge	  when	  compiling	  the	  bibliography,	  which	  has	  been	  divided	  into	  
categories	  of	  online	  and	  offline	  sources.	  	  Where	  online	  sources	  have	  no	  page	  
numbers,	  I	  have	  included	  ‘n.p’	  in	  my	  citations.	  Where	  websites	  have	  no	  stated	  
author	  or	  multiple	  authors,	  as	  in	  discussion	  forums	  and	  surf	  clubs,	  the	  
bibliographic	  entries	  begin	  with	  the	  name	  of	  the	  webpage	  referred	  to.	  For	  
online	  sources,	  the	  capitalization	  and	  punctuation	  of	  each	  item’s	  title	  has	  
been	  kept	  as	  it	  is	  found	  on	  the	  website.	  Some	  of	  the	  links	  in	  the	  bibliography	  
                                                
are	  known	  to	  be	  broken	  at	  the	  time	  of	  submission,	  but	  were	  available	  on	  the	  
date	  of	  access.	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This chapter outlines a series of methods I adopted in order 
to carry out the research. These, along with the conceptions 
of practice-led research outlined in the thesis’ introduction, 
constitute my methodology. 
Extra-subjectivity 
The term ‘extra-subjectivity’ was used as a conceptual tool to 
come to terms with how my authorial agency was enacted in 
my practice, in relation to other entities and people involved 
in the production of the artworks. Its usefulness waxed and 
waned, and my understanding of it shifted throughout the 
research process, especially in relation to my grasp of the 
term ‘subjectivity’ and the role my own subjective capacity 
played in the production of the artworks. I have included 
general observations about the term in this chapter, but it is 
also discussed throughout the thesis in relation to specific 
artworks. I offer a final reflection on the usefulness of the 
term in the conclusion. 
Reflecting on Actor Network Theory (ANT), Bruno Latour 
states: ‘There are four things that do not work with actor-
network theory; the word actor, the word network, the word 
theory and the hyphen! Four nails in the coffin’ (Latour, 1999: 
15). As I wrangled with the term ‘extra-subjectivity’, these 
laconic remarks resonated, and at times it appeared to have 
its own three problems: the word ‘extra’, the word 
‘subjectivity’ and the hyphen. However, since my focus was on 
theoretically informed practice, rather than the development 
of theory, my intention was not to reach a definitive or 
totalizing theory of extra-subjectivity. It thus remained 
methodologically useful despite its limitations and 
terminological problems, which are discussed below.  
The prefix ‘extra-’ can connote ‘outside or beyond’ as well as 
‘surplus’. In the early stages of the research, I explored 
whether a form of effective intentionality could be enacted 
‘outside or beyond’ the artist when they use a computer 
program to generate artworks (see Practice 1). Later, the 
sense of ‘surplus’ became more relevant as I came to see 
extra-subjectivity as placing emphasis on the negotiated 
authorial relations between the artist and other people who 
are involved in the production of artworks. 
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The proposition that extra-subjectivity could describe 
something that produces ‘outside or beyond’ subjectivity was 
problematic for several reasons. Firstly, as discussed in the 
Literature Review below, I came to understand subjectivity as 
being partly produced by experience, including an experience 
of self. Since a form of subjectivity ‘outside or beyond’ 
experience is seen as a conceptual impossibility, extra-
subjectivity is not intended to describe an extra-ontological 
state. Secondly, the possibilities of what ‘extra-subjectivity’ 
could describe shifted as I rejected the idea that effective 
intentionality or subjective experience could be ascribed to a 
computer program. Although I started out thinking that extra-
subjectivity could be used to describe a form of agency 
instantiated in human/computer relations, the focus quickly 
shifted to forms of human agency in which there are varying 
degrees of authorial intentionality. The paradox of the term 
extra-subjectivity (understood in the ‘outside or beyond’ 
sense) is that as a noun, it inexorably returns us to the 
subject.6 
                                                
6	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  ‘extra-­‐subjective’	  is	  a	  good	  way	  to	  describe	  a	  computer	  
program,	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  ‘outside’	  subjectivity,	  but	  the	  paradox	  of	  
extra-­‐subjectivity	  problematizes	  this	  reading.	  	  
Since extra-subjectivity has to be extra ‘to’ subjectivity, it 
cannot be completely outside or beyond it. In an attempt to 
circumvent this paradox, I started to think about extra-
subjectivity in its adverbial form, as a property of the artist’s 
authorship or agency, rather than as a phenomenon outside 
their subjective experience. 
In this new formulation, I speculated that it was possible for a 
form of authorship or agency to be ‘extra to’ the subject, 
rather than a form of subjectivity being extra to the subject. 
This prompted me to use the terms ‘extra-subjective 
authorship’ or ‘extra-subjective agency’ to think about my own 
and others’ roles in the production of my artworks. However, 
these terms were also problematic: Although one could 
describe the productive capacities of non-human agents as 
being extra-subjective – i.e. ‘outside or beyond’ the human 
subject – in this research, ‘agency’ implies the artist’s effective 
intentionality in the production of artworks. Thus, claims for a 
form of agency outside or beyond the subject come up 
against the same problems as claims for a form of subjectivity 
outside or beyond the subject. Even when considered in its 
adverbial form as a property of the subject’s agency, extra-
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subjectivity still could not describe something ‘outside’ or 
‘beyond’ the subject.  
Rather than ‘outside or beyond’, therefore, the sense of 
surplus connoted by ‘-extra’ was more fertile. ‘Extra-
subjectivity’, ‘extra-subjective agency’ and ‘extra-subjective 
authorship’ all came to connote multifarious forms of 
production involving the negotiated authorial relations 
between the artist and other people or entities who are 
involved in the production of artworks. Thus ‘both’ or ‘and’ is a 
fundamental aspect of what extra-subjectivity might be. 
Digital methods 
Richard Rogers opens his book Digital Methods by stating: 
This is not a methods book, at least in the sense of a 
set of techniques and heuristics to be lugged like a 
heavy toolbox across vast areas of enquiry… Rather, 
this book presents a methodological outlook for 
research with the web. As such it is a proposal to 
reorient the field of Internet-related research by 
studying and repurposing what I term the methods of 
the medium, or perhaps more straightforwardly 
methods embedded in online devices. (Rogers, 2013: 
1)  
I saw an affinity between practice-led research and the digital 
methods imperative to ‘follow the medium’, in that both are 
concerned with letting the materials and procedures of the 
medium in question lead the research. Digital methods 
researchers study how online devices make use of ‘natively 
digital’ objects, and then repurpose these uses for social and 
cultural research. Online devices include social networking 
platforms (e.g. Twitter), recommendation systems (as used by 
Amazon) or search engines (e.g. Google), which deploy online 
methods for data collection and sorting such as ‘crawling, 
scraping, crowd sourcing and folksonomy’ (Rogers, 2013: 1).7 
Natively digital objects include hyperlinks, page hits, likes, 
                                                
7	  Web	  crawling	  and	  scraping	  are	  distinct	  but	  related	  automated	  processes	  of	  
collecting	  online	  data:	  ‘Web	  scraping	  is	  the	  process	  of	  taking	  unstructured	  
information	  from	  Web	  pages	  and	  turning	  it	  in	  to	  structured	  information	  that	  
can	  be	  used	  in	  a	  subsequent	  stage	  of	  analysis…	  Search	  engines	  use	  a	  
specialized	  type	  of	  web	  scraper,	  called	  a	  web	  crawler	  (or	  a	  web	  spider,	  or	  a	  
search	  bot),	  to	  go	  through	  web	  pages	  and	  identify	  which	  sites	  they	  link	  to	  and	  
what	  words	  they	  use’	  (Hanretty,	  2013:	  9).	  Crowdsourcing	  is	  ‘a	  type	  of	  
participative	  online	  activity	  in	  which	  an	  individual,	  an	  institution,	  a	  non-­‐profit	  
organization,	  or	  company	  proposes	  to	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  of	  varying	  
knowledge,	  heterogeneity,	  and	  number,	  via	  a	  flexible	  open	  call,	  the	  voluntary	  
undertaking	  of	  a	  task’	  (Estellés-­‐Arolas	  &	  González-­‐Ladrón-­‐de-­‐Guevara,	  2012:	  
197).	  Folksonomies	  are	  collaborative	  tagging	  systems	  that	  ‘allow	  users	  to	  tag	  
documents,	  share	  their	  tags,	  and	  search	  for	  documents	  based	  on	  these	  tags’	  
(Wu,	  H.,	  et	  al.,	  2006:	  111).	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hashtags, datestamps and search engine results. The purpose 
of understanding how online devices use digital objects is not 
to be able to ‘fine tune’ the devices (by building a better 
search engine, for example), but to ‘think along’ with them, 
asking what can be learned from online methods, and how 
they can be reapplied for social research. Digital methods 
thus ‘think along with’ online devices, learning how they 
handle digital objects. 
Rogers states: ‘By continually thinking along with the devices 
and the objects they handle, digital methods, as a research 
practice, strive to follow the evolving methods of the medium’ 
(Rogers, 2013: 1). For example, Google uses web crawlers to 
discover publicly–available web pages that can be returned 
when someone searches using its search engine. Google 
‘makes use’ of its search engine results by ranking them, 
which in turn structures traffic and attention online. Digital 
methods offer technical means for studying and visualizing 
Google’s search engine results and how they are ranked over 
time to reveal socio-cultural phenomena: 
 ‘Search engines author new orders of things in the 
sense that they rank sources for any topic. Reading 
and interpreting engine returns as hierarchies of 
credible sources per subject matter can itself be a 
form of social research’ (Rogers, 2013: 6).  
Using a digital methods approach, hyperlinks can be used to 
show a ‘politics of association’ rather than just to assign a 
ranking to a website (Rogers, 2013: 5). I adopted the notion of 
‘thinking along with’ or ‘making work with’ the web for my 
practice, as a way of trying to use the web as an art medium, 
rather than a platform for dissemination.  
Significantly, digital methods are distinguished from and seen 
as superior to ‘virtual methods’, which simply digitize 
traditional sociological research methods and port them to 
the web. A categorial distinction is made between ‘the natively 
digital and the digitized, that is, between the objects, content, 
devices, and environments that are “born” in the new medium 
and those that have “migrated” to it’ (Rogers, 2013: 19). For 
example, standard sociological methods such as surveys can 
be digitized and migrated into the web, whereas 
recommendation systems are seen as ‘natively’ digital. In 
moving beyond the virtual, Rogers proposes to move Internet 
research beyond the study of online culture: 
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Ultimately, I propose a research practice that learns 
from the methods of online devices, repurposes them, 
and seeks to ground claims about cultural change and 
societal conditions in web data, introducing the term 
‘online groundedness.’ The overall aim is to rework 
methods for Internet-related research, developing a 
novel strand of study, digital methods. (Rogers, 2013: 
19) 
This distinction between the digitized and the natively digital 
particularly drew me to the digital methods approach. In my 
computer-generated artworks (see Practice 1). I used 
strategies that could be considered ‘digitized’ because I was 
porting an offline, computational mode of production to the 
web for display.8 I hoped that digital methods would help me 
move beyond this and consider what a natively digital artwork 
would be. 
During the 2012 DMI Summer School I formed a project 
group with Nili Steinfeld, a programmer from Israel, 
Tommaso Renzini, a graphic designer from Italy, and two 
sociologists, Nadia Dresscher-Lambertus and Simeona 
Petkova from Aruba and Amsterdam respectively. We carried 
                                                
8	  The	  use	  of	  ‘natively	  digital’	  in	  this	  context	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  Mark	  
Prensky’s	  much	  contested	  term	  ‘digital	  natives’,	  which	  refers	  to	  a	  generation	  
of	  young	  people	  who	  have	  grown	  up	  with	  digital	  technologies	  (Prensky,	  2001).	  	  
out a project titled The Life of an Image (on Tumblr), which 
investigated the circulation and re-contextualization of 
images on Tumblr (Dresscher-Lamburtus et al., 2012). We 
collected data from Tumblr through two custom-built data 
collection tools that used the Tumblr API. An API is a piece of 
code that allows applications to access data from each other. 
For example, Twitter is essentially a website, but because its 
API is publicly available, third parties are able to create 
applications allowing information on Twitter to be accessed 
from different places. Using these data collection tools, we 
traced the circulation of a poster for the Kony 2012 campaign, 
and an image of a mineral through Tumblr (Figs. 1.2 and 1.3).9  
With the data collected, which included the usernames and 
biographical information of people who had reblogged, liked 
or commented on the images, Tommaso created a data 
visualization that showed how many times each image was 
reblogged and liked, its popularity over time, and the number 
of related images shown alongside it in any given Tumblr (Fig. 
1.4).  
                                                
9	  Kony	  2012	  was	  a	  campaign	  mounted	  by	  advocacy	  organization	  Invisible	  
Children,	  which	  attempted	  to	  expose	  African	  militia	  leader,	  Joseph	  Kony,	  and	  
have	  him	  arrested	  (Invisible	  Children,	  2014:	  n.p).	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I wanted to test whether our data could result in an artistic 
output as well as a data visualization, and suggested that we 
also present our findings in another format.10  
 
Fig. 1.2 Invisible Children, Kony 2012 poster. Image permission granted by 
Invisible Children. 
                                                
10	  It	  was	  challenging	  to	  infer	  clear	  sociological	  insights	  or	  claims	  from	  our	  
findings.	  This	  planted	  a	  ‘so	  what?’	  question	  for	  me,	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  
discussed	  in	  Practice	  4	  in	  relation	  to	  Selfie	  City	  (Manovich	  et al.,	  2014).	  	  
 
Fig. 1.3 Quebul Fine Minerals, Fluorite, specimen and photograph. Image 
permission granted by Quebul Fine Minerals. 
 
I created a short slideshow in which Tumblr users’ profile 
descriptions were overlaid on screenshots of their Tumblr 
archives, creating an alternative ‘picture’ of how the Kony 2012 
image was presented by users in relation to other kinds of 
imagery (Fig. 1.5). This method set a clear precedent for Selfie 
Portrait, which adopts a similar technique of combining profile 
information with user-generated imagery (see Practice 4).
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Fig. 1.4 Tommaso Renzini, Data visualization, 2012 (detail). Image permission granted by Tommaso Renzini.  
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Fig. 1.5 Tumblr archives, overlaid with users’ profile descriptions, screenshots.
 26 
The data visualization was a conventional digital methods 
output that treated the images and metadata as information 
to be mapped in order to reveal sociological phenomena. The 
slideshow performed a more transformative operation on the 
images and their metadata, and was a first step towards 
developing a hybrid methodology, in which digital methods 
techniques, are re-purposed for art practice. During the 2013 
Winter School, the same group of us researched the 
circulation of images and use of hashtags on Instagram 
(Dresscher-Lamburtus et al., 2013b). Simeona Petkova and I 
presented a paper on this work, titled Hashtagging in 
Instagram: Tactical Connectivity in a Visual Social Network at the 
European Conference for the Arts and Humanities in 2013 
(International Academic Forum, 2013: 26). Here, we shared 
findings from our analysis of 400 images from a dataset of 
40,000 tagged with #kony and #kony2012, dating from 
January to May 2012. We suggested that Instagram images 
are tagged with popular hashtags not just to associate them 
with a common issue or improve searchability, but for a 
number of other ‘tactical’ reasons, such as surfacing unrelated 
digital images, pushing related images into popular streams, 
or keeping digital images at the top of content flows by 
constantly updating the hashtags. As with the Tumblr project, 
this work with Instagram paved the way for Selfie Portrait, 
which is discussed in Practice 4. 
Digital methods involve a ‘postdemographic’ approach to 
studying online networks, which is distinct from traditional 
sociological research into online culture that involves studying 
‘how users present themselves and manage their identities 
and privacy, and how online friendship is related to being 
friends for real’ (Rogers, 2013: 35). Postdemographics can be 
understood as less attentive to subjectivities than traditional 
sociological research. It originates in computer and 
information science and replaces demographic measures 
such as age, gender or class with metrics such as ‘interests, 
taste in music, favourite books, and television programs’ 
(Rogers, 2013: 35). Although I was not ‘doing sociology’, my 
research hovered somewhere between these approaches. On 
the one hand, my aspiration to make ‘natively digital’ artworks 
meant treating the images and hashtags I appropriated as 
digital objects (in the digital methods sense). On the other 
hand, it was important that I attended to how they marked 
the subjectivities of the people who made them. 
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This was particularly relevant in Selfie Portrait, which uses an 
automated data collection technique learned at the DMI, but 
foregrounds the agency of the people who took the selfies, as 
discussed in Practice 4. 
Digital methods research involves programmers, sociologists, 
issue experts, graphic designers, data visualization experts 
and others whose cross-disciplinary skills are necessary for 
digital methods to work effectively. The projects undertaken 
at the DMI Summer and Winter Schools were a collaborative 
effort, with co-authored and co-presented outputs. The 
assertion of my artistic agency within this context thus 
pivoted around bringing my disciplinary perspective to digital 
methods research. 
Use of APIs 
The use of the Flickr and Instagram APIs was fundamental to 
the production of Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase 
and Selfie Portrait. It enabled me to understand a particular 
set of legal and ethical implications distinct from those 
applicable to the use of material taken from the web by other 
means such as downloading and saving content or 
automated web scraping. Web scraping is ‘a prominent 
technique for the automated collection of online data’, 
according to Noortje Marres and Esther Weltevrede (2013: 
313). Web scrapers are bits of code that make it possible to 
‘automatically download data from the Web, and to capture 
some of the large quantities of data about social life that are 
available on online platforms like Google, Twitter and 
Wikipedia’ (Marres & Weltevrede, 2013: 313). 
Web scraping does not necessarily involve an API, and can be 
done without permission from the website owner. Marres 
and Weltevrede note that the popularity of scraping has led to 
more social media platforms making APIs available, but that 
the data offered through them is highly constrained by these 
platforms (Marres & Weltevrede 2013: 322). Winnie Soon 
suggests that scraping, whilst likely to violate websites’ terms 
of use, offers the possibility to circumvent the regulatory 
control and governance of platforms, which constrain the 
quantity and format of available data through APIs (Soon, 
2011: 8). 
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Rogers also notes that special access is required ‘for the study 
of certain natively digital objects such as engine query logs, 
leading to the discussion of the tension between employing 
the APIs offered by companies and scraping data’ (Rogers, 
2013: 15). He states that there is a ‘requirement of ethical 
review often accompanying proposals to scrape online data, 
including profiles’ (Rogers, 2013: 15).11  
I chose to access the ‘data’ (images) I wanted to use through 
the Flickr and Instagram APIs instead of scraping it, as this 
was a relatively accessible, and less ethically and legally 
contentious technique. Corporate social media platforms 
make APIs available to allow developers to create commercial 
applications through which their services can be accessed and 
interacted with in novel ways. Thus APIs have been designed 
to encourage people (usually developers) to engage in a form 
of creative (though not necessarily artistic) production. 
Whereas the invitation to build on top of platforms is 
motivated by platforms’ commercial interests, I was 
interested in the use of APIs for the purpose of art 
                                                
11	  Several	  cases	  of	  the	  public	  release	  of	  supposedly	  anonymous	  personal	  data,	  
which	  was	  subsequently	  identified	  (AOL	  user	  search	  histories	  in	  2006	  and	  
Harvard	  students’	  Facebook	  data	  in	  2008),	  have	  contributed	  to	  these	  ethical	  
demands	  (Zimmer,	  2010:	  313–314).	  
production, and in asking what the APIs would enable and 
constrain in my practice. I saw value in exploring APIs as an 
artistic medium that involves a negotiation between the artist, 
the platform, and its users. 
Marres and Weltevrede note that scraping is not ‘native’ to 
social research, and introduces ‘alien’ concepts into the 
discipline:  
‘To use scrapers in social research is to import a 
technique from the worlds of information science and 
digital services, one that must be adapted if it is to suit 
the purposes of social research’ (Marres & Weltevrede 
2013: 320).  
Using APIs in my research was also to import a technique 
from the worlds of information science and digital services, 
which I adapted to explore forms of agency within web-based 
art practice. 
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Working with (human) others  
A number of people played a role in producing the submitted 
artworks, with varying degrees of authorial intentionality. This 
section focuses on intentional human working interactions, 
rather than on people whose cultural productions were 
incorporated into the works without their knowledge, as 
discussed in Practice 3 and Practice 4. 
The primary ongoing working interaction was between 
myself, and Arthur Webb, who programmed the artworks. 
Arthur is my father. He spent 37 years in a software 
engineering environment, in the specialized field of industrial 
process control (rather than in commercial programming or 
website development). Reflecting on how his involvement 
came about, Arthur said: 
I think how the collaboration arose was that in 
conversation about your work you mentioned that you 
needed someone to do programming to achieve your 
objectives. I had free time due to being retired so given 
my background I offered to help out. I had some of the 
skills and knowledge necessary but not all of it so I 
learnt as necessary along the way (for example, I had 
not used JQuery or PhP before). (Webb, A., 2016 – 
email 1 January) 
This accurately describes how we started working together. 
As he suggests, Arthur’s technical input evolved as the 
research progressed. In Topic Generator, 
39,063,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Flies, After William 
Blake, 1000 Truly Original Ideas and Infinite Puffs, he used 
HTML, CSS and JavaScript, all in a single file. In Infinite Violets 
he used HTML, CSS, JavaScript and JQuery, in multiple files. In 
Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase and Selfie Portrait 
he used HTML, CSS, JavaScript, JQuery and PhP in multiple 
files, and made use of the Flickr and Instagram APIs. For Selfie 
Portrait, he also used a server side cron job to collect the data. 
Our work was mainly done online, with only intermittent face-
to-face meetings being practically possible. We used email, 
Skype, phone calls, and Trello, a shared task management 
system. Trello allowed us to organize our work, prioritize 
tasks, agree deadlines for completion, and easily see when 
tasks were completed. 
As the work moved towards a focus on the web, I undertook 
training to develop my knowledge of HTML and CSS so I could 
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better understand the coding process during the remaining 
research period.12 
However, what I wanted to achieve in the work required 
JavaScript and PhP, which I did not have the capacity to learn 
during the PhD. This raised some anxieties about my lack of 
programming expertise, and I questioned whether having 
only a very basic knowledge of HTML and CSS was a limitation 
for my art practice. However, committing time to learning 
new programming languages would have moved me away 
from my research focus, and thus it was important for me to 
work with someone who had the skills needed to make the 
work ‘work’. 
I found the concept of the ‘T-shaped Designer’, coined by Tim 
Brown, helpful for rationalizing this dynamic. The vertical 
stroke of the ‘T’ represents the designer’s depth of skill in one 
                                                
12	  The	  ability	  to	  program	  is	  frequently	  conflated	  with	  human	  agency	  and	  the	  
ability	  to	  ‘occupy	  the	  highest	  leverage	  point	  in	  a	  digital	  society’	  (Jennifer	  
Hansen	  et	  al.,	  2013:	  22).	  Douglas	  Rushkoff’s	  book	  Programme	  or	  Be	  
Programmed	  advocates	  programming	  as	  a	  mean	  of	  accessing	  the	  ‘control	  
panel	  of	  civilisation’	  (Rushkoff	  &	  Purvis,	  2010:	  7),	  and	  suggests	  that	  people	  
who	  cannot	  program	  are	  easily	  controlled	  by	  those	  who	  can.	  Although	  I	  agree	  
with	  Rushkoff	  that	  programming	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  empowerment,	  I	  favour	  
a	  less	  techno-­‐centric	  approach,	  in	  which	  critical	  thinking	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  
work	  across	  disciplines	  are	  as	  important	  as	  technical	  mastery.	  
area, which allows them to contribute to the creative process. 
The horizontal stroke represents their disposition for cross-
disciplinary collaboration through empathy and a basic 
knowledge of or enthusiasm for collaborators’ disciplines 
(Brown, paraphrased from Morten T. Hansen, 2010: n.p). 
Thus, having learned basic HTML and CSS, I was able to 
empathize with Arthur’s discipline sufficiently to make the 
working interaction successful. Rather than my agency being 
enacted through the mastery of a certain programmatic 
language, it was enacted through the ability to see how 
programming can be deployed for art. 
Arthur and I had distinct roles, with me providing initial ideas 
and impetus, and him providing technical solutions for these. 
However, there were moments when these roles relaxed, and 
Arthur’s thought process influenced the work. For example, 
during the development of Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a 
Staircase, it became clear that some of the imagery returned 
for ‘nude’ was explicit. Arthur was uncomfortable being 
confronted with explicit images whilst coding, and wary of 
making multiple calls to the Flickr API for the term ‘nude’, in 
case authorities looking for indications of criminal activity 
were watching out for heavy use of that term. To address this, 
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he suggested using ‘noodle’ instead during development. I 
was struck by his humorous play on words and wanted to 
keep it present in the work. This led to the original title of the 
work ‘Flickr Nude Descending a Staircase’ becoming ‘Flickr Nude 
or Noodle Descending a Staircase’. Thus, what was a technical 
solution for the programming environment became part of 
the work, and the way I narrated its development. During a 
conversation, which I audio recorded, Arthur noted that 
developing our working practice was 
a natural evolution of the way things go, you know, 
because I learn just through – beginning to do what 
you ask, I begin to learn and have ideas about – and 
through seeing what I do, you learn possibilities, and 
so that just becomes a natural cycle in which there’s a 
moving together, in a sense, of understanding, that 
brings about I suppose a more collaborative 
authorship. (Webb, C. and Webb, A., 2013, 8 July, audio 
recording, 17:54–18:48) 
Our intentional agreement to work towards a shared end 
could be seen as a collaborative form of working 
(‘collaboration’ is discussed more in Practice 3). However, I 
remained the person with the highest degree of authorial 
intentionality over the work, and was responsible for 
fundamental decisions about its key structural features. Thus, 
I remained the primary ‘author’ of the work.  
The fact that the works (particularly those described in 
Practice 3 and Practice 4) involved the contributions of a 
number of people with varying degrees of authorial 
intentionality raised the question of whether these people’s 
involvement could be considered a form of ‘labour’ that I 
exploited. This is discussed in Practice 4 and Chapter 4.13 In 
Arthur’s case, his contribution was entirely intentional and 
undertaken on the basis that the project was of personal 
interest to him. He was not coerced into taking part, and 
gained enjoyment and self-development through working on 
these projects. His voluntary contribution did not take place 
at the expense of someone else’s, nor was he offering work 
for free that he would otherwise have been paid for. 
As well as working with Arthur, I was involved in several 
collaborative, cross-disciplinary projects and events that 
                                                
13	  Debates	  about	  digital	  labour	  have	  become	  prominent	  in	  Critical	  Media	  and	  
Communications	  studies	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  social	  media	  (Fuchs,	  2014a:	  63).	  
Fuchs	  distinguishes	  between	  three	  ‘levels’	  of	  digital	  labour	  –	  agricultural,	  
industrial,	  and	  informational	  (Fuchs,	  2014b,	  05:48),	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  was	  
most	  relevant	  to	  this	  research.	  Informational	  labour	  includes	  the	  production	  
of	  information	  content	  by	  Internet	  users	  as	  well	  as	  software	  engineering,	  call	  
centre	  work	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  work	  relating	  to	  the	  ICT	  industries.	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helped me reflect on the production conditions of the 
broader field of digital creative practice, and to develop my 
position within it. For example, I took part in Hack the Space, 
during summer 2014 (The Space, 2016a).14 Here, artists, 
developers, hackers, researchers, and technology 
entrepreneurs worked together during a 24-hour ‘hackathon’ 
in response to a brief to ‘take any piece of data and turn it 
into a piece of digital art’. During this event, I co-founded 
‘Glasshouse’, a group comprised of an artist, developer, and a 
technology entrepreneur (Berman et al., 2015a). In 2014, 
Glasshouse was commissioned by The Space to produce The 
Work We Want, a project investigating how the web is 
transforming the world of work (The Space, 2016b). The 
project was exhibited at the Web We Want Festival at the 
Southbank Centre, London in May 2015 – see Southbank 
Centre (2015) and Webb (no date). Although my involvement 
in Glasshouse did not directly result in the artworks 
submitted for the PhD, taking part in Hack the Space and 
forming this group helped me to understand cross-
disciplinary working as a dominant condition of production in 
                                                
14	  At	  the	  time	  of	  submission,	  The	  Space	  are	  migrating	  their	  website	  content	  to	  
a	  new	  site,	  and	  as	  such	  this	  page	  and	  others	  hosted	  by	  The	  Space	  that	  are	  
cited	  in	  the	  thesis	  are	  no	  longer	  available.	  
the field of digital creative practice. I see my ‘own’ art practice 
as relatively conventional in relation to these forms of 
working, in that it positions my individual authorship as 
central, despite my attempts to defer or complicate my 
authorial agency. 
Summary 
The ‘outside or beyond’ connotation of ‘extra-’ was rejected in 
favour of the ‘surplus’ connotation, as my conception of extra-
subjective authorship came to place emphasis on the 
negotiated authorial relations between the artist and other 
people who are involved in the artworks’ production. This 
implied that ‘both’ or ‘and’ is a fundamental aspect of what 
extra-subjectivity might be. 
Digital methods encouraged me to attempt to make a 
‘natively digital’ artwork to understand the web as an artistic 
medium rather than just a device for dissemination. Technical 
and theoretical aspects of digital methods were adapted from 
their sociological context and re-purposed for my practice, 
creating a hybrid methodology. The research hovered 
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between the postdemographics approach of digital methods 
and more conventional sociological approaches to studying 
the web, since I treated online images and hashtags both as 
data and as representations of subjectivities. 
Using the Flickr and Instagram APIs in Flickr Nude or Noodle 
Descending a Staircase and Selfie Portrait enabled me to 
explore APIs as an artistic medium that involves a negotiation 
between the artist, social media platforms, and their users. It 
also allowed me to investigate a particular set of legal and 
ethical implications distinct from those applicable to the use 
of material taken from the web by other means.  
The ongoing working interaction with Arthur Webb provided a 
method of exploring my authorial agency in relation to 
another person with different disciplinary and technical 
expertise. My involvement in Hack the Space and Glasshouse 
Collective enabled reflection on cross-disciplinarity as a 
dominant production condition within digital creative 
practice. 
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Subjectivity
Tammy Clewell (2000: 381) notes that the term ‘subjectivity’ is 
used in various social science discourses to describe ‘a human 
being constituted and altered by historical, social and linguistic 
structures’. Rather than seeing the human subject as ‘the 
intending source of knowledge and meaning’, postmodernist 
and poststructuralist theorists redefined the human self as ‘an 
entity constructed by, and not simply reflected in a culture’s 
social discourses, linguistic structures, and signifying practices’ 
(Clewell, 2000: 382). Although there was consensus about 
subjectivity being constructed, the concept was expressed by 
postmodern theorists with high degrees of variation. 
As Goriunova notes, Foucauldian theory built a ‘general’ 
understanding of ‘institutions as modelling and controlling 
apparatuses that ensure the production and management of 
subjectivities necessary for the current mode of production, 
social order, and various other vectors of dominance’ 
(Goriunova, 2012: 13). Clewell notes that following Foucault’s 
conflation of subjectivity with political power, 
cultural critics have introduced issues of human agency 
and individual responsibility, and concepts of 
intersubjectivity and community into discussions of 
postmodern subjectivity. In many cultural arenas, the 
constitution of the subject is formulated as a complex 
interaction between linguistic determination and 
personal intervention. Social subjects situate 
themselves in a number of culturally-regulated 
communities, which contain both pre-established 
protocols for communication, and the potential for 
social transformation. (Clewell, 2000: 383)15 
Understanding myself as situated in contexts involving both 
pre-established social protocols and the potential for social 
transformation was useful for thinking about how I enacted my 
agency under constraints imposed by techno-social structures 
in relation to which the artworks were made. This is discussed 
further in the section on ‘agency’, below. The issue of individual 
                                                
15	  Other	  influential	  figures	  in	  the	  postmodern	  formulation	  of	  subjectivity	  have	  
been	  ‘Jacques	  Lacan	  in	  psychoanalysis,	  Jacques	  Derrida	  in	  deconstruction,	  
Roland	  Barthes	  in	  semiotics,	  Michel	  Foucault	  in	  the	  historical	  analysis	  of	  
discourse,	  and	  Luce	  Irigaray	  and	  Julia	  Kristeva	  in	  feminism’	  (Clewell,	  2000:	  382).	  
For	  these	  feminist	  critics,	  the	  cultural	  construction	  of	  the	  subject	  was	  sexed	  and	  
gendered,	  and	  ‘addressed	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  and	  personal	  change,	  
concerns	  some	  have	  argued	  are	  absent	  or	  problematically	  formulated	  in	  the	  
work	  of	  Barthes,	  Lacan,	  Derrida	  and	  Foucault’	  (Clewell,	  2000:	  382).	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responsibility as a key aspect of subjectivity was relevant to my 
attempt to invest a socially responsible ethic into my practice, 
as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Nick Mansfield (2000: 7) notes that during the 1980s and 1990s, 
the focus of the debate about subjectivity shifted from big-
name theorists towards ‘themes’ including technology, a 
category in which ‘the dimensions of human experience, and 
the identity of humanity in general’ are always at stake 
(Mansfield, 2000: 149). The key theorists Mansfield discusses in 
relation to technology are Martin Heidegger and Donna 
Haraway.16 Haraway’s 1985 Cyborg Manifesto was ‘an effort to 
contribute to socialist-feminist culture and theory in a 
postmodernist, non-naturalist mode’ (Haraway, 1991: 150). By 
developing the concept of the cyborg, and collapsing the 
distinction between machines and organisms, Haraway 
attempted to challenge essentialist models of humanity, and 
women in particular: 
With the hard-won recognition of their social and 
historical constitution, gender, race and class cannot 
                                                
16	  In	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  this	  project	  I	  read	  around	  Heidegger,	  but	  felt	  that	  his	  
metaphysics	  of	  technology	  would	  not	  practically	  help	  me	  address	  my	  research	  
questions,	  particularly	  as	  the	  project	  was	  not	  philosophically	  oriented.	  
provide the basis for belief in ‘essential unity’. There is 
nothing about being ‘female’ that naturally binds 
women.’ (Haraway, 1991: 155) 
I chose not to ground my exploration of extra-subjectivity in a 
socialist-feminist discourse, as my intention was not to 
articulate a new form of political subjectivity, or to focus on the 
production of female identity specifically. Instead I wanted to 
use extra-subjectivity as a methodological tool to come to 
terms with how my authorial agency was enacted under 
various conditions of production, firstly in relation to 
computational generative processes and later to the 
programmatic appropriation of other people’s online cultural 
productions. 
Mansfield states that there is an additional usage of the word 
‘subject’ beyond the linguistic, politico-legal and philosophical, 
which pertains to the subject as a human person who develops 
a sense of their self through lived experience (Mansfield, 2000: 
4). For him, seeing subjectivity as a bounded ‘thing’ is 
erroneous, because subjectivity is ‘primarily an experience, and 
remains permanently open to inconsistency, contradiction and 
unself-consciousness’ (Mansfield, 2000: 6). Marsha Bradfield 
notes that: ‘we can also understand subjectivity as a subject’s 
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experience of self. Subjectivity is not only constructed. It’s also 
experienced, with this experience feeding back into a subject’s—
a person’s—becoming, their self realisation’ (Bradfield, 2013: 
119, italics in original). According to Blackman et al., if 
experience is properly taken into account, subjectivity can be 
understood ‘as more than the sum total of combined discursive 
positions’ (Blackman et al., 2008: 7). They note that Foucault’s 
work marked a shift towards a distinction between 
subjects as produced in power/knowledge and 
subjectivity, which we could call the experience of being 
subjected. It is important to separate one from the 
other. Subjectivity, in this account, is the experience of 
the lived multiplicity of positionings. It is historically 
contingent and is produced through the plays of 
power/knowledge. (Blackman et al., 2008: 6, my italics) 
I found an emphasis on experience useful as it acknowledged 
that the research itself is more than the sum of its discursive 
parts, and involved the experience of being a subject 
recursively producing and produced by it. It also foregrounded 
my emphasis on the humanness of subjectivities ‘behind’ user-
generated content. 
As my work shifted towards being located on the web, I sought 
out literature that demonstrated how contemporary cultural 
theorists and media scholars have approached subjectivity in 
relation to the production conditions of the web. Several 
contemporary thinkers have used ecological metaphors to 
describe the relationship of the human subject to techno-social 
processes, such as Matthew Fuller (2005), Jussi Parikka (2007; 
2010) and Michael Goddard (2011). 
Scholars of Media Ecologies represent a break from older forms 
of Media Ecology that emerged from conversations between 
Marshall McLuhan, Eric Mcluhan and Neil Postman in the late 
1960s (Goddard, 2011: 7).17 For Goddard, ‘existing’ Media 
                                                
17	  Philosophers	  whose	  work	  on	  subjectivity	  and	  technology	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  
Media	  Ecologies	  include	  Gilbert	  Simondon	  (2007),	  Bernard	  Stiegler	  (1998)	  and	  
Felix	  Guattari	  (2000).	  Simondon	  insisted	  that	  ‘it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  human	  being	  but	  
the	  machine	  as	  well	  that	  carries	  within	  itself	  dynamics	  of	  thought’	  (Simondon,	  
paraphrased	  in	  Parikka,	  2011:	  36).	  His	  concept	  of	  individuation	  extended	  to	  
human	  and	  non-­‐human	  entities.	  Stiegler’s	  work	  addresses	  the	  relationship	  
between	  technology,	  subjectivity	  and	  time.	  Gary	  Hall	  notes:	  ‘Building	  on	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Stiegler	  argues	  that	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  human	  to	  
technology	  is	  one	  of	  originary	  technicity	  or	  prosetheticity.	  What	  this	  means	  is	  
that,	  contrary	  to	  the	  classical	  Aristotelian	  view,	  technology	  (i.e.	  that	  which	  is	  
organised	  but	  inorganic,	  manufactured,	  artificial)	  is	  not	  added	  to	  the	  human	  
from	  the	  outside	  and	  only	  after	  the	  latter’s	  birth,	  as	  an	  external	  prosthesis,	  tool	  
or	  instrument	  used	  to	  bring	  about	  certain	  ends.	  The	  human	  is	  rather	  born	  out	  
of	  its	  relation	  to	  technology’	  (Hall,	  2013:	  84).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  human	  and	  
the	  non-­‐human	  are	  essentially	  co-­‐dependent	  aspects	  of	  being.	  Guattari	  was	  
‘profoundly	  affected’	  by	  his	  encounter	  with	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  free	  radio	  
movement	  in	  France	  and	  Italy	  in	  the	  1970s.	  This	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  
conception	  of	  a	  ‘post-­‐media’	  era	  in	  which	  mass-­‐media	  could	  be	  appropriated	  by	  
various	  subject	  groups	  for	  non	  capitalist	  purposes	  (Goddard,	  2011:	  9).	  
Guattari’s	  conception	  of	  media	  ecology	  involves	  ‘the	  generation	  of	  a	  media	  or	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Ecology needed to be revisited, as ‘ecology should not be 
limited to the physical systems studied by environmental 
science but ought to include (at least) two other levels, namely 
a social ecology of social relations and a mental ecology of 
subjectivity or rather the production of subjectivity’ (Goddard, 
2011: 8). Fuller often focuses on artistic and activist practices, 
which ‘precisely work through the complex media layers in 
which on the one hand subjectivation and agency are 
articulated and, on the other hand, the materiality of 
informational objects gets distributed, dispersed and takes 
effect’ (Goddard and Parikka, 2011: 2). As Parikka notes: 
Media ecological methodologies and excavations are in 
a good position to map such subjectivities that do not 
follow the normal definitions of subjectivities based in 
consciousness, morals, or for example human sociality, 
but in a more radical material relationality and 
sociabiality [sic].’ (Parikka, 2011: 37) 
Media Ecologies’ emphasis on non-human agency, and the 
investment of non-human agents with properties of 
relationality and sociability, did not provide the right 
framework for my practice. As noted in the section on agency 
                                                
rather	  post-­‐media	  assemblage,	  that	  is	  a	  self-­‐referential	  network	  for	  an	  
unforeseen	  processual	  and	  political	  production	  of	  subjectivity	  amplifying	  itself	  
via	  technical	  means’	  (Goddard,	  2011:	  14–15).	  	  
below, shifting registers when talking about my own subjective 
capacity to produce, and the ‘productive capacities’ of digital 
objects such as selfies or hashtags was important.  
Other discussions such as those by Martyn Thayne (2012), 
Anne Helmond and Carolin Gerlitz (2013), Fuchs, (2014a) and 
Jaron Lanier (2014), address how capitalist society and 
corporate companies extract value from techno-social activities 
and interactions performed by people online,. In some cases 
these activities and interactions are, perhaps too reductively, 
conflated with subjectivity. For example, Thayne posits 
'socialised subjectivity’ as ‘a collective process of self-
expression which is both directly productive for capital and 
immanent to the production/consumption process’ (Thayne, 
2012: 7). He suggests that the creation of online images, videos, 
blogs and other online media, the production of public profiles, 
maintenance of social ties and public expression of affective 
relations are rendered economically valuable through online 
social networks (Thayne, 2012: 4). One limitation of this 
argument is that reflexively engaging in art practice is different 
to performing everyday online activities. As Tiziana Terranova 
puts it, ‘The Internet does not automatically turn every user 
into an active producer, and every worker into a creative 
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subject’ (Terranova, 2000: 35). For Jason Read (2010), ‘The 
conditions of our subjectivity, language, knowledge, and 
habits… have become increasingly important to the 
contemporary production process, becoming the source of 
new forms of wealth’ (Read, 2010: 113).18 Although I do not 
make any economic use of people’s images in my artworks, the 
framing of subjectivity as a commodity good forced me to think 
about what exactly I was appropriating when I used people’s 
images in my artworks. Was I complicit in capitalist processes 
of exploitation by using representations of subjectivities in the 
form of selfies or other user-generated images? This is 
discussed further in Practice 4. 
Read emphasizes two senses of the phrase ‘the production of 
subjectivity’, which can be understood as 
the simultaneous non-identity of the manner in which 
subjectivity is produced and the manner in which 
subjectivity is productive, not just in terms of value or 
wealth, but its general capacity to produce effects. 
(Read, 2010: 115, italics in original) 
                                                
18	  Read	  does	  not	  focus	  just	  on	  the	  production	  of	  subjectivity	  in	  relation	  to	  
technology,	  but	  touches	  on	  this,	  drawing	  on	  Bernard	  Stiegler	  to	  discuss	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  collective	  in	  an	  era	  when	  we	  have	  
become	  ‘simultaneously	  more	  connected	  and	  disconnected’	  (Read,	  2010:	  120–	  
121).	  
The subject is not only an effect of social structures, but is also 
capable of causing effects that transform them. The production 
of subjectivity 
demands that two facets of social reality, that of the 
constitution of ideas and desires and that of the 
production of things, must be thought of not as 
hierarchically structured with respect to each other, but 
fully immanent, taking place at the same time, and 
within the same sites. (Read, 2010: 114) 
This sense of subjectivity being both productive and produced 
informed the development of the conceptual tool that is extra-
subjectivity, which embodies a ‘both’ or ‘and’ logic, as discussed 
in the Methodology chapter.  
The production of subjectivity in the context of the web is also 
framed by discourses of immaterial labour, defined by Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri as 'labor that produces an immaterial 
good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or 
communication' (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 290). For Karl Marx, the 
basic orientation of subjectivity is labour, ‘understood 
specifically as the production of things through the work of the 
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body and hands’ (Read, 2010: 116).19 However, Adam Arvidsson 
notes that contemporary re-readings of Marx have developed 
as a response to the social transformations that have 
accompanied the movement from a Fordist, factory-
centred production process to the more diffuse and 
expanded systems of production that characterize post-
Fordism, where social interaction and communication 
enter as directly productive elements. (Arvidsson, 2005: 
237)20  
Goriunova notes that over the last decade, various currents of 
thought about freedom in digital culture, including the work of 
Maurizio Lazzarato, Terranova, Hardt and Negri, have 
contributed to a post-Marxian conceptual framework that sees 
the whole of society as ‘a site of production, with capital 
extracting value from the entirety of social relations’ 
(Goriunova, 2012: 27). Lazzarato’s concept of ‘immaterial 
                                                
19	  Post-­‐feminist,	  post-­‐colonial	  and	  post-­‐humanist	  critiques	  of	  labour,	  such	  as	  
those	  by	  Donna	  Haraway,	  and	  Paul	  Gilroy	  reject	  the	  Marxian	  view	  of	  labour	  as	  a	  
‘humanizing’	  activity	  that	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  subjectivity.	  In	  feminist	  political	  
economy,	  a	  key	  form	  of	  free	  labour	  beyond	  that	  performed	  on	  the	  Internet	  is	  
the	  unwaged	  reproductive	  and	  household	  labour	  primarily	  performed	  by	  
women.	  	  
20	  Hall	  states	  that	  a	  small	  number	  of	  powerful	  corporations,	  including	  Amazon,	  
Facebook	  and	  Google,	  are	  ‘exposing	  users	  to	  cultural	  and	  cognitive	  persuasion	  
and	  manipulation	  (often	  but	  not	  always	  in	  the	  form	  of	  advertising)	  based	  on	  the	  
tracking	  and	  aggregation	  of	  their	  freely	  provided	  labour,	  content	  and	  public	  and	  
personal	  data’	  (Hall,	  2013:	  86).	  
labour’ refers to the production of the ‘informational and 
cultural process of the commodity’, and involves 
a series of activities that are not normally recognized as 
‘work’ – in other words, the kinds of activities involved in 
defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, 
fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and, more 
strategically, public opinion. (Lazzarato, 1996: 133) 
Thayne notes: ‘As users persistently update and re-evaluate 
their profiles and social relations to reflect their evolving 
interests and tastes, they become affective labourers in the 
production of collective subjectivities’ (Thayne, 2012: 10). As 
Read puts it:  
At this point capital no longer simply exploits labour, 
extracting its surplus, but fundamentally alters its 
technical and social conditions, as it subsumes all of 
society. Subsumption in this case crosses both sides of 
market relations, encompassing labour, which comes to 
involve the work of language, the mind, and the affects, 
and the commodity form. (Read, 2010: 119) 
For Read, understanding how contemporary production 
processes capitalize on the production of subjectivity is crucial. 
He argues that it is essential to examine how subjectivity is 
produced in order to understand how it might be produced 
otherwise, ‘turning a passive condition into an active process’ 
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(Read, 2010: 114). Similarly, Geoff Cox and Joasia Krysa argue 
that ‘new forms of resistance’ are made possible by 
understanding the ‘increasingly immaterial form of social 
relations, communications networks and information systems 
[that have] also been extended to the new type of production 
of ‘immaterial goods’’ (Cox & Krysa, 2005: 10). 
For Goriunova, however, it is important to re-think freedom 
from outside the post-Marxian and liberal theoretical 
framework in order to see what is actually taking place in 
culture and art that can ‘extend and disrupt the dominant 
modes of operation’ (Goriunova, 2012: 29). She criticizes 
Terranova’s picture of capitalism as a ‘smooth, seamless, and 
monolithic process’, stating that framing all aspects of digital 
culture as experiments of late capitalism, eclipses the 
possibility for subversion and resistance (Goriunova, 2012: 29). 
In Terranova’s vision there are no breaks with capital that could 
offer an exit or outside except for an ‘annihilating catastrophe’ 
(Goriunova, 2012: 29). Because Marxist theory understands the 
social plane as a totality, it therefore understands participatory 
platforms and network cultures as ‘machines of exploitation 
and subsumption, involving the deformation of transcendental 
freedom’ (Goriunova, 2012: 29). 
Whilst I acknowledge the very deep purchase capitalism has 
over processes of cultural production, in line with Olga 
Goriunova, I see the post-Marxian theoretical framework as 
problematic in that it tends to designate all forms of cultural 
production as experiments of late capitalism. This eclipses the 
possibility of forms of agency outside dominant modes of 
operation, and does not allow enough distinction between 
different modes of cultural production. 
Agency 
The concept of agency, a key term in discussions of subjectivity, 
became increasingly important as the research progressed. As 
noted by Clewell, issues of human agency and individual 
responsibility are central to postmodern discussions of 
subjectivity (Clewell, 2000: 383), and agency is a ‘landmark’ 
term in debates about the human subject (Mansfield, 2000: 
149). In sociological theory, human agency, described by 
William. H Sewell, Jr. as the ‘efficacy of human action’ (Sewell, 
1992: 2), is inextricably linked to the concept of structure, ‘one 
of the most important and most elusive terms in the 
vocabulary of current social science’ (Sewell, 1992: 1). Margaret 
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Archer states that the problem of the relationship between 
agency and structure points to the ‘central dilemmas in social 
theory’ (Archer, 1996: xi). 
Ian Craib notes that for Anthony Giddens, social structures 
must be understood as ‘dualities’ rather than ‘dualisms’ Craib, 
2011: 3). Structure and agency are not conceptualized as 
separate entities, but as part of a twofold condition of social 
life. In Giddens’ structuration theory, the ‘duality of structure’ 
denotes ‘the essential recursiveness of social life, as 
constituted in social practices: structure is both the medium 
and outcome of the reproduction of practices’ (Giddens, 1979: 
5). According to this view, ‘Structures shape people's practices, 
but it is also people’s practices that constitute (and reproduce) 
structures. In this view of things, human agency and structure, 
far from being opposed, in fact presuppose each other’ (Sewell, 
1992: 4, italics in original). Read similarly argues that the 
individual cannot be seen as a given if it is seen as ‘produced’. 
For him, the idea that individuals are nothing more than an 
effect of a larger structure is an insufficient basis for thinking 
about social relations. However, philosophical concepts of 
social relations that start with irreducible individuals, the total 
of whose actions constitutes society, are also inadequate. 
It is therefore necessary to think beyond an opposition 
between the individual and society in order to ‘grasp the 
productive nexus from which both individualities and 
collectivities emerge’ (Read, 2010: 116). 
Importantly for Giddens, structures enable as well as constrain 
people: ‘Structure must not be conceptualized as simply placing 
constraints upon human agency, but as enabling. This is what I call 
the duality of structure’ (Giddens, 1993: 169, italics in original). 
This, as Sewell makes clear, implies that human agents are 
capable of putting their structurally formed capacities to 
work in creative or innovative ways. If enough people or 
even a few people who are powerful enough act in 
innovative ways, their action may have the consequence 
of transforming the very structures that gave them the 
capacity to act. (Sewell, 1992: 4)  
This sense of being able to transform the structures in relation 
to which I operate is important in my practice. The web is a 
techno-social structure that both enables and constrains my 
capacity to make artworks, and is something I can transform 
through my practice. 
Fuchs draws on Giddens to describe the techno-social nature 
of the Internet and the web. 
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He states that media (which are ‘techno-social systems’, not 
‘technologies’), are based on the duality of structure and 
agency.21 They have 
a technological level of artefacts that enable and 
constrain a social level of human activities that create 
knowledge that is produced, diffused and consumed 
with the help of the artefacts at the technological level. 
(Fuchs, 2014a: 37)  
Techno-social systems create knowledge that is ‘produced, 
distributed, and consumed with the help of technologies in a 
dynamic and reflexive process that connects technological 
structures and human agency’ (Fuchs, 2014a: 37). Fuchs states: 
The Internet consists of both a technological 
infrastructure and (inter)acting humans. It is not a 
network of computer networks, but a network that 
interconnects social networks and technological 
networks of computer networks… The technical network 
structure (a global computer network of computer 
                                                
21	  Cynthia	  Chris	  and	  David	  A.	  Gerstner	  provide	  a	  useful	  overview	  of	  the	  term	  
‘media’	  in	  their	  introduction	  to	  Media	  Authorship	  (Chris	  &	  Gerstner,	  2013:	  4–6).	  
Drawing	  on	  the	  ideas	  of	  Raymond	  Williams,	  Marshall	  McLuhan,	  Friedrich	  Kittler	  
and	  Lisa	  Gitelman,	  they	  acknowledge	  the	  social	  as	  well	  as	  technical	  meaning	  of	  
the	  term,	  stating:	  ‘even	  within	  dissipated	  agency	  and	  corporatized	  identity	  
formation,	  social	  and	  creative	  determination	  remains	  relevant and possible	  
through	  the	  use	  of	  media	  technology…	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  term	  “media”	  
occupies	  not	  only	  mediating	  technologies	  but,	  more	  significantly,	  technologies	  
for	  social	  intervention’	  (Chris	  &	  Gerstner,	  2013:	  5–6,	  italics	  in	  original).	  
networks based on the TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol) protocol, a model that is 
used for defining how data is formatted, transmitted 
and received on the Internet) is the medium for and 
outcome of human agency. It enables and constrains 
human activity and thinking and is the result of 
productive social communication and co-operation 
processes. The technological structure/part of the 
Internet enables and constrains human behaviour and 
is itself produced and permanently reproduced by the 
human communicative part of the Internet. (Fuchs, 
2014a: 37) 
Despite encountering a number of critiques of Giddens’ 
approach such as Archer (1995) and Francisco Perales Pérez 
(2008),22 his emphasis on the agent’s perspective rather than 
the constraints of social structures, resonates with my belief 
that although my practice is constrained by the structural 
elements of the web to a degree, I also have a high degree of 
agency in relation to these constraints. My agency as an artist is 
enacted when I make something that modifies, re-presents, 
                                                
22	  Archer	  states	  that	  endorsing	  the	  mutual	  constitution	  of	  structure	  and	  agency	  
‘precludes	  examination	  of	  their	  interplay,	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  one	  upon	  the	  other’	  
(Archer,	  1995:	  14).	  Perez	  notes	  that	  Giddens	  is	  criticized	  for	  ‘overemphasising	  
the	  role	  and	  freedom	  of	  the	  agent	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  constraining	  
pressures	  of	  social	  structures’	  (Pérez,	  2008:	  55).	  As	  a	  result,	  his	  theory	  lacks	  ‘a	  
notion	  of	  why	  agents	  cannot	  quite	  often	  avoid	  social	  failure	  (i.e.	  
unemployment,	  divorce	  or	  poverty)’	  (Pérez,	  2008:	  57).	  For	  Pérez,	  Giddens	  fails	  
to	  acknowledge	  the	  specificities	  of	  social	  structures	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  different	  
people	  are	  subject	  to	  different	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  and	  constraint	  in	  relation	  to	  
them.	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reflects on or subverts the constraints imposed on me in 
certain contexts, for example by corporate social media sites, 
or API terms of use. 
Actor Network Theory (ANT), which has widely influenced 
media scholarship, collapses the duality between structure and 
agency. As noted by Cassandra S. Crawford, ANT is an anti-
essentialist approach, which 
does not differentiate between science (knowledge) and 
technology (artifact). Similarly, proponents do not 
subscribe to the division between society and nature, 
truth and falsehood, agency and structure, context and 
content, human and non-human, microlevel 
phenomenon and macrolevel phenomenon, or 
knowledge and power. Nature and society, subjectivity 
and structure, and fact and fiction are all effects of 
collective activity. (Crawford, 2005: 1) 
ANT initially appeared to offer a way to think about the 
productive capacities of both human and non-human agents in 
my work. It enabled me to acknowledge that there is a network 
of agents that contribute to the works’ production with varying 
degrees of authorial intentionality. For example, in Flickr Nude 
or Noodle Descending a Staircase (see Practice 3), Arthur Webb, 
who programmed the work, the viewers who interact with the 
work, Flickr users, and a number of non-human entities such as 
images, hashtags and the Flickr API can all be understood as 
agents in the aesthetic production of the work.23 However, 
some ANT tenets did not align well with the orientation of my 
research. For example, the principle of ‘generalized symmetry’ 
involves 
employing a single explanatory frame when interpreting 
actants, human and nonhuman. Investigators should 
never shift registers to examine individuals and 
organizations, bugs and collectors, or computers and 
their programmers. (Crawford, 2005: 2)  
Whilst I accept that non-human agents can have productive 
capacities, they do not have subjective capacities, and do not 
need to have their ‘rights’ protected in the same way as 
humans. As this research focuses on agency as a form of 
effective, human intentionality, it was inappropriate not to ‘shift 
register’ when examining my own subjective intentionality in 
comparison to the ‘agency’ of, for example, an image that was 
appropriated and included in an artwork. As Fuchs notes, 
                                                
23	  The	  Digital	  Methods	  Initiative	  reader	  compiled	  by	  Marc	  Tuters	  and	  Lonneke	  
van	  der	  Velden,	  which	  accompanied	  the	  2012	  summer	  school	  that	  I	  attended,	  
includes	  seven	  texts	  authored	  or	  co-­‐authored	  by	  Latour	  (Tuters	  &	  van	  der	  
Velden,	  2012),	  which	  demonstrates	  his	  theoretical	  influence	  on	  digital	  methods	  
research.	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‘society is based on humans, reflexive and self-conscious 
beings that have cultural norms, anticipative thinking, and a 
certain freedom of action that computers do not have’ (Fuchs, 
2014a: 74). The production of a series of computer-generated 
works (see Practice 1) demonstrated that there was a 
distinction between the productive capacities of the systems I 
inaugurated and my authorial intentionality. 
Authorship and authorial agency 
As with ‘agency’ and ‘subjectivity’, the terms ‘agency’ and 
‘authorship’ are highly entangled in this research. Although I 
acknowledge claims that non-human entities such as software 
can ‘author’, in this research authorship is located in the artist’s 
subjective experience of being a cultural producer who is 
intentionally accountable and responsible for what they 
produce.24 I use the phrase ‘authorial agency’ to identify what is 
                                                
24	  For	  example,	  Ruggill	  and	  McAllister	  list	  computer	  operating	  systems,	  game	  
hardware,	  programming	  languages,	  central	  and	  graphical	  processing	  units,	  
network	  interface	  cards,	  and	  software	  ratings	  groups	  as	  entities	  that	  ‘make	  
authorial	  (and	  certainly	  authoritative)	  contributions	  to	  the	  computer	  games	  
people	  play’	  (Ruggill	  &	  McAllister,	  2013:	  138).	  Although	  these	  entities	  are	  
fundamental	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  production	  of	  computer	  games,	  I	  take	  the	  
claim	  that	  they	  ‘author’	  the	  games	  to	  be	  metaphorical.	  	  
unique about my agency as an artist. To put it another way, 
negotiating the claim of authorship over my artworks is an 
enactment of my artistic agency. 
In Media Authorship, Chris and Gerstner present authorship as 
contested terrain rather than a stable designation; it is 
an identity that is produced by media industries and 
creative imagination as much as it is contained by the 
legal discourses that regulate authorship. (Chris & 
Gerstner, 2013: 11) 
In this research, authorship is also presented as contested 
terrain, or rather contested practice, which shifts in relation to 
the conditions and subjectivities with which the artworks are 
produced. 
Chris Barker notes that Post-structuralist theories of 
authorship, particularly those by Roland Barthes and Foucault, 
challenged the essentialist notion of the author as ‘the creative 
originator of a text whose intentions constitute a work’s 
authentic meanings and significance’ (Barker, 2004). Despite 
Barthes’ famous declaration of the ‘death of the author’, 
neither he nor Foucault ‘kill off the author as much as they re-
evaluate the author’s hegemonic status by foregrounding the 
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reader’s involvement or interaction with an “authored” text’ (Chris 
& Gerstner, 2013: 7, italics in original).25 The author’s ‘death’ is 
thus not total, but rather ‘provides an opening for multiple 
interpretations and possibilities’ (Chris & Gerstner, 2013: 8).26  
According to Kirby, however, networked technologies make the 
reader’s metaphorical, interpretive role literal. In 
Digimodernism, he posits a new cultural paradigm that has 
superseded Postmodernism (Kirby, 2009: 1). He proposes that 
‘digimodernist’ texts, including ‘Wikipedia, blogs, chat rooms, 
and social networking sites’ (Kirby 2009: 51),27 undermine 
postmodernist conceptions of the reader as ‘producer’. He 
states: ‘In its pure form the digimodernist text permits the 
reader or viewer to intervene textually, physically to make text, 
to add visible content or tangibly shape narrative development’ 
(Kirby, 2009: 1). 
                                                
25	  For	  an	  incisive	  discussion	  of	  Barthes’	  and	  Foucault’s	  theories	  of	  authorship	  in	  
relation	  to	  dialogic	  art,	  see	  Bradfield,	  2013:	  353–373.	  
26	  Walter	  Benjamin	  set	  a	  precedent	  for	  this	  in	  1934,	  when	  he	  suggested	  that	  
‘the	  reader	  is	  always	  ready	  to	  become	  a	  writer’,	  who	  ‘gains	  entrance	  to	  
authorship’	  by	  the	  act	  of	  interpretation	  (Benjamin,	  1934	  in	  Jennings	  et al.,	  2005:	  
741).	  
27	  Digimodernist	  texts	  also	  can	  be	  found	  ‘across	  contemporary	  culture,	  ranging	  
from	  “reality	  TV”	  to	  Hollywood	  fantasy	  Blockbusters…	  to	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  
video	  games,	  and	  from	  certain	  kinds	  of	  radio	  show	  to	  crossover	  fiction’	  (Kirby,	  
2009:	  1).	  
This, he argues, is not a metaphorical form of production but a 
literal one, which renders postmodernist theories redundant: 
In truth, theory can only conceptualize the 
reader/viewer as the producer of a text by transforming 
its sense of a text into a system of meanings. This 
enables it to construct the reader/viewer as the 
producer of textual meanings and hence, to all apparent 
intents and purposes, as the producer of text. But, as 
any filmmaker or novelist knows, a text is primarily a 
selected quantity and sequence of visual or linguistic 
materials, and to make text is to create those materials. 
(Kirby, 2009: 56) 
The reader’s interpretive role is secondary to this primary form 
of production. Furthermore, Kirby suggests, existing theories of 
reading as authoring imply an already created text, since they 
‘cannot conceive of a meaningful form of the text which is not 
already materially constituted’ (Kirby, 2009: 56). Although 
Kirby’s focus is on the written text, his assertion about the 
literal involvement of the reader was useful for thinking about 
the role of other entities and people involved in the production 
of my works, particularly Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a 
Staircase, whose development ‘viewers’ can play a visible role in 
shaping. 
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The changing dynamic between the reader and writer in digital 
culture is also reflected in discussions of the collapsing 
dichotomies of production and consumption.28 Jose Van Dijck 
states: 
Since the 1980s, the term ‘prosumer’ has been deployed 
by various academics to denote how users’ agency 
hovers between the bipolar categories of producer 
versus consumer, and of professional versus consumer. 
(Van Dijck, 2009: 41–42)29  
She continues: ‘New hybrid terms such as ‘produser’ and ‘co-
creator’ have meanwhile entered academic parlance to 
accentuate users’ increased production prowess’. Van Dijck 
notes that placing terms such as producer and consumer 
dichotomously is not helpful, as the relations between 
commerce, content and information have been redrawn under 
the production conditions of the web (Van Dijck, 2009: 42). She 
suggests that the question of what forms of agency can be 
ascribed to contributors to user-generated content platforms 
requires a more nuanced analysis. 
                                                
28	  Other	  dichotomies	  said	  to	  have	  been	  collapsed	  by	  the	  web	  are	  
‘commercial/political,	  private/public,	  users/producers,	  artistic/standardised,	  
original/copy,	  democratising/	  disempowering’	  (Institute	  of	  Network	  Cultures,	  
2013b:	  n.p).	  
29	  Curt	  Cloninger	  draws	  on	  Michel	  de	  Certeau	  to	  propose	  a	  continuum	  between	  
‘strategic	  production’	  and	  ‘tactical	  consumption’	  (Cloninger,	  2009:	  2).	  
For Mark Andrejevic, the purported collapse of distinctions 
between producer and consumer, creator and audience, writer 
and reader, 
licenses the claim to authorship of activities hitherto 
excluded from the realm of production or creation. If 
consumption is a form of production precisely because 
it is participatory – in the sense that it requires some 
inputs generated by the consumer – then it can lay 
claim to aspects of authorship. (Andrejevic, 2013: 125)  
This is discussed further in Chapter 4. My focus was on 
production rather than reception, but the porous line between 
these categories provided a context for considering my 
questions of authorship. 
Foucault’s concept of the author function was a recurring touch 
point, as part of my research involved defining and negotiating 
the social, signifying function of my authorship. This is 
discussed in the Practice Review in relation to 1000 Truly 
Original Ideas (also see Practice 2). Foucault states:  
The author’s name serves to characterize a certain 
mode of being of discourse: the fact that the discourse 
has an author’s name, that one can say “this was written 
by so-and-so” or “so-and-so is its author,” shows that 
this discourse is not ordinary speech that merely comes 
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and goes, not something that is immediately 
consumable. On the contrary, it is a speech that must be 
received in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, 
must receive a certain status. (Foucault, 1969: 107) 
He continues: 
The author’s name manifests the appearance of a 
certain discursive set and indicates the status of this 
discourse within a society and culture. It has no legal 
status, nor is it located in the fiction of the work; rather, 
it is located in the break that founds a certain discursive 
construct and its very particular mode of being. As a 
result, we could say that in a civilization like our own 
there are a certain number of discourses endowed with 
the “author function” while others are deprived of it. 
(Foucault, 1969: 107) 
By highlighting the author function, Foucault suggested that 
the author (rather than being ‘dead’ as Barthes claimed) 
remained a signifier that the reader takes note of when reading 
a text. Chris and Gerster note that in the ‘muddled and 
monolithic’ environment of ‘the media’, 
authorship invariably looks more and more like a 
branding strategy. (For example, Steve Jobs was not the 
sole inventor of the iPad and iPhone but, for many, 
Steve Jobs was the author of all Apple products.) Michel 
Foucault, in so many words, identified this authorship 
strategy in Western commodity culture as the ‘author-
function’. (Chris & Gerstner, 2013: 5)  
The author function thus ‘serves an ideological function for 
Western society’s commodity-driven culture’ (Chris & Gerstner, 
2013: 7). As I note in the introduction to the thesis, the 
development of the research involved a shift from wanting to 
resist the author function, to coming to terms with it as part of 
my artistic agency. 
As Boatema Boateng observes, the author function also serves 
to ‘authorize’ the legitimacy of texts in the author’s body of 
works: 
This process of authorization has its legal equivalent in 
intellectual property law, which links creative work with 
clearly specified authors in order to regulate the 
commodification and circulation of that work. The law 
protects the creations of those authors, and criminalizes 
the production of any copies made without their 
permission. In effect, the separation of the work from 
the author’s name renders it illegitimate. (Boateng, 
2013: 87-88) 
Authorship as a phenomenon regulated by legal discourse is 
discussed in Practice 4, where asserting my authorship is part 
of developing an ethical ‘calculus’ in relation to issues of 
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copyright and ownership raised by Selfie Portrait. The 
significance of my authorial agency there lies not only in my 
capacity to claim the work as my own, but also in how that 
claim of ownership makes me responsible for the 
consequences of its production. 
Summary 
Engaging with how ‘subjectivity’ has been theorized helped me 
construct the conceptual tool that is ‘extra-subjectivity’. By 
emphasizing experience as a fundamental aspect of 
subjectivity, I align myself with the notion that subjectivity and 
research are both more than the sum of their discursive 
positions. This emphasis acknowledges the humanness of 
subjectivities ‘behind’ user-generated content, allowing me to 
consider their authorial rights. I embraced Read’s conception of 
subjectivity as simultaneously ‘productive’ and ‘produced’ when 
developing the concept of extra-subjectivity, but rejected post-
Marxian discussions that designate all forms of cultural 
production as experiments of late capitalism. 
My understanding of ‘agency’ draws on Giddens, Fuchs and 
Read, who emphasize a recursive relationship with social 
structures that both enable and constrain social subjects. I 
reject ANT, as my focus is on human agency, understood as a 
form of effective intentionality. The ability to shift registers 
when talking about human and non-human entities was 
important, since the former have different ‘rights’ that needed 
to be considered when investing a socially responsible ethic 
into my practice. 
Authorship is seen as a human practice that shifts in relation to 
the conditions and subjectivities with which the artworks are 
produced. Negotiating the claim of authorship around my 
artworks is an enactment of my agency. Collapsing distinctions 
between production and consumption and Alan Kirby’s concept 
of Digimodernist authorship informed my investigation into the 
role of the ‘viewer’ in Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a 
Staircase. Foucault’s concept of the author function was a 
recurring touch point both in coming to terms with the 
signifying function of my own proper name, and in taking 
responsibility for the consequences of producing my artworks.  
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Cybernetics and generative art
In the early stages of the research, I used the term 
‘cybernetics’ to explore the extent to which a computer 
program could be understood to produce an artwork outside 
or beyond the artist’s authorial agency. As the computer art 
produced during the art and technology movement of the 
1960s adopted the language of cybernetics, it provided an 
initial context for my explorations.30 Catherine Mason (2004: 
2) defines cybernetics as ‘the study of how machine, social 
and biological systems behave’. Maria Fernandez (2008: 7) 
states that cybernetics provided the ‘theoretical backbone of 
the art-and-technology movement of the 1960s’, and created 
a framework for thinking about the interactions of agents in 
human and artificial systems. In the UK, artistic interest in 
cybernetics culminated in the seminal 1968 exhibition 
Cybernetic Serendipity, curated by Jasia Reichardt for the 
Institute of Contemporary Art in London. This was a key 
exhibition of computer art, which ‘unsettled neat notions of 
                                                
30	  Charlie	  Gere	  notes	  that	  developments	  in	  computer	  technology	  have	  heavily	  
influenced	  artistic	  practices	  since	  the	  1960s	  (Gere,	  2008:	  80).	  Historical	  
accounts	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Mason	  (2004,	  2008),	  Gere,	  (2008),	  and	  
Andrew	  Feenberg	  (2005).	  
human uniqueness by allowing machines to invade 
purportedly exclusive human domains’ (Fernandez, 2008: 7). 
Many of the works used computers to generate artworks, 
introducing a non-human element to their production, and 
complicating the notion of human authorship. Considering 
these early computer artworks provided an historical context 
for the generative text works made in the early stages of my 
research (see Practice 1), and offered a way into thinking 
about generative art as a broader field of practice. 
Although the field of cybernetics has radically evolved with 
the development and expansion of digital technologies, it did 
not provide the right conceptual framework for this research, 
as it is concerned with issues of artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, self-organization and emergence, collective 
intelligence and robotics, which model the mind according to 
an information-processing paradigm. For a detailed list of 
topics of interest to current cybernetics researchers, see the 
call for papers for SMC 2016, an international conference on 
‘systems, man and cybernetics’ (SMC 2016: n.p). 
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By making and reflecting on the computer-generated 
artworks discussed in Practice 1, it became clear that my 
questions about authorship and agency were not best 
addressed in relation to cybernetics or artificial intelligence, 
as I had no intention to make claims about a computer’s 
capacity to subjectively author an artwork independent of 
human input. 
I initially situated my computer-generated artworks in relation 
to generative art, a field of production described by Philip 
Galanter as ‘any art practice where the artist uses a system 
that operates with some degree of autonomy, and 
contributes to or results in a completed work of art’ (Galanter, 
no date: n.p). I focused my review of generative art practices 
on those that have a textual emphasis, as the works I was 
making predominantly generated text. 
Florian Cramer refers to the creation of systems designed to 
generate artworks as ‘meta-making’, or ‘making something 
that makes’: 
Poiesis, making, becomes a second-order poiesis of 
making something that makes something else. So 
poetry, making, turns to poetics, the making of making. 
When making turns into meta-making, subjectivity 
simply shifts to a second order position, residing in the 
formula instead of the product. This fact is being 
repeatedly ignored by critical observers whose 
perspective remains fixated on the product and who 
wrongly conclude, in a fallacy reminiscent of Plato’s 
cave, that technology has done away with the subject 
behind the work. (Cramer, 2005: 87) 
Cramer suggests that rather than eclipsing the subject, 
computational systems, which are always designed by 
humans, have subjectivity embedded into their ‘formulas, 
processes and hardware’ (Cramer, 2005: 87). Rather than 
denying the human origins of computational systems, it is 
important to acknowledge and investigate the ‘aesthetics, 
subjectivity and politics’ that they entail (Cramer, 2005: 88). 
Cramer’s view helped me understand the computational 
systems that generated my artworks as being inscribed with 
my subjectivity. This contributed to my rejection of the notion 
that deploying such a system would eclipse my subjective, 
authorial agency from the production of an artwork. 
Historically, the algorithmic production of text has presented 
challenges to the conventions of authorship and critiqued the 
construction of socio-linguistic systems. Challenges to the 
concept of authorship have been discussed further in the 
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Literature Review above. Tristan Tzara’s 1923 work To Make a 
Dadaist Poem stated that cutting up newspaper articles, 
putting the fragments of text into a hat, and pulling them out 
at random, could create a Dadaist poem. Cramer suggests 
that To Make a Dadaist Poem describes an algorithmic process, 
and is ‘the first modern art work based on a computational 
process and arbitrary input data’ (Cramer, 2005: 76). By 
configuring poetics as mechanized formal instruction, Tzara 
defied the concept of the ‘genius’ that had been predominant 
in the Romantic era (Cramer, 2005: 76). Tzara’s work 
contested the idea that only the elite could be poets or artists, 
and challenged the formal conventions of writing and art 
imposed by the Academy and sold to the bourgeoisie (Art 
History Archive, no date: n.p).  
In 1959, William Burroughs and Brion Gysin developed the 
‘cut-up’ method, which instructed people to take a pair of 
scissors to any text, cut it up and rearrange it in order to 
create something new. Like Tzara, Burroughs placed 
emphasis on the egalitarian quality of the cut-up technique, 
stating: ‘Cut-ups are for everyone. Anybody can make cut-ups. 
It is experimental in the sense of being something to do’ 
(Burroughs & Gysin, 1978: 31, italics in original). Burroughs 
also wanted to contest the value assigned to poetry because 
of the cultural capital commanded by famous authors: 
‘Rimbaud announces himself, to be followed by some 
excruciatingly bad poetry. Cut Rimbaud’s words and you are 
assured of good poetry at least if not personal appearance’ 
(Burroughs & Gysin, 1978: 32). For both Tzara and Burroughs, 
there was an emphasis on how using generative methods 
could reconfigure socio-linguistic relations, and they 
successfully championed alternatives to prevailing formal 
artistic and literary conventions. However, as significant 
figures in literary and art history, it is clear that their author 
status remained stable. Dadaist strategies and the cut-up 
technique can therefore be understood as tools for loosening 
the author’s grip on the origination of aesthetic or formal 
properties and meaning within their works, but not as 
something that eclipses their overall authorial status ‘as’ the 
artist. Tzara and Burroughs’ practices helped me think about 
the extent to which my computer-generated artworks 
challenged conventional notions of authorship. 
Nick Montfort notes that cut-up techniques have been 
employed in ‘many aspects of new media, in computer literary 
practice as well as game theory’ (Montfort, 2003: 89). Many 
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web–based text generators can now be found online. Some of 
these, such as Raven Black’s Random Surrealism Generator 
(Black, no date) generate poetry, whilst others generate 
apparently coherent (though parodic) academic texts, such as 
Andrew Bulhak’s Postmodern Essay Generator, modified by 
Josh Larios (Larios, no date: n.p). As Elizabeth Losh notes, 
online generated texts are  
capable of particular rhetorical effects, particularly 
when they satirize individual agency in discourse... 
such generators offer a way to criticize how language 
itself is used and the rules by which utterances are 
assembled.’ (Losh, 2011: n.p) 
 In my own generated text works, however, the focus was not 
on critiquing the social construction of language, but on 
loosening the grip of authorial control as a way to explore my 
artistic agency. I was also drawn to the aesthetic effects I 
could achieve by using a range of different source texts. In 
39,063,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Flies, after William 
Blake, for example, Blake’s poem The Fly, provided a medium 
for disrupting fixed meanings that wasn’t ironic or parodic. It 
allowed me to generate new forms that retained the poetic 
qualities of the original text. 
net.art generator – Cornelia Sollfrank 
As I moved towards the web as a medium and location for my 
practice (see Practice 2), Cornelia Sollfrank’s net.art generator 
(see Fig. 1.6) provided a salient reference work, as it situates 
computer generated processes online, provoking questions of 
authorship, originality and copyright that are specific to the 
web. The net.art generator is a web–based computer program 
that can be accessed through any web browser. Sollfrank 
states: ‘The basic concept of the programme is to interactively 
collect and recombine material from the Internet to create 
new text, a new website or a new image’ (Sollfrank, 2011: 31). 
Since 1998, five different versions of the net.art generator have 
been created with six programmers.31 I focused on nag_05, a 
version of the program that uses ImageMagick software to 
programmatically manipulate images retrieved from Google 
Images (Sollfrank, 2011: 34–35). This was of particular interest 
when making Infinite Violets and considering whether and how 
to apply a generative process to images as opposed to text 
(see Practice 2). 
                                                
31	  The	  work	  was	  made	  in	  collaboration	  with	  programmers	  Ryan	  Johnston,	  
Luka	  Frelih,	  Barbara	  Thoens,	  Ralf	  Prehn,	  Richard	  Leopold	  and	  Panos	  Galanis	  
(Sollfrank,	  2011:	  32–34).	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As Sollfrank’s work is located on the web, it allows a 
‘continuous user interaction…involving thousands of users 
and producing endless numbers of artworks’ (Sollfrank, 2011: 
50). Sollfrank thus not only opens her production process to a 
computer program, but also to a potentially endless number 
of other humans. This is an example of Kirby’s conception of 
Digimodernist authorship, in which the reader literally as 
opposed to metaphorically produces the work.  
For Sollfrank, there is a ‘permanent confusion’ over whether 
the actual artwork is ‘the process/set of instructions/ 
programme for creating, or the results created by this 
process’ (Sollfrank, 2011: 44). The instantiation of the process 
can be unambiguously attributed to Sollfrank, who notes that 
‘the concept for the project can be attributed to my name’ 
(Sollfrank, 2011: 67). However, since the ‘results’ of the 
process (the images) combine already existing materials, it is 
‘no longer possible to attribute unambiguous authorship’ to 
these (Sollfrank, 2011: 68). The images are thus a ‘point of 
access’ to specific questions of copyright (Sollfrank, 2011: 
284). These questions are complicated further by the fact that 
Sollfrank prints, exhibits and sells physical versions of images 
generated by nag_05, including a number based on Andy 
Warhol’s Flowers pictures (see Fig. 1.7).32 Florian Cramer asks: 
Who exactly is the creator of a Warhol flower variation 
computed by the net.art generators? Caulfield as their 
original photographer, Warhol as their first artistic 
adopter, Solfrank as the artist who created the concept 
of the net.art generators, the programmers who 
technically designed and implemented them, the users 
of the net.art generator, or the running program itself? 
(Cramer, 2005: 83–84) 
                                                
32	  She	  proposed	  to	  show	  a	  series	  of	  these	  in	  a	  2004	  exhibition	  at	  the	  Forum	  
for	  New	  Media	  [plug.in],	  in	  Basel,	  Switzerland,	  under	  the	  title	  anonymous-­‐
warhol_flowers	  (Sollfrank,	  2011:	  255).	  However,	  the	  exhibition	  was	  cancelled	  
due	  to	  the	  organizers’	  fear	  of	  copyright	  infringement	  (Sollfrank,	  2011:	  258).	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Fig. 1.6 Cornelia Sollfrank, net.art generator, 1999 onwards, screenshot (homepage). Image permission granted by Cornelia Sollfrank. 
 
 
Fig. 1.7 Cornelia Sollfrank, Warhol Flowers, 2004 onwards, screenshot. Image permission granted by Cornelia Sollfrank.
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Cramer signals here to the art-historically complex 
provenance of Warhol’s flowers, which he appropriated from 
photographer Patricia Caulfield, and Elaine Sturtevant 
appropriated from Warhol.33 He also posits various human 
and non-human agents as potential ‘creators’ of the Warhol 
flower variations. I would argue that although Sollfrank is not 
the only agent that ‘creates’ the Warhol flower variations, she 
is ultimately their meta-creator. Of course they appropriate 
prior versions of the images, but Sollfrank is the artist who 
instantiates the system that enables other human and non-
human agents to contribute to the production of the work. 
Ultimately she is accountable for its production. This 
demonstrates that although Sollfrank relinquished a degree 
of control over the results of her system, her overall 
authorship remains intact. On one hand this appears to 
engender a paradox, whereby the artist both challenges and 
recuperates a conventional notion of authorship. On the 
other, it demonstrates that the work raises different 
questions of authorship in relation to its different ‘levels’ – the 
system, the images it produces, and the material and 
discursive contexts in which they are shown. The questions of 
                                                
33	  Sollfrank	  (2011:	  264-­‐273)	  gives	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  various	  layers	  of	  
appropriation	  taking	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  Warhol’s	  flowers.	  
copyright and authorship raised in this work became relevant 
in relation to the production of Selfie Portrait (see Practice 4 
and Chapter 4). 
In a gallery context, the work is ‘distinctly marked as an art 
project’ explicitly ascribed to Sollfrank’s name (Sollfrank, 2011: 
286). She notes that her unambiguous status as the author of 
the overall concept for the work ‘smoothly functions within 
the traditional economy of the art world’ (Sollfrank, 2011: 67). 
In this economy, the artist is still understood as the distinctive 
author of the work. The art system thus continues to trade on 
the notions of authorship the work tries to subvert. The 
author function – the role of Sollfrank’s name as a signifier 
that the viewer takes note of when encountering her work – 
has not been eclipsed by the involvement of the 
programmatic system, or the thousands of users who 
contribute to the work’s production. The author function has 
been discussed in more detail in the Literature Review above. 
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Net art 
Terms such as ‘net.art’,34 ‘Internet art’ and ‘post-Internet art’ 
all come with a degree of mutability, as they designate a 
diverse and changing range of practices, which reflect 
broader techno-social changes. As Josephine Bosma notes: 
There is not one true way to make Net Art. The 
Internet, or new media in general, is used in an 
abundance of ways in all kinds of art practices, often 
creating amazing crossovers and interdisciplinary 
wonderlands. (Bosma, quoted in Cont3xt.net, 2009: 
n.p) 
Engaging with discussions about these terms helped me 
situate my practice as I started to engage with the web as a 
medium and location for my work (see Practice 2), and 
understand that I am working within an evolving, live field. For 
an historical account of net art see Bosma (2011).35 
                                                
34	  Sollfrank	  notes:	  ‘The	  dot	  between	  the	  terms	  net	  and	  art	  was	  a	  reference	  to	  
the	  nomenclature	  of	  computer	  files	  in	  the	  UNIX	  operating	  system’	  (Sollfrank,	  
2011:	  54).	  
35	  Marisa	  Olson	  (2009)	  and	  Michael	  Connor	  (2015)	  discuss	  revisions	  to	  what	  
the	  term	  net	  art	  might	  designate.	  For	  discussions	  of	  post-­‐Internet	  art	  see	  
Olson	  (2011),	  Gene	  McHugh	  (2011),	  Artie	  Vierkant	  (2010),	  Omar	  Kholief	  
(2013),	  Brian	  Droitcour	  (2014)	  and	  Karen	  Archey	  and	  Robin	  Peckham	  (2014).	  	  
For Bosma, the flexibility of the term net art results from the 
fact that: ‘The “net” in net art is both a social and a 
technological reference’ (Bosma, 2011: 24). She rejects the 
idea that net art has to be browser based, or dependent on 
an Internet connection (Bosma, 2011: 24). As well as rejecting 
a medium specific definition of net art, Bosma criticizes the 
conflation of the terms ‘net art’ and ‘web art’, which are often 
used interchangeably: 
Replacing the term ‘net art’ by ‘web art’ causes a 
negligence of art history within a political and 
economic environment. The radical implications of net 
art are replaced by the much less threatening aspects 
of web art. It therefore of course also becomes more 
compact, easier to grasp and more marketable. 
(Bosma, 2000: n.p) 
In my own practice, I do not see the use of a browser as 
precluding or advancing an artwork’s radical potential. A 
definition of net art that I found more useful was that 
established by Michael Connor for the 2015 Prix Net Art 
competition: ‘net art acts on computer networks, and is acted 
on by them’ (Connor, 2015: n.p). This definition resonated 
with my understanding of the recursive relationship of agency 
and structure, as discussed in the Literature Review. Curt 
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Cloninger proposes that there is a continuum between ‘deep 
net art’ and ‘surface net art’, which perhaps relates to a 
continuum between production and consumption: 
Deep net art is net art made by 
programmers/coders/hackers who attempt to 
modulate the network by opening up its hood and 
tweaking it down toward its protocological core. 
Surface net art is net art made by artistic net surfers 
who attempt to modulate the network by staying on 
the surface of the network and tweaking in amongst 
the images, animations, videos, human languages, and 
other readymade media that travel across its surface. 
(Cloninger, 2009: 6) 
The arc of my research could be understood as an attempt to 
move further along the continuum from the surface towards 
the protocological core, although I would not consider myself 
a programmer, coder or hacker, and as such have not 
‘reached’ this end of the continuum. 
By 1995 artists had set up a number of mailing lists, bulletin 
board systems (BBS) and forums focusing on critical 
discussions of art that engaged with the Internet.36 Much of 
                                                
36	  An	  early	  example	  of	  an	  art-­‐focused	  online	  forum	  was	  ‘THE	  THING’,	  founded	  
in	  1991	  by	  Wolfgang	  Staehle,	  which	  is	  described	  as	  a	  ‘flexible	  and	  supportive	  
venue	  for	  developing,	  presenting	  and	  distributing	  innovative	  forms	  of	  on-­‐line	  
the discussion about early net art took place on the Nettime 
mailing list, initiated by Geert Lovink and Pit Schultz in 1995, 
which provided a social, discursive and intellectual framework 
for the development of the field. The list was conceived of as 
‘a radical counter force against a so-called ‘disneyfication’ of 
the Internet in all its aspects’ (Bosma, 2000: n.p). It started as 
a small community of around ten people including artists 
Heath Bunting and Paul Garrin, who were at least initially 
united by a shared set of goals: ‘Being a member of nettime 
more or less equalled joining [a] battle against commerce, 
corporate powers, techno-ignorance and cultural deprivation’ 
(Bosma, 2000: n.p). In her later writing, Bosma rejects the 
notion that net art designates a specific ‘ideological routine’ 
(Bosma, 2009: n.p). 
However, the net art of the 1990s is often associated with this 
small group of artists and characterized by ‘a specific 
approach to the use of technology and the anti-institutional 
politics of their work’ (Olson, 2009: n.p). In this sense it can be 
                                                
activism,	  media	  art	  and	  cultural	  criticism	  concerned	  with	  exploring	  the	  
possibilities	  of	  electronic	  networks’	  (The	  Thing,	  no	  date:	  n.p).	  It	  initially	  took	  
the	  form	  of	  a	  BBS	  focusing	  on	  contemporary	  art	  and	  cultural	  theory,	  and	  then	  
launched	  a	  website,	  http://bbs.thing.net,	  in	  1995.	  This	  initial	  website	  is	  now	  
archived,	  and	  THE	  THING	  operates	  from	  http://the.thing.net/.	  Rhizome	  was	  
also	  a	  prominent	  online	  forum	  for	  promoting	  artistic	  activities	  and	  debate.	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seen as a ‘bounded’ stage in the development of art that 
engages with the Internet. Following this, it is not a category 
with which I would associate my practice. 
Surf clubs and Tumblr  
As I continued trying to contextualize my own emerging 
practice, I found it useful to look at some of the discursive 
social networks underpinning contemporary forms of art 
engaging with the web. Since the early days of specialized 
text-based exchanges, the rise and commodification of social 
media has radically expanded the audience for and 
participative reach of social communication culture. 
The commodification of social networks was seen, by some, 
to threaten the radical potential of net art, and has been 
critiqued by cultural critics including members of the Unlike Us 
initiative at the Institute of Network Cultures, University of 
Amsterdam: 
On the one hand new media create and expand the 
social spaces through which we interact, play and even 
politicize ourselves; on the other hand they are literally 
owned by three or four companies that have 
phenomenal power to shape such interaction. 
Whereas the hegemonic Internet ideology promises 
open, decentralized systems, why do we, time and 
again, find ourselves locked into closed corporate 
environments? (Institute of Network Cultures, 2013b: 
n.p)37  
Cramer also sees the commodification of social networking by 
corporate platforms as one of the challenges facing 
contemporary artists working with the web: 
The notion of an Internet-specific social 
communication culture has migrated from artist- and 
activist-run online systems (fully in parallel and 
agreement with the movement of artist-run spaces) to 
corporate services like Blogspot.com and Facebook, 
which have turned social networking into a 
commodity. (Cramer, 2011: 11) 
He suggests that this shift from social networking being 
conducted amongst a group of specialist net artists with 
common interests to a ubiquitous form of cultural production 
had a ‘detrimental effect on the net art ethos of self-designed 
and self-organized media’ (Cramer, 2011: 11).  
                                                
37	  Unlike	  Us	  is	  ‘a	  research	  network	  of	  artists,	  designers,	  scholars,	  activists	  and	  
programmers	  who	  work	  on	  “alternatives	  in	  social	  media”’	  (Institute	  of	  
Network	  Cultures,	  2013b:	  n.p).	  Their	  work	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  
the	  ideological	  battle,	  expressed	  by	  Bosma,	  to	  resist	  the	  domination	  of	  social	  
networks	  by	  commerce	  and	  corporate	  powers.	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More recently, artists (arguably, also ‘specialists’ with common 
interests) have used Internet ‘clubs’ as forms of social 
network. For a comprehensive list of these, see Paul Slocum 
(2016), and for a nuanced discussion of the nature of surf 
clubs see Cloninger (2009). Slocum distinguishes between 
‘surf clubs’, ‘art clubs’ and ‘related sites’. The term ‘surf club’ 
‘originated from the Nasty Nets group blog tagline “Internet 
Surfing Club,” and is often used to describe group artist blogs 
where the prevailing subject is internet culture and aesthetics 
and where lines are blurred between the roles of artist, 
curator, and archivist’ (Slocum, 2016: n.p). Slocum uses the 
term ‘art club’ to describe ‘similar artist group blogs that do 
not actually have much to do with web surfing. Instead, they 
may explore digital illustration and collage, or use a group 
blog to explore connections between works of non-internet 
art’ (Slocum, 2016: n.p). Typically built on Wordpress or (later) 
Tumblr, Internet clubs can be seen as a form of practice that 
characterizes the transition from net art to the almost 
ubiquitous adoption of corporate social media by artists born 
in the mid–late 1980s. Karen Archey notes: 
While surf clubs such as Nasty Nets, Club Internet, and 
Computers Club began appearing in the mid-naughts, 
just before the full blossom of Web 2.0, their unique 
functionality was soon replaced circa 2009 by easier-
to-use, democratized image sharing platforms, namely 
Tumblr. (Archey, 2013: 1)38 
Similarly to mailing lists, surf clubs and art clubs are based on 
real-life connections and friendship, and as such they can 
appear ‘insular and cliquish’ (Droitcour, 2009: n.p). In an 
article about the Loshadka surf club, Droitcour notes: 
‘Everyone in the community likes each other, so messages in 
the comment section tend to be positive, if oblique’ 
(Droitcour, 2009: n.p). As I began experimenting with Tumblr, I 
found that this ‘easier-to-use, democratized’ platform was 
easy to use, but this did not mean that it offered a meaningful 
community of practice. This is discussed further in Practice 2. 
During this research I subscribed to and participated in 
specialist mailing lists and social networks as well as using 
corporate social media platforms (Tumblr, Flickr and 
Instagram) as a medium and location for my practice.39 
Operating across these online spaces helped me develop a 
                                                
38	  Slocum	  puts	  Computers	  Club	  in	  the	  ‘art	  club’	  category,	  and	  Club	  Internet	  in	  
‘related	  sites’	  (Slocum,	  2016:	  n.p).	  
39	  For	  example,	  I	  subscribe	  to	  the	  Association	  of	  Internet	  Researchers,	  
Nettime,	  Netbehaviour	  and	  Unlike	  Us	  mailing	  lists,	  and	  am	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
Selfies	  Research	  Network	  Facebook	  group.	  	  
 65 
form of mobility as an artist. Rather than rejecting all forms of 
corporate social media on an ideological basis, I accept them 
as part of the conditions under which I am a producer, but 
hope to be able to reflect on or expose them as problematic 
and compromised. Being part of mailing lists that often 
critiqued the use of corporate social media helped me reflect 
on my own use of it, rather than providing space in which the 
artworks were made. It also helped me develop a network 
and context for my practice, introducing me to artists and 
others with similar interests. 
The creation of 1000 Truly Original Ideas (see Practice 2) 
prompted a review of artists using Tumblr as a context and 
medium for their work. Tumblr is a popular image based 
micro-blogging platform and social network created by David 
Karp in 2007. It enables social processes of sharing, 
commenting, messaging, tagging and liking through the 
reblog button, which allows users to post a copy of someone 
else’s post to their own blog. A ‘Share on Tumblr’ bookmarklet 
also allows users to post content from elsewhere on the web. 
Ben Valentine provides an overview of contemporary artists 
using Tumblr: 
‘Lacan Cat’ by Alli Miller, ‘Sony HD’ by Giordano Matteo, 
‘Friendster Friday’ by Ian Aleksander Adams, ‘Hyper 
Geography’ by Joe Hamilton, ‘Cloaque’ by Carlos 
Sáez and Claudia Maté, and ‘Echo Parade’ by Brad 
Troemel and Jonathan Vingiano all function within this 
young medium, and all are using the inherent qualities 
of Tumblr to varying degrees. (Valentine, 2013: n.p)40 
In 2013, Tumblr and Hyperallergic, a Brooklyn based online art 
blog, staged ‘The World’s First Tumblr Art Symposium’ at 319 
Scholes Street, Brooklyn, New York (Hyperallergic, 2014: n.p). 
The event comprised an exhibition, discussions, and a series 
of commissioned essays. The Tumblr artwork that I found 
most compelling was Joe Hamilton’s 2011 work 
Hypergeography, discussed in the following section. 
Hypergeography – Joe Hamilton 
In Hypergeography Hamilton was interested in representations 
of ‘natural, built and networked environments’, and he mined 
Tumblr for images evoking this theme (Hamilton, quoted in 
Jason Huff, 2011: n.p). He used digital imaging techniques to 
                                                
40	  Echo	  Parade	  is	  no	  longer	  functioning,	  and	  as	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  find	  an	  
archived	  version,	  it	  is	  not	  listed	  in	  the	  bibliography.	  For	  a	  description	  of	  the	  
project,	  see	  Jonathan	  Vingiano	  (2011b).	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collage other users’ Tumblr images together to create a series 
of over 100 images that, when posted in the customized 
Tumblr, link together horizontally and vertically (see Figs. 1.8 
and 1.9). The viewer can click on any square in the collage to 
view the Tumblrs from which images were originally taken. 
Each individual post has ‘notes’ attached to it to show how 
many people have liked or reblogged it. The production and 
circulation of the work is partly structured by Tumblr’s 
technical mechanisms: the reblog and like buttons are a way 
for the audience to respond to and re-produce the work. It is 
not possible to see how many followers Hypergeography has, 
as Tumblr does not make this information publicly available. 
However, the number of likes and reblogs associated with 
each post shows that a significant number of people have 
engaged with the work. The uppermost post had 157 notes 
on 29 June 2015 (Fig. 1.9), whilst the bottom left had 1292 
notes (Fig. 2.0).41 As Bosma suggests, the development of art 
in computer networks is ‘part of, or in addition to a larger 
electronic culture’ (Bosma, 2000: n.p). Artists on Tumblr by 
necessity operate in and amongst the larger community of 
users who would not necessarily self-identify as artists.  
                                                
41	  I	  counted	  these	  manually,	  as	  the	  work	  does	  not	  display	  these	  numbers.	  	  
The audience for Hypergeography is clearly not limited to 
‘Tumblr artists’, or even general Tumblr users, as it received a 
significant amount of media attention from the international 
art press, and was featured on Rhizome.org (Huff, 2011), and 
in an article by Dominikus Müller in the German edition of 
Frieze magazine, (Müller 2012). Hamilton also produced a 
video version of the work, which was exhibited in Notes on a 
New Nature, at 319 Scholes, New York (319 Scholes, 2011), as 
well as online (see Fig. 2.1). In 2014, the work was reiterated 
in the physical form of a book, created in collaboration with 
Jean Boîte Éditions, 2014 (see Fig. 2.2). This is an example of 
an artwork that, although very much ‘of the platform’, was 
directed towards other online and offline channels of 
distribution and validation.
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Fig. 1.8 Joe Hamilton, Hypergeography, 2011, screenshot 1 (homepage).
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Fig. 1.9 Joe Hamilton, Hypergeography, 2011, screenshot 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2.0 Joe Hamilton, Hypergeography, 2011, screenshot 3.
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Fig.	  2.1	  Joe	  Hamilton,	  Hyper Geography,	  2011,	  video	  still.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  2.2	  Joe	  Hamilton,	  Hypergeography,	  2014,	  book	  published	  by	  Jean	  Boîte	  Éditions.	  Image	  permission	  granted	  by	  Jean	  Boîte	  Éditions.
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Hamilton states that he prefers to think of Tumblr as a 
‘medium, rather than a platform’ (Hamilton, quoted in Huff, 
2011: n.p). I take this to mean that he sees the whole Tumblr 
system and its socio-technical properties as something he can 
manipulate, rather than seeing Tumblr only as a ‘given’ means 
of disseminating images. This helped me to see that in 1000 
Truly Original Ideas, I was only using Tumblr as a means of 
dissemination. As with my discovery of digital methods, 
discussed in the Methodology chapter above, Hamilton’s work 
encouraged me to think how I could treat the web as a 
medium.42 
Conventional forms of audience attention from galleries, 
curators and the art media, and from Tumblr users played a 
role in the overall reception of Hypergeography. This 
demonstrates the multiple forms of dissemination available 
within and beyond the art system, which enable artists to 
reproduce their work in a variety of forms. Hamilton’s 
‘market-friendly’ versions of Hypergeography may be seen as 
at odds with net art’s original aim to ‘fight or resist the art 
                                                
42	  I	  actually	  moved	  entirely	  away	  from	  Tumblr,	  but	  considering	  ways	  to	  
manipulate	  it	  as	  a	  medium	  may	  be	  a	  fruitful	  area	  for	  further	  exploration	  in	  my	  
practice.	  	  
market’, and to challenge the idea of art as a commodity good 
(Bosma, 2000: n.p). However, the fact that they co-exist with 
the Tumblr version implies that different spaces (galleries, 
websites, bookshops or others) can make web-based works 
visible in various iterations that do not preclude each other. In 
my own practice, creating different versions of the works for 
different contexts and environments, such as the web and 
gallery exhibitions, was a way of developing a form of 
‘mobility’ as an artist, rather than limiting myself to the web as 
an exclusive space in which to make and show works. As 
discussed in Practice 3, showing Flickr Nude or Noodle 
Descending a Staircase in a gallery and allowing people to 
interact with it in a social setting brought something new to 
the work itself. 
Hypergeography also related to my concerns about 
appropriating other people’s images in my artworks. Hamilton 
‘attributes’ each image to its original author by hyperlinking to 
the source Tumblr where it was originally posted (the ethics 
of appropriating online images are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4). Hamilton, however, clearly retains his authorial 
status by conceiving of the work, selecting and collaging the 
images, and presenting them through his code. He has the 
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highest level of authorial intentionality over the work. As is 
the case with Sollfrank, the circulation of Hamilton’s work 
within the art system demonstrates that, whilst it 
incorporates the productions of many other individuals, the 
author function is still in play. 
Artistic strategies from appropriation to 
aggregation 
As I began to programmatically access images through the 
Flickr and Instagram APIs, (see Practice 3 and Practice 4), it 
was useful to think about appropriation as an historicized 
artistic practice and to consider whether there has been a 
paradigm shift from the appropriation strategies adopted by 
the ‘Pictures Generation’ artists of the 1980s to current 
practices of web-based appropriation.  
In the visual arts, appropriation is the ‘intentional borrowing, 
copying, and alteration of pre-existing images and objects’ 
(MOMA, no date: n.p). Lisa Phillips (1992: 30) notes that in the 
1980s, appropriation took on new significance within the 
context of mass media and consumerism and a post-
modernist critical framework expounded by critics including 
Abigail Solomon-Godeau, Douglas Crimp, Hal Foster, Rosalind 
Krauss, Tom Lawson, Kate Linker and Craig Owens. These 
critics saw artists’ use of photographic means in particular as 
‘a chance to define a critical postmodernist art’ that would 
challenge Modernist notions of originality, authorship and 
authenticity (Phillips, 1992: 30). The medium of photography 
was significant because of its ‘special role… in dispelling the 
mystique of “origin” that had settled on the work of art’ 
(Foster et al., 2004: 581). Having internalized the ‘lessons’ of 
Walter Benjamin’s 1936 essay The Work of Art in The Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction, Pictures Generation artists, such as 
Sherrie Levine 
thoroughly understood the condition of the 
photograph as a ‘multiple without an original.’ Thus 
the cult-value of the unique object, the artistic original 
whose aesthetic magic or ‘aura’ would be voided by 
the invalidity of a copy or fake, was held up to question 
by the very nature of photography. (Foster et al., 2004: 
581) 
In particular, Levine and Richard Prince were 
upheld as exemplary figures: their minimal mediation 
represented a new paradigm. They were seen as the 
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most programmatic in their contestation of notions of 
subjectivity, originality – and especially authorship. 
(Phillips, 1992: 30–31) 
In 1977 Prince re-photographed a series of interiors from the 
New York Times magazine using 35mm film, bringing 
assumptions about the ownership of public images into 
question. Levine’s 1980 work Untitled, After Walker Evans, in 
which the artist re-photographed a series of photographs by 
Walker Evans and presented them as her own, was ‘a 
landmark of postmodernism’ (Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
2000: n.p). In this work Levine was seen as going beyond just 
challenging Weston’s legal status as the owner and copyright 
holder of the work. Instead, Hal Foster et al. note, ‘her 
appropriation was taken as extending into Weston’s very 
claim to originality, in the sense of being the origin of the 
images’ (Foster et al., 2004: 580). Significantly for my question 
about a paradigm shift within appropriation strategies, this 
was a discipline-specific, self-referential, inter-textual and 
historical gesture. Levine – an established artist - was 
appropriating work by an established photographer, within 
an art-historical context.  
In December 2014, the Denny Art Gallery in New York 
mounted Share This! Appropriation After Cynicism, an exhibition 
exploring contemporary practices of appropriation. In a 
review of the exhibition, critic Joseph Henry states: 
What’s new is the alacrity and ease with which 
appropriation can occur on a mass level. The obvious 
historical paradigm shift between late and high 
appropriation is the changed technologies: image 
duplication and distribution. (Henry, 2015: n.p) 
Although appropriation has featured heavily in art and culture 
at large for decades, the web has accelerated and amplified 
its application and distribution to such a degree of magnitude 
that it has changed in character and consequence. In 1982, 
Douglas Crimp suggested: 
Appropriation, pastiche, quotation – these methods 
extend to virtually every aspect of our culture, from 
the most cynically calculated products of the fashion 
and entertainment industries to the most committed 
critical activities of artists…If all aspects of the culture 
use this new operation, then the operation itself 
cannot indicate a specific reflection upon the culture. 
(Crimp, 1982: 126)  
Today, as a result of the de-differentiating forces of the web, 
appropriation, pastiche and quotation are not only 
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undertaken by media industries and artists, but an even wider 
group of (often ‘amateur’) cultural producers. It is a 
fundamental feature of remix culture, discussed in Chapter 4. 
In Postproduction Nicholas Bourriaud places strategies of 
remixing, editing, and re-contextualization at the centre of the 
production of contemporary artworks. However, although 
Bourriaud claims that Postproduction takes, as its point of 
departure, ‘the changing mental space that has been opened 
up for thought by the Internet’ (Bourriaud, 2002a: 8), the 
artists he discusses, including Rirkrit Tiravanija, Pierre Hugye, 
Jorge Pardo, Felix Gonzales-Torres and Liam Gillick 
(Bourriaud, 2002a: 8–9), are not producers operating in the 
field of net art, Internet art or even new media art conceived 
very broadly. They often, like the Pictures Generation artists, 
re-use the works of already famous artists. Bourriaud does 
not address the medium specificity of the Internet, or 
sufficiently describe new paradigmatic strategies of 
appropriation that characterize current web-based art 
practice. As Marialaura Ghidini states: 
There is no specific focus on the workings of the Web 
as a site of production, display, and distribution; 
instead the Web is used as an allegory to indicate the 
‘cultural chaos’ in which artists operating in the 1990s 
found themselves. (Ghidini, 2012: n.p) 
In her 2012 Artforum article ‘The Digital Divide’, Bishop states: 
Faced with the infinite resources of the Internet, 
selection has emerged as a key operation; we build 
new files from existing components, rather than 
creating from scratch. Artists whose work revolves 
around choosing objects for display (Bove, Johnson) or 
who reuse previous art (Olowska with Stryjenska, 
Simon Starling with Henry Moore, Ryan Gander with 
Mondrian) are foregrounding the importance of 
selection strategies, even when the outcome is 
decisively analog. Questions of originality and 
authorship are no longer the point; instead, the 
emphasis is on a meaningful recontextualization of 
existing artifacts. (Bishop, 2012: 438)  
Like Bourriaud, Bishop’s examples here are not of artists 
engaging specifically with the web. Rather, she focuses on the 
reuse of works by established artworld figures by other 
established artworld figures.  
Artie Vierkant, however, notes that a number of 
contemporary artists proclaim an authorial stance by 
‘indexing’ or ‘curating’ items of culture including those that 
have been created without necessarily being described as art 
(Vierkant, 2010: n.p). Examples of artists taking this approach 
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include Cory Arcangel (Sorry I Haven’t Posted, 2010 and 
Working on My Novel, 2009–2014),43 Brad Troemel and 
Jonathan Vingiano (Blind Mist, 2011)44 and Nick Hasty, Sergio 
Pastor, and Ryan Trecartin (Riverofthe.net, 2010).45 Vierkant 
states: ‘Artists after the Internet thus take on a role more 
closely aligned to that of the interpreter, transcriber, narrator, 
curator, architect’ (Vierkant, 2010: n.p).46  
                                                
43	  Sorry I Haven’t Posted	  was	  a	  ‘Blog	  which	  re-­‐posts	  the	  best	  blog	  posts	  of	  
people	  apologizing	  for	  not	  posting	  to	  their	  blogs’	  (Arcangel,	  2010a:	  n.p).	  
Working on My Novel	  was	  a	  ‘Twitter	  Feed	  which	  re-­‐tweets	  the	  best	  posts	  
featuring	  the	  phrase	  “working	  on	  my	  novel”’	  (Arcangel,	  2012–2014:	  n.p).	  
44	  At	  the	  time	  of	  submission,	  Blindmist.com	  is	  no	  longer	  available,	  so	  is	  not	  
listed	  in	  the	  artworks	  section	  of	  the	  bibliography.	  It	  was	  ‘a	  system	  of	  images,	  
generated	  by	  URLs	  of	  websites	  provided	  by	  visitors.	  Blind	  Mist	  was	  constantly	  
reading	  from	  the	  user	  submitted	  URLs	  to	  add	  images	  to	  itself.	  There	  are	  over	  
half	  a	  million	  images	  in	  the	  system	  and	  no	  two	  visitors	  share	  the	  same	  
experience’	  (Vingiano,	  no	  date:	  n.p).	  
45	  Riverofthe.net	  was	  based	  on	  an	  idea	  by	  Ryan	  Trecartin	  and	  Tumblr	  founder	  
David	  Karp,	  developed	  as	  part	  of	  Rhizome’s	  ‘Seven	  on	  Seven’	  commission.	  It	  is	  
‘a	  continuous	  stream	  of	  10	  second,	  user	  submitted	  videos.	  Videos	  are	  tagged	  
with	  3	  words	  or	  phrases,	  and	  videos	  with	  the	  same	  tag	  are	  linked	  together	  to	  
create	  a	  playlist.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  frenetic	  and	  often	  hilarious	  juxtaposition	  of	  
videos.	  The	  site	  is	  currently	  a	  collaboration	  between	  Nick	  Hasty,	  Sergio	  Pastor,	  
and	  Ryan	  Trecartin’	  (Karp	  et	  al.,	  2010:	  n.p).	  
46	  Corporate	  social	  media	  platforms	  such	  as	  Tumblr,	  Flickr	  and	  Pinterest	  also	  
enable	  people	  who	  may	  not	  necessarily	  self-­‐identify	  as	  artists	  to	  aggregate,	  
organize	  and	  ‘curate’	  images,	  videos,	  texts	  or	  other	  cultural	  artefacts.	  These	  
processes	  constitute	  one	  of	  the	  dominant	  production	  conditions	  brought	  
about	  by	  the	  web.	  
Like appropriation and pastiche, selection has also emerged 
as a key operation in the broader field of web-based cultural 
production, where platforms such as Pinterest place 
emphasis on collecting and organizing images according to 
personal interests or aspirations. Thus, another dominant 
production condition of the web is the reframing of 
authorship as a process of selecting, organizing and 
aggregating other people’s content. 
As well as the shift from appropriating art or media imagery 
towards appropriating user-generated content, the technical 
means of ‘high appropriation’ are paradigmatically distinct, 
having shifted away from photography towards the techno-
social space of the web. Artists are able to use digital objects 
(to use digital methods terminology) such as reblogs, tweets, 
images, URLs and hashtags in order to programmatically 
aggregate and re-present user-generated content. 
Furthermore, they are not only appropriating digital objects, 
but online platforms themselves. As Marialaura Ghidini puts 
it: ‘strategies of confiscating, re-arranging and customizing 
ready-to-use web interfaces might occur as a reflection on the 
distributive properties of the adopted platform’ (Ghidini, 
2012: n.p). 
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Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase and Selfie Portrait 
adopt a similar strategy in that they ‘re-arrange’ Flickr and 
Instagram, in order to bring bodies of user-generated content 
into new temporary formations. Web-based processes of 
selecting, indexing and aggregating online cultural artefacts 
do not eclipse questions of authorship as Bishop suggests. 
Rather they demand distinct questions of authorship – 
particularly about the implications of (often 
programmatically) appropriating items of culture created by a 
wide range of people belonging to online communities, 
including non-artists. This is explored further in Practice 3 and 
Practice 4. 
Summary 
The term cybernetics was adopted briefly in the beginning of 
the research, but rejected, as its emphasis on computational 
systems and artificial intelligence did not provide the right 
conceptual framework for addressing my questions about 
human agency and authorship. 
Cramer’s concept of second-order poiesis contributed to my 
rejection of the notion that deploying a computational system 
would eclipse my subjective, authorial agency from the 
production of an artwork. Tzara’s Dadaist poetry and 
Burroughs’ cut-up method championed alternatives to 
prevailing formal and literary artistic convention, and offered 
tools for loosening the artists’ grip over formal properties and 
the origination of meaning within their works. More recently, 
online text generators have enabled critiques of the social 
construction of language. In my own works the computational 
generation of texts was a way to explore whether a form of 
effective intentionality was possible ‘outside or beyond’ me. 
Sollfrank’s net.art generator provided a salient reference work, 
as it provokes questions of authorship, originality and 
copyright that are specific to the web. The images the 
generator produces are the ‘access point’ to questions of 
copyright, since they involve the appropriation of existing 
material. These questions are complicated by images’ 
circulation in the art system, which demonstrates that the 
author function is still in play, despite the challenges to 
authorship the work instantiates. 
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Discussions about ‘net art’, ‘Internet art’ and ‘post-Internet art’ 
helped me further situate my practice and I moved away from 
computational generativity. Artists’ Internet clubs and 
critiques of the commodification of social networks provided 
another context for my practice. Rather than rejecting all 
forms of corporate social media on an ideological basis, I 
accept them as part of the conditions under which I am a 
producer, but hope to be able to reflect on or expose them as 
problematic and compromised. I used Joe Hamilton’s 
Hypergeography to reflect on the use of Tumblr in my practice. 
Hamilton’s modification of the work for online, gallery and 
print demonstrates that adapting work for different contexts 
is part of the role of an artist engaging with the web. Hamilton 
attributes each image to the original author by hyperlinking to 
their own Tumblrs, but as with Sollfrank’s net.art generator, 
the circulation of Hypergeography within the art system 
demonstrates that the author function is still in play. 
Appropriation strategies specific to the web are 
paradigmatically different to the appropriation strategies of 
the Pictures Generation, or those described by Bishop and 
Bourriaud. The paradigm shift has been enabled and driven 
by digital technology (shifting from a focus on photography 
amongst Pictures Generation artists towards the web). Web-
based appropriation often involves taking user-generated 
material on commercial and social networking sites rather 
than just mass media imagery or artworks circulating in the 
art system. Appropriation on the web also involves the 
appropriation of the platforms on which user-generated 
content exists. These forms of ‘high appropriation’ demand 
distinct questions about the implications of (often 
programmatically) appropriating items of culture created by a 
wide range of people belonging to online communities, 
including non-artists. 
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Fig. 2.3 Topic Generator, 2011, screenshot 1, p. 83.
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Fig. 2.4 Topic Generator, 2011, screenshot 2, p. 85.
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The generative phase 
Topic Generator 
Topic Generator was an early experiment that reflects the 
openness of the field of enquiry at the beginning of research. It 
was the catalyst for a series of computer-generated works 
(discussed later in this chapter and in Practice 2), which 
enabled me to reflect on my authorial agency in relation to a 
computer program. In contrast to later works such as Infinite 
Violets, which had a more defined aesthetic intentionality, Topic 
Generator was a relatively open-ended means of launching the 
research. It was a generative moment, the unpredictability of 
which set the research into motion. The rudimentary aesthetic 
quality of Topic Generator reflects the fact that generativity and 
experimentation were higher on my mind at this stage than on 
creating a ‘polished’ artwork. 
Topic Generator uses an algorithm and a database of 69 words 
to generate alternative titles for my PhD (see Fig. 2.5). The 
generated titles are displayed on a webpage, appearing one 
after another in an ongoing, scrolling list. Each generated title is 
hyperlinked, and when clicked it takes the viewer to a page of 
search engine results that are generated by the title being 
automatically entered into Google Scholar (see Fig. 2.6). 
The terms contained in the database relate (some more 
directly than others) to my initial PhD title: Cybernetics of 
collaboration: towards an extra-subjective agency in collaborative 
art practice.47 The grammatical structure of the original title was 
kept in place, which provided a formal parameter for the words 
I could use.
                                                
47 I omitted generating alternatives for ‘in collaborative art practice’, as I was 
unsure whether this would remain the focus of my research. 
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Word 1 
Plural noun &  
metaphor 
Word 2 
Preposition 
Word 3 
Verb 
Word 4 
Preposition  
or present 
participle 
 
Word 5 
Indefinite article 
Word 6 
Adjective 
Word 7 
Adjective 
Word 8 
Noun 
Ecologies of Collaboration Towards  a/an Automated Extrasubjective Agency 
Autopoietics   In search 
of  
a/an Autonomous Practice-based Authorship 
Cybernetics   Finding  a/an Systems-based Integrated  Art practice 
Logics     Communicative Knowing Methodology 
Assemblages     Embodied Autopoietic Amateurism 
     Assimilated Authorial Epistemology 
     Emerging Swarming Entity 
     Entropic Appropriated Art criticism 
     Intersubjective Proliferating Mind 
     Amateur Generative Thought experiment 
     Thinking Iterative Wiki 
     Random Situated Language 
     Responsive Extrapersonal Project 
     Recursive Mental Group exhibition 
     Self-creating Self-organized Monthly publication 
     Self-generating Associative Installation art  
     Stochastic Distanced Computer art 
     Unified Cybernetic Sculpture 
     Participatory System-based Social network 
     Fragmented Networked Web assemblage 
Fig. 2.5 Database of terms for Topic Generator. 
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Fig. 2.6 Google Scholar search engine results from Topic Generator.  
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There are 174,420 possible titles, which although tiny from a 
computer-processing point of view, was far more than I would 
have been capable of producing manually. This created a 
distancing effect between my agency, enacted through the 
intentional act of ‘inputting’ to the system, and the outputs of 
the system, which were outside my intentionality and too large 
in quantity for me to read. The sense of setting something 
‘bigger than myself’ in motion is an aspect that runs through 
the rest of the works in this PhD. The distance between my 
intentionality and the system’s outputs was always experienced 
in relation to my knowledge of its structure, so I saw my agency 
as being enacted as a matter of degree, rather than being 
eclipsed by the system. I had a higher degree of agency at the 
input stage, and a lower degree at the output stage. 
The input/output relation thus engendered a tension between 
my agency, or intentionality in structuring the work, and my 
lack of agency, or un-intentionality over what the work 
‘produced’. Another way of thinking about these degrees of 
agency is to distinguish between ‘intentionality’ and ‘control’. 
Enacting my intentionality in relation to the Topic Generator is 
not the same as controlling the Topic Generator. Not being able 
to control its output was a fundamental part of my 
intentionality, which involved being open to a degree of 
unpredictability. This openness reflects the fact that I wanted 
to embrace the possibilities that would be generated through 
practice-based research. Tolerating a degree of unpredictability 
and uncertainty, and being willing to pursue unexpected paths 
was a conscious part of my approach. 
As well as the titles themselves, the Google Scholar search 
engine results they generate created an additional layer of 
complexity and a greater level of sprawl in the work. Clicking 
on a title disrupts the stream of titles viewed on the webpage, 
and extends the works’ location beyond my website into the 
broader sphere of the web. The search results heightened the 
satirical undertone of the work, implying ironically that an 
intellectually involved part of the research process (the 
literature review) could be automated. Despite this intended 
irony, however, there were instances when the search results 
did seem relevant. 
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For example, a search for the generated title ‘Ecologies of 
collaboration: in search of an entropic distanced project’ 
returned Matthew Fuller’s 2005 book Media Ecologies: 
Materialist Energies in Art and Technoculture, which was later 
included in the Literature Review. 
The status of the Topic Generator was thus ambiguous. I was 
not certain whether it should be understood as a form of 
representation that satirized the PhD process by implying that 
it could be automated, or as a genuinely useful ‘tool’ for 
generating other ways of thinking about my research and 
exploring related literature. For me, the usefulness of Topic 
Generator (as a tool) came as much from populating the 
database with relevant terms as from reading the generated 
titles, since the former involved considering alternative words 
and metaphors that might be relevant for my research. This 
again reflects the importance of the higher degree of agency at 
the input stage. 
The structure and inputs of the system determine the outputs, 
no matter how unpredictable they may seem. The outputs thus 
‘reflect’ the inputs, albeit in unpredictable configurations. 
One way of emphasizing the tool-like quality of the Topic 
Generator would have been to make a version that would allow 
other PhD students to enter their own set of synonyms and 
generate their own alternative PhD titles. I did not pursue this 
line of enquiry, as I did not want to make an unambiguously 
functional work, but it did catalyse the idea of exploring my 
own authorial agency by allowing others to interact with my 
work – a strand of practice that was explored most thoroughly 
in Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase (see Practice 3). 
Rather than seeing the Topic Generator as either an 
autonomous form of representation or as a tool that has some 
potentially useful functional qualities, it is better understood as 
an experiment that encompasses both these aspects. 
As a relatively conceptually oriented, process-driven work, one 
of the most challenging aspects of making Topic Generator was 
the question of how it should look. My focus was on the 
computational generation of the titles, and I did not intend any 
other visual elements of the work to be automated. This meant 
that decisions about its visual appearance were part of my 
intentional establishment of the whole ‘system’. This created a 
quandary over whether to adopt a systematic approach to the 
work’s aesthetic dimensions, or whether the use of imagery 
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and the assertion of (very basic) design and typographic 
decisions was an opportunity to bring a more affective 
dimension to the work through a more direct enactment of my 
intentionality. After much deliberation, I concluded that an 
attempt to systematize the aesthetic dimensions of the work 
would be as much an assertion of my intentionality as an 
attempt to introduce personally selected aesthetic elements. I 
settled on a middle ground by using an understated repeat 
pattern, taken from an online wallpaper website, as a backdrop 
for the text, which is displayed in two standard fonts, Arial and 
Courier. The ‘problem’ of the aesthetic dimensions of my 
generative works, and the relative ease with which I was able to 
automate text in comparison to images, came up in 
39,063,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Flies, After William Blake 
(discussed below) and Infinite Violets (discussed in Practice 2). 
Topic Generator demonstrates that there were a number of 
generative elements at work in the research, all of which could 
produce unpredictable lines of enquiry: I generated a system, 
which generates titles, which generate literature reviews. 
However, the intentionally enacted research itself is also 
generative, in that it changes over time and thus ‘generates’ 
new titles that reflect what has been discovered. The fact that 
my actual PhD title was subject to institutional constraints 
meant that I was never entirely in ‘control’ of it, although the 
decisions about what it would be were entirely intentional. The 
generative nature of the research process meant that the final 
title had to reflect what had taken place, and what the PhD had 
become – so the research itself ‘generated’ the title, rather than 
the title generating the research. 
Overall, Topic Generator allowed me to reflect on intentionality 
as an aspect of artistic agency, and to consider the extent to 
which I was comfortable allowing unintentional elements to 
determine the direction of my practice and research. My 
intentionality was enacted at the level of the artwork-as-system 
rather than at the level of its outputs, so although not 
responsible for generating the particular combinations of titles, 
I was responsible for generating the work as a whole. Thus 
creating the conditions for un-intentionality was an enactment 
of my agency. 
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As with the Dadaist strategies and cut-up techniques discussed 
in the Practice Review, the computer generation in Topic 
Generator was a way of loosening my grip on the origination of 
meaning within the work, but not something that completely 
eclipsed my agency, intentionality and authorship of the work. 
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Fig. 2.7 39,063,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Flies, After William Blake, 2011, screenshot 1, p. 95.
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Fig. 2.8 39,063,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Flies, After William Blake, 2011, screenshot 2, p. 97.
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39,063,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 
Flies, After William Blake 
39,063,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Flies, After William Blake 
applied a similar algorithmic process to William Blake’s poem 
The Fly, which I had enjoyed reading over a number of years, 
finding its meaning intriguing and moving. I selected a poem 
because I wanted a contrast to the functional, academic quality 
of Topic Generator. The formal qualities of The Fly, such as its 
economy of language, rhyming couplets and small number of 
verses, lent themselves to the generative process. I sought 
something short and simple enough for differences between 
the original and the permutations to be recognized and 
compared. Choosing the text to be permuted was an aspect of 
the work where I clearly enacted my intentionality. 
The algorithm generates variations of the original poem by 
substituting the original words with synonyms manually 
collated in a database. The number in the work’s title refers to 
the number of possible permutations of the poem. As with 
Topic Generator, the vast quantity of what is generated, and the 
impossibility of encountering everything that the system 
produces, created a distancing effect between my intentionality 
and the system’s output. This points to the ‘surplus’ aspect of 
extra-subjective authorship, which can involve producing and 
apprehending a surplus of material that is both a result of the 
artist’s intentionality, and a result of something beyond it. The 
generative works discussed in this chapter produced an excess 
of material out of a bounded starting point (a text), but later 
works, such as Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase and 
Selfie Portrait, were more focused on collating and re-
presenting a cultural excess of material created by other 
people (see Practice 3 and Practice 4). 
Viewers can click a ‘generate variant’ button to generate a new 
permutation of Blake’s original poem. The inclusion of this 
button was a first step towards inviting viewers to be literally 
involved in the production of my work, although their degree of 
authorial intentionality here is extremely limited. 
As with the Topic Generator, I considered developing a version 
in which viewers could input their own source text, but 
concluded that I was trying to achieve something different 
from existing online text generators that enable this. 
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The N+7 machine, for example, is an online text generator 
based on an Oulipo constraint in which every noun in a text is 
replaced with the noun seven entries after it in a dictionary.48 
The viewer can enter any text, and the N+7 machine returns a 
generated version in a simple text-only format. Like the text 
generators described by Losh (2011), the N+7 machine creates 
a particular rhetorical effect and critiques the social 
construction of language. In contrast, I saw 
39,063,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Flies, After William Blake 
as an artwork through which I was addressing my particular 
research questions. In relation to Topic Generator, this work is 
less ‘tool-like’ and more autonomous as a form of 
representation. 
As with Topic Generator, deciding on the aesthetic qualities of 
the work was a challenging task for which I was solely 
responsible. I wanted to include a visual element without being 
simplistically illustrative of the text (for example by using an 
image of a fly), but found it difficult to arrive at a rationale for 
this. As before, I took an abstract geometric image from a 
                                                
48	  I	  submitted	  my	  research	  proposal	  to	  the	  N+7	  machine	  under	  whose	  logic	  my	  
‘creative	  strategies	  of	  collaboration’	  become	  ‘creative	  strawberries	  of	  collapse’,	  
and	  the	  ‘ethical	  dimensions	  of	  the	  research’	  become	  the	  ‘ethical	  dimples	  of	  the	  
resentment’.	  
website that provided free wallpaper and computer-generated 
patterns, and used it as a ‘background’ for the text. This was a 
way to bring the visual language of the web into the work 
whilst grappling with my frustrations over the apparent 
arbitrariness of choosing an image to ‘go’ with the text. The 
decision seemed so arbitrary I felt I might as well use wallpaper 
from the web. With this said, the choice of the wallpaper was 
not arbitrary, and as it is so visually dominant, to call it 
‘wallpaper’ seems incongruous. The fractal design chimed with 
the way the work creates (effectively) infinite permutations, 
and the highly saturated colour palette emphasized the 
expressive qualities of the poems. By treating the image as a 
background, however, I was perhaps attempting to highlight 
the text as the thing I wanted to be most actively ‘read’.  
Given the difficulty of choosing an image, I again wondered if I 
should adopt a systematic approach to the work’s aesthetic 
dimensions in order to emphasize its conceptual, process-
driven orientation. Could I automate the selection of images in 
the same way as I was automating the permutation of text? 
However, it is not possible to apply the algorithm that 
permutes the texts to images, because images cannot be 
broken into ‘naturally occurring’ component parts in the way 
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that text can. For example, a sentence can be broken into 
component parts (words), which can be substituted by 
correlate component parts (synonyms). Although digital images 
could of course be broken down into pixels, these pixels do not 
have the equivalent of synonyms. Text therefore lends itself to 
the algorithm used in this work, but images do not – or to put it 
another way, the algorithm is designed for text, not image. 
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Fig. 2.9 Infinite Puffs, 2012, screenshot 1, p. 103.
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Fig. 3.0 Infinite Puffs, 2012, screenshot 2, p. 105.
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Infinite Puffs 
Infinite Puffs was a third attempt at using an algorithmic 
process of permutation. Having used my PhD title and a poem, 
I wanted to experiment with using song lyrics as the source 
text, and introduce an audio element to the work. The use of a 
song was another way of considering the extent to which I 
wanted to literally involve the viewer in the work – in this case 
by inviting them (notionally) to sing along. Unlike in the 
previous work, I was led by the format I wanted to experiment 
with, rather than a particular song. As with choosing images, 
choosing a song was challenging. On one hand, it seemed like a 
relatively arbitrary decision, since I just wanted to continue 
experimenting with the algorithmic process but was not aiming 
to refract the meaning of any particular song. On the other 
hand, it seemed essential, since the choice of song would 
determine the work’s expressive properties. I settled on Puff 
the Magic Dragon, which has a charm and lightness of touch I 
felt would resonate with my own playful approach. I deemed its 
melody and lyrics to be recognizable enough for the 
permutations to register as humorous. For me, one of the most 
compelling aspects of using an algorithm to generate text is 
that it often results in humorous, surreal or unexpected 
phrases. 
When Infinite Puffs loads in a browser, a synthetic backing track 
plays and the permuted lyrics appear as if they are being 
displayed on a karaoke machine.49 I investigated the possibility 
of enabling people to record themselves singing along via a 
webcam, but decided not to pursue this line of enquiry, as the 
focus was still on my intentionality in relation to computational 
generativity rather than viewer participation at this stage. The 
potential for viewer participation in Infinite Puffs pre-empted 
the more interactive elements of Flickr Nude or Noodle 
Descending a Staircase, as discussed in Practice 3. 
Summary 
The computational generation of material that was ‘beyond’ 
me, both in its quantity and unpredictability, created a 
                                                
49	  Whilst	  making	  Infinite	  Puffs	  I	  asked	  my	  dad	  to	  create	  a	  backing	  track	  for	  the	  
work,	  since	  he	  is	  a	  talented	  guitar	  player.	  He	  agreed	  to	  do	  this	  and	  after	  several	  
days,	  sent	  me	  the	  audio	  file.	  I	  listened	  to	  the	  file	  and	  was	  moved	  to	  tears,	  as	  it	  
sounded	  beautiful	  and	  seemed	  like	  a	  gift	  from	  him.	  When	  I	  rang	  him	  to	  tell	  him	  
how	  moved	  I	  had	  been,	  he	  said,	  ‘Thanks,	  but	  it	  was	  a	  synthetic	  track	  generated	  
in	  Garageband!’	  This	  perceptual	  slippage	  was	  a	  reminder	  of	  how	  technological	  
processes	  are	  always	  subject	  to	  human	  interpretations	  and	  projections.	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distancing effect between my intentional inputs to and the 
unintentional outputs of the systems I had inaugurated. These 
input/output relations highlighted the co-presence of 
intentionality in determining the structure of the works, and 
my lack of intentionality in determining what these structures 
generated. This points to the ‘surplus’ aspect of extra-
subjective authorship, which can involve the generation of 
artistic outcomes that exceed the artist’s intentions. Although 
computer generation introduced unpredictable elements to 
these works, it did not eclipse my authorial agency, and the 
works were clearly not produced exclusively ‘outside’ me. I 
understood my authorial agency to be fully intact and saw 
myself as accountable for the works if, for example, they 
breached copyright, or even if someone simply wanted to have 
a conversation about them, since I would be identified as their 
creator. Whilst the computer programs have a productive 
capacity, they do not have any subjective capacity or effective 
intentionality. In light of this, the ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ aspects of 
extra-subjectivity associated with computer automation 
became less important than the ‘surplus’ aspects.  
The generative elements of these works was fundamental to 
creating a sense of playfulness and humour.  
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Fig. 3.1 1000 Truly Original Ideas, 2012, screenshot, p. 111.
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Transitioning towards the web 
Whilst making the works in Practice 1, I undertook a concurrent 
practice and literature review, which allowed me to reflect on 
the works themselves and the contexts in which they might be 
best understood. Through the making, reflection and 
theoretical contextualization, it became evident that my 
questions of artistic authorship and agency needed to be 
situated not in relation to offline computational processes or 
cybernetic systems, but to the techno-social context of the 
web. This chapter discusses two artworks that represent a 
transition towards the web as a new location and medium for 
my practice. 
1000 Truly Original Ideas 
1000 Truly Original Ideas incorporates a computer-generated 
text work into my existing Tumblr blog, 
otheragents.tumblr.com, which works like a sketchbook. It is a 
visual research testing ground where I post my own digital 
images and reblog posts that I find visually interesting or 
resonant with my practice. I chose to use 
otheragents.tumblr.com rather than setting up a new 
dedicated Tumblr for the work, as I initially saw 1000 Truly 
Original Ideas as a methodological experiment rather than an 
autonomous artwork. Later I came to see it as a work in its own 
right, and because it is hard to ‘see’ in amongst all my other 
posts, I created a filtered view of it, which can be accessed from 
bit.ly/1KOIDEAS. The work is potentially ongoing, but the 
majority of posts were made between October 2011 and 
October 2013. 
1000 Truly Original Ideas permutes a quote from the film A 
Beautiful Mind: ‘Find a truly original idea. It is the only way I will 
ever distinguish myself. It is the only way I will ever matter’ (A 
Beautiful Mind, 2001). This quote was pertinent because it 
hinges on an essentialist vision of originality as something 
‘discoverable’. By permuting the quote, I was playfully critiquing 
this notion and invoking post-structuralist theories of 
authorship that challenge the view of the author as ‘the 
creative originator of a text whose intentions constitute a 
work’s authentic meanings and significance’ (Barker, 2004: 10). 
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As with the works described in Practice 1, I created a database 
of synonyms for each word in the quote and algorithmically 
generated a large set of permutations. 
For practicality, I chose to limit the work to the first 1000 
permutations, which I intended to post to my Tumblr.50 I 
considered automating the posting process as a way of 
extending the generative aspect of the work, but discovered 
that this would be a breach of Tumblr’s community guidelines. 
Tumblr states that users must not ‘register accounts or post 
content automatically, systematically, or programmatically’, and 
sees automation as an activity that can ‘jeopardize our users, 
threaten our infrastructure, and damage our community’ 
(Tumblr, 2015: n.p). This demonstrates that by placing the 
practice of computer-generation in the context of Tumblr, it is 
bounded by the platform’s code of practice, and subject to new 
constraints. The closest I could get to automatically posting the 
quotes was to queue them and set my account to upload one 
post per day. This highlighted the need to undertake 
continuing manual work to keep a Tumblr populated with 
                                                
50	  There	  are	  1,638,095,000,000	  possible	  permutations.	  I	  did	  not	  post	  all	  1000	  
posts,	  as	  I	  did	  not	  feel	  it	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	  meaningfully	  on	  the	  
work.	  	  
content. The demand for content production is the subject of 
Brad Troemel’s essay Athletic Aesthetics, in which he discusses 
the pressure on artists to continually produce content that can 
be shared on social media. He suggests that the web has 
spawned a new kind of cultural producer, the ‘aesthlete’, who 
‘trumps craft and contemplative brooding with immediacy and 
rapid production’ (Troemel, 2013: n.p). 
Further exploring the possibilities of automation, I set my 
Tumblr account to automatically post each quote to my 
Facebook timeline, so that they appeared in amongst my 
personally created photos and posts. This offered another way 
to bring a form of computational (Latourian) agency into my 
practice, this time in the techno-social context of the web. A 
concerned friend got in touch to inform me that my Facebook 
account had been hacked. It was confusing for them to see this 
series of automated texts appear on my Facebook timeline in 
amongst other content that was obviously created by me 
personally. In keeping with my rejection of non-human agency 
as a focus for my research, I did not pursue this as a line of 
enquiry, but the confusion these posts caused signalled the 
creative potential of using automation to adopt an ambiguous 
or complicated artistic identity. 
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In this research, it was important that I remained accountable 
for the artwork ‘as me’, but experimenting with online identity 
offers a fruitful area for future research, as discussed in the 
conclusion. 
I did not see my Tumblr as a discrete artwork in which to 
proclaim a particular authorial stance through ‘curating’ or 
‘indexing’ digital artefacts, as is discussed in the Practice 
Review. Rather, it is an experimental space where I can collect 
materials to inform my practice, or test out artworks like the 
one discussed here. However, juxtaposing other people’s posts 
with my own prompted me to consider the relationship 
between the overall Tumblr, which I author, and the images 
that make it up, which are authored by others. Once other 
people’s images are reblogged and appear in my Tumblr, they 
become part of something I have authored. This does not 
mean that I want to claim authorship of them, but that on 
Tumblr, my authorial agency is hybridized with the authorial 
agency of other people.51 Questions of the ownership of 
                                                
51	  Ben	  Valentine	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  de-­‐emphasis	  on	  authorship	  in	  Tumblr,	  
because	  much	  of	  the	  content	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  dashboard	  feed,	  which	  gives	  a	  real-­‐
time	  display	  of	  all	  the	  content	  being	  shared	  by	  all	  the	  Tumblrs	  you	  follow	  
(Valentine,	  2013:	  n.p).	  He	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  artists	  to	  assert	  control	  
over	  how	  their	  work	  is	  displayed	  in	  Tumblr,	  and	  that	  they	  may	  not	  be	  
images became more explicit through the production of Selfie 
Portrait (see Practice 4 and Chapter 4). 
Using Tumblr prompted me to evaluate whether I wanted to 
measure the success of my work by its engagement with and 
popularity amongst Tumblr users, expressed through likes, 
comments or reblogs. The question remained speculative 
however, as I did not work on developing a following on 
Tumblr. This would have involved following, reblogging and 
producing content on a regular basis, which I did not want to 
invest time in at this stage of the research. The platform itself 
does not offer a meaningful community of practice or a 
readymade audience – the artist or cultural producer has to 
build this up by interacting with the community. Without the 
aspect of social interaction, the platform is just a tool. 
I also questioned whether courting likes, comments and 
reblogs could be seen to encourage a form of cultural 
expression that compromises more critical and reflective 
responses. However, as noted in the Practice Review in relation 
to Joe Hamilton’s Hypergeography, the popularity of a work on 
                                                
understood	  as	  the	  author	  of	  the	  work	  (Valentine,	  2013:	  n.p).	  Although	  this	  may	  
be	  the	  case,	  Valentine’s	  assertion	  relates	  to	  the	  point	  of	  reception	  rather	  than	  
production,	  which	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  research.	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Tumblr does not necessarily preclude it from receiving critical 
or reflective responses in other contexts. Furthermore, I would 
not want to suggest that a comment on Tumblr is necessarily 
uncritical or reflective. 
After 1000 Truly Original Ideas I did not use Tumblr to produce 
any more artworks, as I wanted the works to have a reflective 
distance from corporate social media. As Curt Cloninger asks, 
Is using off-the-shelf corporate software to create a 
‘unique/personal’ MySpace page a way of subverting the 
institutions of mass media production, or is it simply 
one more example of these institutions using the myth 
of ‘originality’ to assimilate and amass a demographic 
market of "unique" individuals? Artists who use these 
templates have to be particularly wily if they hope to 
keep from being assimilated and rendered ‘tactically’ 
impotent. (Cloninger, 2009: 3) 
 
In the following works, content appropriated from social media 
platforms is displayed ‘outside’ them, such that they are less 
reliant on the economy of the platforms themselves. 
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Fig. 3.2 Infinite Violets, 2012, screenshot 1 (homepage), p. 117.
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Fig. 3.3 Infinite Violets, 2012, screenshot 2, p. 119.
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Fig. 3.4 Infinite Violets, 2012, screenshot 3, p. 121.
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Infinite Violets 
Infinite Violets was the final computer-generated text work. 
Here, I incorporated user-generated images from Flickr as a 
different way to explore my authorship in relation to content 
created and shared by other people. I also wanted to integrate 
images more fully than I had done in the previous works. The 
use of images from Flickr added a layer of complexity in 
relation to my author position, prompting questions of 
copyright and how to attribute the images appropriated in the 
work.  
 
The impetus for the work was an invitation to participate in an 
exhibition at the Blythe Gallery, London (Throwing Perfume on 
Violets, 2013).52 The premise of the exhibition was an 
exploration of notions of excess and embellishment, and its 
title was taken from a verse of Shakespeare’s play King John: 
Therefore, to be possess’d with double pomp, 
To guard a title that was rich before, 
                                                
52	  Later,	  the	  work	  was	  also	  exhibited	  online	  as	  part	  of	  the	  My	  Shakespeare	  
Festival	  (Royal	  Shakespeare	  Company,	  no	  date:	  n.p).	  This	  required	  me	  to	  ‘re-­‐
package’	  the	  work	  for	  this	  context,	  creating	  a	  still	  that	  could	  go	  on	  the	  website,	  
and	  writing	  an	  explanatory	  text	  different	  to	  the	  one	  on	  the	  work’s	  homepage.	  	  
To gild refined gold, to paint the lily, 
To throw a perfume on the violet, 
To smooth the ice, or add another hue 
Unto the rainbow, or with taper-light 
To seek the beauteous eye of heaven to garnish, 
Is wasteful and ridiculous excess. (Shakespeare, 2015, 
4.2: 9–16) 
in response to the exhibition theme, I proposed to permute 
this verse using the same algorithmic process I had been 
working with. The conceit was that generating millions of 
versions of Shakespeare’s poetry was a form of digital, hyper-
textual embellishment. 
This work allowed me to re-visit the ‘problem’ of the aesthetic 
dimensions of the computer-generated text works, as 
described in Practice 1. As well as a database of synonyms, I 
created a database of Flickr images. To find these, I took each 
synonym and searched for images tagged with that word, or 
containing it in the related text posted by the user.53  
As noted in Practice 1, texts can be broken into component 
parts (words), with naturally existing correlates (synonyms), 
                                                
53	  Using	  the	  tags	  and	  accompanying	  text	  widened	  the	  scope	  of	  available	  images.	  
If	  I	  had	  been	  taking	  a	  digital	  sociological	  approach,	  I	  may	  have	  limited	  the	  
search	  to	  just	  tags,	  in	  order	  to	  infer	  something	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	  images	  and	  users’	  practices	  of	  tagging.	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which enable them to be permuted. Images cannot be 
permuted in the same way, since they do not have equivalent 
kinds of component parts or synonyms. Once selected, the 
images were not broken into component parts, but put in a 
sequence that matched the order of words in the permuted 
text. In other words, whenever a new textual variation of the 
verse was generated, the computer program generated a 
slideshow of 'corresponding' images (i.e. images tagged with 
the words in that permutation). Thus, with the images, 
permutation was only happening at the level of ordering, not at 
the level of the individual image itself. With the text, the 
permutations happened at the level of the text itself. 
A high degree of authorial intentionality was required in the 
selection of the images, which reinforced my earlier 
observations that despite the inauguration of computational 
systems, my authorial agency was still fully intact. The use of 
systems is better understood as a way of structuring my artistic 
activity than of negating my intentionality. I did not take a 
process-driven approach to the selection of the images (for 
example by selecting the first image for every search term), 
because this would have compromised the aesthetic quality of 
the work. There was a subjective, aesthetic evaluation involved 
in choosing the images, which was not the case with text. I 
looked for high-resolution images that I felt would have a 
strong visual impact. The selection of the images was part of 
setting up the structure of the work, which involved a high 
degree of intentional, subjective decision making on my part. 
The use of Creative Commons licences 
As I moved towards the web as a context and location for my 
practice, it became clear that questions of copyright, 
authorship and ownership were at stake when appropriating 
other people’s cultural productions. As an artist and 
researcher, it was important to me to take a socially 
responsible approach to the use of other people’s images, out 
of respect for the authors and a desire to behave ethically 
within online communities. This became an increasingly 
significant area of focus as the research progressed. Here, I 
only selected images that had been published under Creative 
Commons licences that permit people to modify, adapt, or 
build upon the images. 
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The Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation, founded in 
2001, which aims to ‘build a layer of reasonable copyright on 
top of the extremes that now reign’ (Lessig, 2004: 282, italics in 
original). Creative Commons offers a free set of licences, which 
anyone can apply to their content without the need of a lawyer. 
These licences make it ‘simple for creators to express the 
freedom for others to take and build upon their work’ (Lessig, 
2004: 282). Lessig’s description of Creative Commons licences 
expresses their ideological as well as practical underpinnings: 
A Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of 
freedom to anyone who accesses the license, and more 
importantly, an expression of the ideal that the person 
associated with the license believes in something 
different than the ‘All’ or ‘No’ extremes. Content is 
marked with the CC mark, which does not mean that 
copyright is waived, but that certain freedoms are given. 
(Lessig, 2004: 282) 
In Infinite Violets, whenever an image appears on screen, the 
name of the author and the licence they used appears as a 
hyperlink on the bottom right of the screen, which acts as a 
credit to the original author. At any point, the viewer can visit 
the original source of the images included in the work. Infinite 
Violets is licensed under the most restrictive Creative Commons 
licence applied to the images that comprise the work, which is 
an Attribution-Non Commercial-ShareAlike licence. This licence 
‘lets others remix, tweak, and build upon your work non-
commercially, as long as they credit you and license their new 
creations under the identical terms’ (Creative Commons, no 
date: n.p). The use of Creative Commons–licensed images from 
Flickr limited the images that could be included, but enabled 
me to implement a relatively simple process for ensuring a fair 
and lawful use of content created by other people. Later works 
using content from other platforms that do not promote the 
use of Creative Commons licences generated more complex 
copyright issues, which are discussed in Practice 4 and Chapter 
4. 
How the work was displayed 
The inclusion of Infinite Violets in a gallery exhibition prompted 
me to consider how the work might manifest differently in 
online and physical spaces. I was conflicted about whether to 
participate in Throwing Perfume on Violets, because exhibiting in 
a conventional gallery seemed at odds with the opportunity 
web-based art offered to circumvent conventional forms of 
dissemination. However, opting out on this basis seemed a 
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wasted opportunity, especially given that I had not come to any 
conclusions about the implications of exhibiting web-based 
artworks in physical spaces, so I decided to take part. Perhaps 
in an attempt to reach a compromise, I chose not to physically 
install the work in the gallery, but to provide small cards with a 
QR code so that viewers had to view the work either on mobile 
devices in the gallery or on other devices elsewhere (see Fig. 
3.5). This was a way to be involved with the exhibition, but still 
point to the fact that the work was located ‘outside’ a gallery 
context. It was also intended to acknowledge the fact that a 
work displayed on the web would inevitably be seen in 
different contexts on different devices, which were beyond my 
control. 
 
Fig. 3.5 Cards with QR code link to Infinite Violets, 2012.  
 
The QR code approach was problematic because many of the 
gallery visitors did not have QR code readers downloaded on 
their mobile phones. At the private view, my ad hoc response to 
this was to physically walk around with a laptop, and personally 
show the work to individuals or small groups. This was an early 
indication that the experience of the artwork in a gallery is 
inherently different to the experience of the artwork online. In 
later works, I became more reconciled to the idea that web-
based works can reasonably be exhibited in a range of contexts 
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and locations, which require different treatments and 
realization. This is discussed in more detail in the Practice 
Review, in relation to Joe Hamilton’s work Hypergeography. 
Summary 
Computational generative processes are subject to new 
constraints when carried out online, as demonstrated by the 
fact that automating the posts in 1000 Truly Original Ideas 
would have breached Tumblr’s community guidelines. They 
also have different effects, as demonstrated by the confusion I 
caused by posting computer-generated texts on my Facebook 
timeline. I found that my authorial agency on Tumblr is 
hybridized with the authorial agency of other people, whose 
cultural productions are included in my Tumblr. Using Tumblr 
prompted me to question the value of likes, comments and 
reblogs as a form of audience attention. I found that whether 
or not this form of attention is desirable, it is not provided by 
the platform itself – the artist or cultural producer has to build 
an audience on the platform by posting content there and 
interacting with the community. In order to establish a 
reflective distance from corporate social media, I chose not to 
use Tumblr or other platforms as a medium for displaying 
subsequent artworks. The use of Flickr in Infinite Violets added a 
layer of complexity in relation to my author position and the 
appropriation of other people’s images. The use of Creative 
Commons licences provided a way to take a socially 
responsible approach to this. A high degree of authorial 
intentionality was required in the selection of images, which 
was not automated, as I wanted to retain control over the 
aesthetic quality of the work. The work thus used computation 
not just as an end in itself, but as a means of prompting 
intentional decisions about what it should include. An invitation 
to display the work in an exhibition revealed a personal conflict 
over whether the gallery was an appropriate context for the 
work. My use of a QR code that invited people to view the work 
on a mobile device was only partially successful, as many 
people did not have QR code readers on their phones. This 
demonstrated that web-based artworks are experienced 
differently depending on where and on what device they are 
displayed and viewed. 
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Fig. 3.6 Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase, 2013 (nude version), screenshot, p. 131.
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Fig. 3.7 Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase, 2013 (noodle version), screenshot, p. 133.
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Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a 
Staircase 
This work represents a significant turning point in my 
practice, as it was the first piece that I consider to be ‘natively 
digital’ in DMI terms. It deploys an automated technique of 
data collection to access images through the Flickr API. A 
number of people, with varying degrees of authorial 
intentionality, are involved in the aesthetic production of Flickr 
Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase: Arthur Webb, who 
programmed the work, viewers who intentionally interact 
with or participate in it and Flickr users whose images are 
included without their knowledge. The work is distinct 
amongst the other submitted works, in that it offers the 
‘viewer’ the opportunity to contribute. 
Genealogy part 1: laptop performance 
In the early stages of my research I spent time experimenting 
with the everyday features of my computer and the web. I 
played with the aesthetic qualities of browser windows, tabs 
and images found online, as well as with basic applications 
available on my laptop. This was a way of familiarizing myself 
with the idea of my computer and the web as materials for 
my practice. Amongst these initial experiments was a short 
video, made with iShowU (Apple’s basic screen capturing 
application) to record myself ‘performing’ with 70 open 
browser windows on my laptop (see Fig. 3.8). I had been 
experimenting with arranging large numbers of windows on 
my computer, and found a diagonally descending 
configuration of windows formally pleasing. The appearance 
of the windows brought Marcel Duchamp’s 1912 painting 
Nude Descending a Staircase to mind, so I decided to use 
images of it as the content of the browser windows. I 
searched Google for ‘Nude Descending a Staircase’, and 
opened up a new browser window for each of the first 70 
results that were returned. I arranged each new window on 
top of the last, lining them up as precisely as possible. The 
‘performance’ began by starting iShowU and then closing 
each browser window in sequence, starting at the bottom 
right of the screen and moving up towards the top left. The 
performance was recorded in one take in real time, which 
took several attempts.
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Fig. 3.8 Search results for ‘Nude descending a staircase’ in multiple browser windows, screenshot.
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I then reversed the video so it appeared that the windows 
were descending across the screen, echoing the composition 
of Duchamp’s painting. Although I was pleased to have 
created a digital version of Duchamp’s work, I was frustrated 
with the apparent discord between the content of the work 
and the medium in which it was realized, i.e. video. I felt that 
making a web-based version would resolve this by bringing 
the form and content of the work closer together. It was not 
until after I had attended the DMI Summer School, however, 
that I found a way of realizing a web-based version of the 
work (see the Methodology chapter) for a discussion of digital 
methods). 
Genealogy part 2: web version 
Having attended the DMI summer school and learned about 
the automatic collection of data through APIs, I was able to re-
imagine this work for the web. I began to conceive of ‘nude’ as 
a search term, and ‘descending a staircase’ as a format in 
which the results of this search could be displayed. The web-
based version therefore needed an application that could 
obtain images tagged with ‘nude’ and display them in a 
browser. I decided to work with Flickr again, as it has a 
publicly–available API, and was a good source of images in 
previous work.54  
The application uses a mixture of HTML,55 CSS,56 JavaScript,57 
JQuery58 and PhP59 to search Flickr for images tagged with 
‘nude’ and display them in a descending staircase formation 
across the browser window. Once the viewer has entered the 
main page, it retrieves the keyword ‘nude’ and passes this on 
to a PhP page that in turn makes a call to the Flickr API to get 
a set of pictures associated with the keyword. The pictures 
are received in reverse chronological order of posting, i.e. the 
most recent image tagged with the keyword is displayed first.  
                                                
54	  I	  considered	  using	  Instagram,	  but	  felt	  that	  the	  aesthetic	  qualities	  of	  
Instagram	  photographs	  such	  as	  the	  square	  format,	  frames	  and	  faux	  vintage	  
filters	  would	  dominate	  the	  work	  too	  much.	  
55	  HTML	  stands	  for	  hypertext	  mark	  up	  language.	  It	  is	  ‘the	  Web’s	  core	  language	  
for	  creating	  documents	  and	  applications	  for	  everyone	  to	  use,	  anywhere’	  
(W3C,	  2016:	  n.p).	  	  
56	  ‘CSS	  is	  a	  stylesheet	  language	  that	  describes	  the	  presentation	  of	  an	  HTML	  (or	  
XML)	  document’	  (W3Schools,	  2016a:	  n.p).	  
57 ‘JavaScript	  is	  the	  programming	  language	  of	  HTML	  and	  the	  Web’	  
(W3Schools,	  2016c:	  n.p).	  
58	  ‘JQuery	  is	  a	  JavaScript	  Library’	  (W3Schools,	  2016d:	  n.p).	  	  
59 ‘PhP	  is	  a	  server	  scripting	  language,	  and	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  making	  dynamic	  
and	  interactive	  Web	  pages’	  (W3Schools,	  2016e:	  n.p).	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When one staircase of 15 pictures has been displayed the 
page again calls PhP, which in turn calls Flickr for the next set 
of 15. These pictures are displayed in a second staircase 150 
pixels to the right of the first staircase. The number of images 
per flight of stairs is modifiable, as is the number of flights, 
the gradient and step height.60 
As well as the main working page, the work comprises three 
static pages (‘Home’, ‘About’ and ‘Archive’). ‘Home’ provides 
some basic introductory text and gives the viewer the option 
to visit the ‘nude’ or ‘noodle’ version of the work. ‘About’ 
instructs viewers on how to interact with the work, and 
‘Archive’ stores viewers’ staircases (described below). The 
work underwent several iterations, with significant changes 
being made to its design, navigation and functionality. Three 
versions of the homepage and eighteen versions of the main 
page were created. Appendix 1 provides detailed 
documentation of aesthetic and functional changes to the 
                                                
60	  In	  the	  original	  version,	  after	  six	  staircases,	  the	  browser	  window	  was	  wiped	  
out	  and	  the	  process	  continued	  again	  from	  the	  top	  left	  with	  the	  next	  set	  of	  15	  
pictures.	  This	  whole	  process	  continued	  until	  the	  page	  was	  closed	  or	  refreshed.	  
We	  realized,	  however	  that	  this	  could	  be	  very	  frustrating	  for	  viewers	  who	  were	  
waiting	  to	  take	  a	  screenshot	  of	  their	  custom	  staircase	  at	  a	  particular	  moment,	  
only	  to	  find	  it	  wiped.	  
main page. Screenshots of the homepage can be seen in Figs. 
3.9 and 4.0 below.
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Fig.	  3.9	  Flickr Nudes Descending a Staircase,	  homepage	  version	  1,	  2013,	  screenshot.	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Fig.	  4.0	  Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase,	  homepage	  version	  2,	  2013,	  screenshot.
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Changes made to the homepage depended on changes to the 
functionality of the main page. For example, as new features 
and pages were added it became necessary to create a menu 
on the homepage. The most significant change was in version 
2 of the homepage, which removed all ‘explanatory’ text, 
placing greater emphasis on graphic design. This was an 
attempt to create greater visual consistency in this work and 
my personal website www.otheragents.net, following 
discussions at the PhD transfer stage about maintaining a 
consistent professional online identity. Although the look of 
version 2 achieved this consistency, the lack of text on the 
homepage made less explicit the viewer’s ability to choose 
which version of the work to enter. I wanted the work to be 
open to as many people as possible, so I reverted back to a 
version that included the explanatory text and a menu 
offering navigation to the other pages. 
The introduction of the term ‘noodle’, described on page 31, 
suggested there was potential for the work to be further 
modified by the viewer; if they could search for ‘noodle’ 
instead of ‘nude’, why not other terms as well? Following this 
we enabled the viewer to edit the keyword at the end of the 
URL of the main page so they could create a staircase of 
images associated with any chosen keyword. Following this, 
we introduced a further series of features. The search field is 
the main mechanism by which the viewer can interact with 
the work. A ‘staircase capture’ function allows the viewer to 
take an automatic screenshot of their staircase and submit it 
to an archive (see Fig. 4.1). This feature creates a visible 
record of how people have contributed to the work over time, 
but has not been used very heavily. Seven staircases were 
captured at the private view of Everything Wants to Run 
(discussed below), for the terms ‘pregnant’, ‘plaster’, ‘noel 
Edmunds’, ‘jim tetlow’, ‘goode’, ‘gary savage’ and ‘cheesy’. It 
may not be obvious that capturing a staircase is a possibility, 
or people may just not want to do it. The archive 
demonstrates that the presence of an interactive element in 
itself does not guarantee interaction, just as placing an 
artwork on Tumblr does not guarantee an audience, as 
discussed in Practice 2. The ‘African Dance’ staircase (see Fig. 
4.2) was created during the display of the work at the 2014 
Screening Scholarship Media Festival (Camra, 2014), which 
shows that the promotion of the work at a physical event 
prompts engagement with its interactive elements. 
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Various feedback points (PhD transfer stage, informal 
feedback from friends and colleagues, showing the work in an 
exhibition) revealed that it was not obvious to viewers that 
they could contribute to the work, and that better navigation 
and signposting were required. To encourage viewers to 
contribute, I created iconographic buttons for the actions 
‘slow down’, ‘speed up’, ‘pause’, ‘step back’, ‘view stats’, 
‘capture’, ‘customize’, ‘refresh’, ‘view archive’ and ‘home’ (see 
version 2.7 in Appendix 1). These buttons were designed to 
look like a media player interface, in the hope that this would 
feel intuitive to the viewer.
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Fig.	  4.1	  ‘Bergen’	  staircase,	  created	  by	  Anitra,	  Friday,	  15	  November	  2013,	  screenshot.
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Fig. 4.2 ‘African Dance’ staircase, created by Rafiat, Sunday, 2 March 2014, screenshot.
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Genealogy part 3: gallery version
 
Fig. 4.3 Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase, installation view, Block 336 Gallery, 2013.
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Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase was exhibited as 
part of the exhibition Everything Wants to Run held at Block 
336 Gallery, Brixton, London, 2013 (Block 336, 2016). It was 
displayed as a wall mounted projection with a wirelessly 
connected keyboard and mouse housed on a freestanding 
support (see Fig. 4.3). Instructions for how to ‘use’ the work 
were adapted from the ‘About’ page of the website and 
pinned to the wall next to the keyboard and mouse (see Fig. 
4.4). 
As noted in the Methodology chapter, artists working in the 
field of web-based art have to negotiate the display of their 
work for the web and physical spaces, which has presented 
new challenges to artists, museums and curators (Gere, 2004; 
Christiane Paul, 2008; Graham & Cook, 2010; Sabine 
Hochrieser et al., 2009). Adapting my work for exhibition 
settings became a necessary ‘method’ as opportunities to 
show the work in physical spaces arose. As Hochrieser et al. 
note: ‘showing a net artwork in the real space means more 
than simply re-presenting it but also reformatting it for the 
best possible experience – in a physical exhibition space with 
all the features and traits it can be specified with’ (Hochrieser 
et al., 2009: 50). 
Fig. 4.4 Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase, gallery instructions.
 
FLICKR NUDE OR NOODLE DESCENDING A STAIRCASE !"#$!%&'!()*(+',!+#!-#)+&(.$+'!+#!%)!#)/#()/!0+%(&-%0'!%&-1(*'2!31(-1!-#)+%()0!0-&'')01#+0!#4!0'%&-1'0!5%,'!.6!5'5.'&0!#4!+1'!7$.8(-9!:'&';0!1#3!(+!3#&<0=!
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Here, it was important that the viewer could not easily exit the 
work and browse the web, so we created a ‘gallery mode’. 
This removed the ‘home’ button so that during the exhibition, 
viewers could only view the main page or the archive page. 
The archive page was set to open in a new window, and 
included a link back to the main page, which further 
structured viewers’ navigation of the work. The browser was 
set to ‘display mode’, and HTML was used to position the 
buttons so that viewers were less likely to hover over the 
toolbar and make it appear in the display. This did occur 
several times during the private view, and there were 
moments when viewers clicked somewhere that caused the 
desktop of the computer to appear. There were several 
occasions when the work could not run due to interruptions 
to the gallery’s broadband connection, and because, at one 
point, the Flickr website itself went down. These kinds of 
contingency still remain an inherent part of web-based works. 
Viewing and/or interacting with the work in a gallery setting is 
significantly different to doing so on a personal computer or 
mobile device, not only because of the scale and aesthetic 
transformation of the work in a gallery space, but because in 
a gallery, interacting with and contributing to the work 
becomes a public act. One viewer noted that they felt they 
were ‘on stage’ when searching for a term in the gallery.61 
Another visitor spilt his drink on the floor by the stand where 
the keyboard and mouse were positioned. After quietly 
mopping up the spilt liquid and ice, he typed in ‘spilt’ and 
stood and watched the staircase unfolding before moving on. 
It was a poignant moment that offered another sense of how 
the work is nuanced by the participants’ actions in the gallery 
space.
                                                
61	  When	  discussing	  this	  during	  a	  supervision,	  Dr.	  Tim	  O’Riley	  told	  an	  anecdote	  
about	  his	  cat,	  who	  was	  very	  shy	  and	  wouldn’t	  come	  into	  the	  room	  when	  his	  
friend,	  Hans-­‐Jörg	  visited.	  Later,	  Tim	  had	  a	  Skype	  meeting	  with	  Hans-­‐Jörg,	  
during	  which	  the	  cat	  jumped	  on	  Tim’s	  lap	  (Hans-­‐Jörg	  no	  longer	  posing	  a	  threat	  
as	  a	  digital	  version	  of	  himself).	  The	  interesting	  thing	  was	  Hans-­‐Jörg’s	  reaction	  
–	  he	  was	  shocked	  to	  see	  the	  cat!	  He	  hadn't	  accounted	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
would	  behave	  very	  differently	  when	  its	  ‘audience’	  took	  on	  a	  digital	  form.	  The	  
point	  is	  that	  the	  viewer	  of	  this	  work	  is	  likely	  to	  behave	  differently	  when	  
engaging	  with	  it	  online	  in	  relative	  privacy,	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  physical	  presence	  
of	  others.	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The role of the viewer: interaction, 
participation, collaboration 
The decision to allow the viewer to interact with the work was 
a departure in my practice thaht offered a way to explore the 
artwork as an ‘interactive’ domain, or, as Bourriaud puts it, a 
‘generator of activities’ (Bourriaud, 2002a: 13). As viewers now 
had a more significant role, it was necessary to articulate their 
input in the production of the work. The active role of the 
viewer in the production of art has an historical precedent, 
independent of the web. Tim O’Riley states: 
Artistic activity (perhaps over and above production)[62] 
engenders viewer activity, the artist’s role being, 
perhaps, to structure and question the nature, type 
and purpose of this activity. The work’s meaning is 
revealed through the conjunction of viewer, work and 
                                                
62	  For	  O’Riley,	  ‘activity’	  is	  a	  broader	  term	  than	  ‘production’	  as	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  
ripple	  effect	  of	  the	  artwork	  beyond	  itself,	  which	  is	  expressed	  through	  the	  
conjunction	  of	  viewer,	  work,	  and	  world.	  ‘Production’	  refers	  more	  specifically	  
to	  ‘the	  work’	  –	  whatever	  form	  it	  takes.	  For	  me,	  ‘production’	  is	  a	  broad	  term	  
referring	  to	  activity,	  rather	  than	  the	  artwork.	  The	  consideration	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  viewer	  in	  this	  work	  demonstrates	  that	  even	  at	  the	  point	  of	  reception,	  my	  
interest	  is	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  ‘production’.	  One	  can	  produce	  something	  without	  
‘authoring’	  it.	  
world, in a process that is ultimately ﬂuid, dynamic and 
mobile. (O’Riley, 2006: 2) 
As noted in the Literature Review, postmodernist theories 
posited that the reader’s active role in the production of a 
work’s meaning was important in re-evaluating the author’s 
hegemonic status. For Alan Kirby, however, digital culture 
makes the reader’s mental, interpretive role literal, as readers 
can literally and visibly shape the development of a text such 
as a Wikipedia page, blog, or social media site. For Kirby, 
‘digimodernism’ has created a new form of textuality, in which 
functional titles such as ‘reader, author, viewer, producer, 
director, listener, presenter, writer’ are disrupted, and given 
new, hybridized meanings (Kirby 2009: 52). He states: 
The digimodernist text in its pure form is made up to a 
varying degree by the reader or viewer or textual 
consumer. This figure becomes authorial in this sense: 
s/he makes text where none existed before. It isn’t that 
his/her reading is of a kind to suggest meanings; there 
is no metaphor here. In an act distinct from their act of 
reading or viewing, such a reader or viewer gives to 
the world textual content or shapes the development 
and progress of a text in visible form. (Kirby 2009: 51) 
Viewers of Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase can 
both read (in the postmodernist sense) and visibly shape the 
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development of the work, which prompted me to explore 
various terms that could describe their activity: ‘interaction’, 
‘participation’ and ‘collaboration’. This helped me reflect on 
the varying levels of viewer activity, and consider whether this 
was something I wanted to foster further in my practice. 
Graham and Cook provide ‘quick and usable’ definitions of the 
terms ‘interaction’, ‘participation’ and ‘collaboration’ in 
Rethinking Curating (Graham & Cook, 2010: 112–114). The 
following table (Fig. 4.5) is adapted from their book, 
summarizing definitions and characteristics of these terms. I 
used this to map the different ways in which the viewer can 
apprehend and/or visibly shape Flickr Nude or Noodle 
Descending a Staircase. As Fig. 4.5 demonstrates, there are 
overlaps where activities could be considered both interactive 
and/or participative, suggesting that the terms are sometimes 
interchangeable, and that ‘recording’ isn’t a pre-requisite for, 
but rather one factor that can identify participation. Graham 
and Cook note: 
Some have argued that an artwork can ‘act upon’ a 
human in terms of a mental or emotional reaction, but 
considering that some kind of human reaction can be 
expected from any kind of external stimulus, then this 
‘default option’ makes almost everything ‘interactive’, 
and then the word becomes an inaccurate catch-all. 
(Graham & Cook, 2010: 112–113) 
In line with this, I do not consider the creation of a mental or 
emotional reaction in the viewer as constituting ‘interactivity’ 
in my work, and so have not included ‘just’ viewing the work in 
the table. Importantly, where the work is being viewed or 
interacted with has a bearing on the nature of the viewer 
activity. For example, a viewer’s motivation to enter a 
particular search term or pause a staircase at a certain 
moment may be different in public or private, and it could 
create a greater effect between viewers in the public setting.
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Activity 
category 
Category description Viewer activity 
Reaction  ‘A human presses keys or triggers 
sensors, and the machine or computer 
program reacts’ 
Is often popularly (falsely) termed 
‘interaction’ 
View nude or noodle staircase 
and use pause/speed up/slow 
down buttons  
Interaction ‘Acting upon each other’ 
Can occur between people, between 
people and machines, between machines, 
or between artwork and audience 
Create staircase 
Capture staircase 
Add comments to created 
staircase 
Participation ‘To have a share in or take part in’ 
Implies that the participant can have 
some kind of input that is recorded. 
Involves not just getting reactions, but 
also changing the artwork’s content 
Create staircase 
Capture staircase 
Add comments to created 
staircase 
Collaboration ‘Working jointly with’ 
Implies the production of something with 
a degree of equality between the 
participants. Concerns production more 
than relationship between artwork and 
audience 
N/A  
 
Fig. 4.5 Table adapted from Graham and Cook (2010: 112–114).
 150
Interactive Art (as an art historical field) connotes a haptic, 
sensorial approach, in which embodiment plays a central role 
and the activation of the work depends on physical 
interaction in space, typically an installation. As Erkki 
Huhmato states in his recollection of early interactive art, ‘the 
visitor was not only allowed, but required to touch the work. 
The touch – often physical, but sometimes “virtualized”, 
mediated by a videocamera or a microphone, was essential’ 
(Huhmato, 2004: 2).63 Although Flickr Nude or Noodle 
Descending a Staircase does invite the viewer to physically 
interact by using a series of buttons, it is not concerned with 
the senses or embodiment through those interactions. It is 
therefore reasonable to use the common sense of 
‘interaction’ to describe people’s engagement with the work, 
but this does not mean it fits into the art historical field of 
Interactive Art. 
                                                
63	  Bosma	  is	  critical	  of	  superficially	  constructed	  forms	  of	  interaction:	  ‘The	  much	  
sought	  after	  “interactivity”	  does	  not	  reside	  in	  well	  designed	  interfaces	  and	  
interesting	  buttons	  to	  push	  (or	  windows	  to	  fill),	  but	  lies	  hidden	  within	  the	  
presence	  of	  the	  audience	  inside	  the	  network.	  Collaborations	  of	  variable	  
intensity,	  exploration	  of	  networked	  art	  pieces	  and	  the	  discourse	  around	  these	  
are	  causing	  the	  audience	  to	  directly	  enter	  the	  realm	  of	  critical	  and	  artistic	  
practice	  simultaneously’	  (Bosma,	  2000:	  n.p).	  
As shown above, certain forms of viewer activity can be 
understood as participative according to Graham and Cook’s 
definition. However, the term ‘participation’ is also widely 
adopted and critically examined in the broader culture of 
socially and politically engaged art. In her 2006 book 
Participation, Claire Bishop emphasizes the social dimensions 
of participation, rather than the ‘activation of the individual 
viewer in so-called “interactive” art and installation’ facilitated 
by digital technologies (Bishop, 2006a: 10). She states that 
participatory art is underpinned by three concerns – 
activation, authorship, and community. The first involves ‘the 
desire to create an active subject, one who will be 
empowered by the experience of physical or symbolic 
participation’ (Bishop, 2006a: 12). The second pivots around 
ceding authorial control, which is ‘conventionally regarded as 
more egalitarian and democratic than the creation of a work 
by a single artist’ (Bishop, 2006a: 12). The third is about ‘a 
restoration of the social bond through a collective elaboration 
of meaning’ (Bishop, 2006a: 12).64 
                                                
64	  Bishop	  criticizes	  discourses	  of	  participation	  that	  eclipse	  the	  aesthetic	  impact	  
of	  art,	  focusing	  instead	  on	  the	  models	  of	  collaborative	  practice	  they	  offer,	  or	  
the	  ‘ameliorative’	  effects	  they	  yield	  for	  society	  (Jennifer	  Roche,	  2008:	  202).	  
She	  notes	  that	  ‘accusations	  of	  mastery	  and	  egocentrism	  are	  levelled	  at	  artists	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Both socially engaged and new media art have ‘languages for 
identifying different types of participative relationships 
between artwork and audience’, which are ‘not shared by the 
general world of contemporary art’ (Graham & Cook, 2010: 
116). Understanding these languages helped me situate the 
work in a context that makes sense of what the work ‘does’. 
The viewer activities enabled in Flickr Nude or Noodle 
Descending a Staircase are better described by the 
vocabularies of new media art than socially engaged art, since 
its aim was not to produce a non-hierarchical social model, 
empower the subject or heal a social bond. Viewers can be 
considered to interact with and participate in the work, 
according to Graham and Cook’s definition of these terms, 
which overlap. This does not mean, however, that Flickr Nude 
or Noodle Descending a Staircase fits into the category of 
Participatory Art. 
Like Graham and Cook, Beech distinguishes between 
collaboration and participation: 
Collaborators…are distinct from participants insofar as 
they share authorial rights over the artwork that 
                                                
who	  work	  with	  participants	  to	  realize	  a	  project	  instead	  of	  allowing	  it	  to	  
emerge	  through	  consensual	  collaboration’	  (Bishop,	  2006b:	  180).	  
permit them, among other things, to make 
fundamental decisions about the key structural 
features of the work. That is, collaborators have rights 
that are withheld from participants. (Beech, 2008: 3) 
Similarly, I do not consider viewers who interact with or 
participate in the work as collaborators, as none of them 
make fundamental decisions about the structural features of 
the work. Even though people who create and contribute 
staircases ‘author’ aspects of the work, they were 
(intentionally) not involved as consensual collaborators. 
Arthur’s relatively high degree of authorial intentionality, as 
compared with other agents who contribute to the work’s 
production, prompted me to consider whether he was a 
‘collaborator’. Our intentional agreement to work towards a 
shared end could be seen as a collaborative form of working, 
and Arthur did have authorial rights that were withheld from 
other actors that contributed to its production, such as 
writing the code and engaging in discussions about the 
development of the work. However, fundamental decisions 
about the key structural features of the work were my 
responsibility, which indicates that Arthur was not a 
collaborator in Beech’s sense of the term. Arthur’s overall role 
is discussed above in the Methodology chapter. 
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The introduction of viewer interaction was also a way to 
explore my authorial agency in relation to others who ‘author’ 
aspects of the work. Returning to Sollfrank’s distinction 
between the net.art generator, and its results (the images 
people generate and submit to a database), a distinction can 
be made here between Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a 
Staircase, and its results (the staircases people create and 
submit to a database). I am clearly the author of the overall 
artwork, but the individuals can also be said to ‘author’ their 
own staircases.65 This points to the surplus connotations of 
extra-subjective authorship. Being co-present with but distinct 
from those contributing to the work allowed me to articulate 
what kinds of authorial activity was taking place in the work, 
and what was being generated through it. 
The role of hashtags  
My approach to and reflections about this work were 
influenced by my involvement with the DMI. In particular, 
                                                
65	  Questions	  of	  copyright	  were	  not	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  my	  mind	  in	  this	  work.	  
However,	  Sollfrank’s	  distinction	  between	  the	  authorship	  of	  the	  overall	  
artwork	  and	  the	  results	  it	  produces	  signals	  that	  different	  questions	  of	  
copyright	  would	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  respective	  aspects	  of	  the	  work.	  	  
digital methods allowed me to think about the non-human 
agents involved in the production of the work, including the 
hashtags, images and Flickr API. Of particular interest here 
were the hashtags, which I came to understand as digital 
objects that could be appropriated for art practice. In this 
work, they are the specific mechanism by which people’s 
Flickr images are aggregated and included. The hashtags are 
therefore as much a material aspect of the work as the 
images themselves. Clay Shirky describes the act of tagging as 
‘free form labelling, without regard to categorical constraints’ 
(Shirky, 2005: n.p). The lack of categorical constraints, which 
distinguishes tagging from traditional forms of classification 
such as those adopted by libraries, enables a form of user-
developed classification. This brings surprise and humour to 
the work when it displays images that seem incongruous with 
the keyword in play. For example, ‘Noodle’ typically returns 
images of bowls of actual noodles, but also intermittently 
returns cats, because people name their cats ‘Noodle’. Other 
images returned for noodle have included a toy, calligraphy 
pen, people at a mangafest convention and beer. User-
classification or tagging can be understood as a form of social 
practice, and hashtags are grounded within this context. They 
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are markers of human agency and subjectivity. In this work, I 
appropriate the images, hashtags and the social process of 
user classification that contextualizes and produces them. 
The appropriation of this social process of tagging as a 
contingent factor in the work produces unexpected and 
uncontrollable formations. This demonstrates that although 
the hashtags can be understood as digital objects, they also 
signify forms of social human agency. 
Summary 
I consider Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase to be 
my first ‘natively digital’ artwork, as it uses the web as a 
medium rather than a device for dissemination. Exhibiting the 
work in a gallery setting meant reformatting it for a physical 
space, demonstrating the need for web-based artists to 
negotiate the display of their work for the web and physical 
spaces. In a gallery setting, viewing, interacting with or 
contributing to the work became a public act, which created a 
sense of performativity that is not present when the work is 
viewed on a personal computer or mobile device. Flickr Nude 
or Noodle Descending a Staircase engenders different forms of 
viewer activity – including interacting or participating, and 
authoring – depending on how viewers engage with the work. 
Where they create and submit a staircase, they are the 
authors of that aspect of the work. The work thus incorporates 
various instances and degrees of authorial intentionality 
within its overall production. None of these instances 
diminish my role as the author of the overall work, but rather 
demonstrate how a surplus inheres in extra-subjective 
authorship. Hashtags played an important role in the work. 
They are seen as both digital objects and markers of human 
subjectivity and user classification. By appropriating hashtags, 
I also appropriate the social process of tagging, which 
produces unexpected formations within the work. After 
making Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase, I did not 
see interaction as a necessary component of future works, as 
I felt there was a risk of incorporating interactivity ‘for its own 
sake’. 
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Fig. 4.6 Selfie Portrait, 2014, screenshot 1 (homepage), p. 157.

 158
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 Selfie Portrait, 2014, screenshot 2, p. 159.
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Fig. 4.8 Selfie Portrait, 2014, screenshot 3, p. 161.
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Selfie Portrait 
Because selfies are images of selves, Selfie Portrait re-focused 
my attention on the production of subjectivities, and the term 
‘extra-subjectivity’.66 Part of my intention was to bring my 
reading of selfie-taking to the work: it is a shared, techno-
social process of producing subjectivities, enacted by millions 
of people. It produces an endless stream of selfies that 
highlights the tensions between sameness and individuality, 
exemplarity and exceptionality, structure (imposed by 
Instagram) and agency (enacted by Instagram users). Other 
intentions were to counter Andrew Keen’s argument that 
selfies are narcissistic, and to reflect (on) my understanding of 
them as representations of human subjectivities as opposed 
to ‘just’ digital objects or data. These intentions are discussed 
throughout the chapter.  
Selfie Portrait was originally motivated by an invitation to 
make an artwork for Virtualverbs.com, a website created by 
artist and curator Molly Richards. Contributing artists are 
invited to respond to a list of verbs relating to Internet 
                                                
66	  This	  work	  highlighted	  the	  entanglement	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  ‘identity’	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  web,	  which	  I	  discuss	  in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
practice and culture, and display the resulting artwork on the 
website (Richards, 2013).67 I chose to respond to the word 
‘selfie’ as it received significant media attention during 2013, 
which I felt would provide traction for the reception of the 
work.68 A selfie is ‘a photograph that one has taken of oneself, 
typically one taken with a smartphone or webcam and 
uploaded to a social media website’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 
2013: n.p). ‘Selfie’ was announced as the Oxford Dictionaries 
International Word of the Year in November 2013, and its 
frequency of use increased by 17,000% over the preceding 
year (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013: n.p). Jerry Saltz notes that 
selfies are ‘formally distinct’ and usually less technically 
accomplished or considered than traditional self-portraits 
(Saltz, 2014: 2). However, formal qualities or levels of technical 
accomplishment are not what fundamentally distinguish 
selfies from other forms of self-portraiture. 
                                                
67	  Richard	  Serra’s	  1967–68	  ‘Verb	  List’	  and	  Brandon	  Bauer’s	  ‘Post	  Internet	  Verb	  
List’	  influenced	  the	  list	  of	  verbs	  (Bauer,	  2011).	  Samantha	  Friedman	  notes	  that	  
Serra’s	  work	  lists	  ‘the	  infinitives	  of	  84	  verbs	  –	  to	  roll,	  to	  crease,	  to	  fold,	  to	  
store,	  etc.	  –	  and	  24	  possible	  contexts	  –	  of	  gravity,	  of	  entropy,	  of	  nature,	  etc’	  
(Friedman,	  2011:	  n.p).	  Bauer’s	  list	  re-­‐interprets	  Serra	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  
‘post-­‐Internet	  cultural	  situation’	  (Bauer,	  2011:	  4),	  and	  includes	  verbs	  such	  as	  
open,	  search,	  copy,	  merge,	  bitmap	  and	  encode	  (Bauer,	  2011:	  6).	  
68	  ‘Selfie’	  is	  listed	  as	  a	  verb	  on	  the	  site,	  although	  technically	  it	  is	  a	  noun.	  
 163 
Selfies are distinct because their form of transmission (being 
shared on a social network) constitutes their material 
condition. Although it is possible to take a self-portrait with a 
smartphone or webcam without sharing it on a social 
network, the sharing element is such a fundamental 
characteristic of the selfie, that I consider it to be a defining 
one.69 I therefore define selfies as photographs people have 
taken of themselves and shared on a social network. In this 
sense, a selfie is as much an event as an object. Rather than 
making a philosophical distinction between objects and 
events as discussed by Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi (2015: 
n.p), I am using ‘event’ here simply to indicate that as well as a 
material object, a selfie also ‘takes place’ at a specific time and 
place, within a techno-social context. 
‘Selfie’ is a popular Instagram hashtag, with 263,321,674 
photographs tagged #selfie on 16 February 2016 
(Iconosquare, 2016: n.p). This presented a rich opportunity to 
use Instagram as a source of material and to experiment with 
                                                
69	  The	  speed	  with	  which	  a	  self-­‐portrait	  becomes	  a	  selfie	  depends	  on	  the	  
software	  used.	  Selfies	  within	  the	  Instagram	  application	  are	  usually	  shared	  
immediately	  (although	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  avoid	  this	  by	  having	  one’s	  phone	  on	  
airplane	  mode	  –	  see	  Kolowich,	  2016:	  n.p).	  Selfies	  taken	  and	  edited	  outside	  
Instagram	  and	  published	  later	  have	  a	  longer	  time	  delay	  between	  being	  self-­‐
portraits	  and	  selfies.	  
using the Instagram API, which I had previously done at the 
DMI Winter School (see the Methodology chapter).70 
Instagram is an image-based social network that allows users 
to take photographs, apply one of a selection of visual filters, 
and then share them via Instagram, Flickr, Facebook and 
Twitter. It has various social capabilities: users can follow each 
other, like or comment on individual photographs, and 
mention each other in comments. Publicly–available 
photographs can also be hashtagged, so they can be retrieved 
via Instagram’s search function and appear on public tag 
pages, such as those provided by iconosquare.com. Tag 
pages display all the photographs people have uploaded with 
a particular hashtag. Instagram’s membership and use has 
grown rapidly since it launched in October 2010: one hundred 
and fifty million photos were uploaded by August 2011, 
twenty billion by August 2014. 
                                                
70	  Winnie	  Soon	  notes	  that	  ‘there	  is	  a	  growing	  trend	  for	  artists	  (such	  as	  JODI,	  
Jonathan	  Harris	  &	  Sep	  Kamvar,	  Jer	  Thorp	  and	  Shu	  Lea	  Cheang)	  to	  employ	  
available	  web	  APIs	  in	  their	  works’	  (Soon,	  2014:	  n.p).	  Discussing	  APIs	  as	  ‘art	  
making	  enablers’,	  she	  states:	  ‘First	  programmers,	  then	  artist/programmers,	  
then	  artists	  became	  involved	  in	  collecting,	  interpreting,	  and	  publishing	  from	  
the	  Internet;	  they	  include	  metadata	  as	  part	  of	  their	  artwork	  creation.	  As	  the	  
technical	  barriers	  have	  been	  removed,	  the	  public	  interface	  is	  a	  major	  resource	  
for	  artistic,	  creative,	  and	  technological	  practices.	  The	  results	  of	  such	  work	  
reveal	  the	  complex	  behavior	  and	  patterns	  of	  the	  metadata	  world’	  (Soon,	  
2011:	  4).	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There were ten million users by September 2011, eighty 
million users by July 2012, one hundred million users by 
February 2013, and two hundred million users by April 2014 
(Instagram, 2014c: n.p). Working with Instagram thus meant 
engaging with a vast edifice of imagery and associated 
metadata. 
Technical description 
Selfie Portrait uses PhP, JavaScript, JQuery, HTML and CSS. It 
also uses the Instagram API to retrieve and display Instagram 
photographs tagged with ‘selfie’ along with the biographical 
information of the people who posted them. The user 
provides this biographical information when they set up an 
account, and it is shown as part of their public profile. The 
question ‘How do people who post selfies on Instagram 
describe themselves?’ is displayed as a line of hyperlinked text 
on the homepage.71 When clicked, the link calls the working 
                                                
71 This question may appear to belong to the realm of digital sociology, 
where one might see it answered through a collection and analysis of 
selfies and biographical information as research data.  Here, however, the 
intention was not to ‘answer’ the question by making the artwork. Rather, 
the question struck me as a useful way to frame or introduce the work, and 
became an integral part of its presentation. 
page, which displays the selfies and the biographical 
descriptions associated with them. To get the selfies and 
biographical information, a daily scheduled PhP job runs in 
our Internet Service Provider’s server to prepare a JSON data 
file containing a list of the fifty most recent photographs 
tagged #selfie, each with the biographical information of the 
person who posted them.72 The JSON data files are stored in 
the server and numbered, so it is possible for the code to 
easily determine their chronological order. To prepare the 
JSON data file, the PhP makes two calls to Instagram 
requesting two pages’ worth of data describing the most 
recently posted photographs tagged #selfie. Instagram 
returns this data in JSON format, in chunks of approximately 
25 sets per page. Arthur experimented with how much data 
to request, as we got failures if we asked for too much. 
Instagram does not return any actual picture files, just image 
URLs indicating where the picture files are stored.  
                                                
72 We use a Cron job – ‘a scheduled task that is executed by the system at a 
specified time/date’ (Timme, no date: n.p). 
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The data includes the ID of the user who posted the image 
and for each one the PhP makes a further request to 
Instagram to get that user’s biographical information. The PhP 
saves an amalgamation of the image descriptions and 
biographical data in a JSON file as per the following example. 
{ 
 "username":"volkova__a", 
 "bio":"Hi\u270c I'm from Moscow, 
Russia\ud83c\uddf7\ud83c\uddfa I love musicals 
and theatre\ud83c\udfad Follow me \u2764", 
 "fullname":"Alina \ud83c\udf38", 
 "picture":"http:\/\/photos-
b.ak.instagram.com\/hphotos-ak-
xpf1\/10472015_452911991511745_1011449253_a.jpg"
, 
"link":"http:\/\/instagram.com\/p\/rT6p11RUKg\/"
, 
 "selfie":"http:\/\/scontent-
a.cdninstagram.com\/hphotos-xaf1\/t51.2885-
15\/10560996_438911692917495_640730622_a.jpg" } 
When a viewer loads the working page, a JavaScript function 
runs and asks the PhP to send the most recent JSON file that 
was prepared by the daily scheduled job. The working page 
then calls another JavaScript function to start the process of 
displaying the photographs. For each pairing of image URL 
and biographical information in the most recent JSON file, a 
hidden HTML table is created containing both elements. This 
is added to an empty div element on the working page.73 The 
JavaScript function then instructs the tables to successively 
fade in and out on a ten-second cycle. When the JavaScript 
gets to the end of the tables in the most recent file, it 
requests the second most recent, then the third, and so on 
until all files have been displayed. Should the JavaScript 
display all the files saved in the server, it would start the 
process again. 
Instagram requires authentication via user login in order to 
respond to certain data requests made on behalf of a user, 
such as commenting, liking, or browsing a user’s feed 
(Instagram, 2014a: n.p). 
                                                
73	  A	  div	  tag	  ‘defines	  a	  division	  or	  a	  section	  in	  an	  HTML	  document.	  The	  <div>	  
tag	  is	  used	  to	  group	  block-­‐elements	  to	  format	  them	  with	  CSS’	  (W3Schools,	  
2016b:	  n.p).	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Selfie Portrait does not make calls that require authentication, 
so we were able to just use our own client_id and hence not 
trouble the user with the need to log in to Instagram to view 
the artwork.74 However, Instagram limits the number of 
programmatic calls individual client_ids can make such that if 
we made a call every time anyone accessed the Selfie Portrait 
page, we could quickly run into that limit and be prevented 
from making further calls. To avoid this problem we chose to 
limit the number of calls we made per day and to store the 
retrieved data in a file on the server, which would be returned 
any time someone requested the Selfie Portrait page. Initially, 
this meant that only a set of approximately 200 photographs 
could be displayed during any one visit to the Selfie Portrait 
page. Once those had been displayed, a message appeared 
saying: ‘That is all the data we have retrieved for today, please 
visit the site again tomorrow.’ This was a significant limitation, 
because it meant that the stream of images came to an end 
within approximately 30 minutes, making it necessary to 
                                                
74	  The	  ‘client’	  is	  the	  application	  that	  attempts	  to	  access	  the	  data	  held	  within	  
Instagram.	  A	  client_id	  ‘simply	  associates	  your	  server,	  script,	  or	  program	  with	  a	  
specific	  application’	  (KonstantinSviridov,	  2015:	  n.p).	  Individuals	  who	  wish	  to	  
use	  the	  Instagram	  API	  are	  required	  to	  register	  their	  application	  by	  providing	  a	  
website	  URL,	  phone	  number	  and	  statement	  specifying	  what	  they	  intend	  to	  
build.	  We	  stated	  that	  we	  would	  be	  creating	  ‘an	  online	  art	  application’.	  
manually refresh the work. Once the page was refreshed 
viewers would then see the same set of images appearing 
again. This would have been practically problematic if it was 
displayed in a gallery setting, where an invigilator would have 
to regularly manually refresh the work. Beyond pragmatics, 
presenting an apparently endless stream of selfies was an 
important part of the work’s expressive properties, as 
discussed below. Our solution was to keep each day’s data 
and use it to extend the length of the sequence. There were 
soon enough files in the server to provide many hours of 
display without repetition. In June 2016, Instagram changed 
their API terms of use, which meant that we were unable to 
collect new data from that point on. This demonstrates that 
web-based artworks built using social media APIs are 
dependent on the API terms and conditions, and can cease to 
function if changes are implemented by the platform owners.  
 167 
Contextualizing selfies 
While developing Selfie Portrait, I undertook a focused review 
of literature on selfies in order to grasp the implications of 
how they have been positioned by social and cultural 
theorists, and to think through my own affective responses to 
selfies.75 Some scholars such as Keen (quoted in The Current, 
2013) and journalists such as Thomas Gorton (2014), dismiss 
selfies as narcissistic, whilst others, such as Sarah Gram 
(2013), Jenna Brager (2014) and Elizabeth Losh (no date) take 
a more nuanced position. Feminist critics exploring ‘different 
forms of agency in image making’, such as Natalie Hendry, Jill 
Walker Rettberg, and Teresa Senft, founder of the ‘Selfies 
Research Network’ Facebook group, propose that selfies can 
offer a form of empowerment (Losh, no date). However, Losh 
notes that it is important to be wary of over-simplified 
                                                
75	  In	  a	  straightforward	  sense,	  affect	  is	  ‘often,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  used	  as	  a	  
synonym	  for	  passion,	  sentiment,	  mood,	  feeling	  or	  emotion’	  (Shepherd,	  2016:	  
n.p).	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  philosophical	  and	  psychological	  explanations	  of	  
affect,	  see	  Shepherd	  (2016).	  For	  Simon	  O’Sullivan,	  affects	  are:	  ‘moments	  of	  
intensity,	  a	  reaction	  in/on	  the	  body	  at	  the	  level	  of	  matter.	  We	  might	  even	  say	  
that	  affects	  are	  immanent	  to	  matter.	  They	  are	  certainly	  immanent	  to	  
experience.	  (Following	  Spinoza,	  we	  might	  define	  affect	  as	  the	  effect	  another	  
body,	  for	  example	  an	  art	  object,	  has	  upon	  my	  own	  body	  and	  my	  body’s	  
duration.)’	  (O’Sullivan,	  2001:	  126).	  
narratives of empowerment, and that photographically 
documenting oneself has the potential to be both expressive 
and repressive (Losh, no date). Gram views selfies as a form 
of labour under capital, which both demands and punishes 
young women’s attempts to render themselves visible 
through adorning and representing their bodies in particular 
ways. The selfie is ‘clearly the product of work, both on the 
body and on the representation of the body... [it] is both a 
representation of and, in the case of social media sites like 
Instagram and Facebook, an opportunity for the public 
recognition of that labour’ (Gram, 2013: n.p). She states that 
the problem is not whether selfies are narcissistic or 
empowering, but that young women’s bodies are 
commodified and entered into an attention economy. 
Although Selfie Portrait does not focus only on young women, 
Gram’s framing of selfies as a form of labour prompted me to 
think about whether I was exploiting this labour when I 
appropriated selfies. The issue of labour is discussed in the 
Literature Review, Practice 4, Chapter 4 and the conclusion. 
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In The Cult of the Amateur, Keen claims: 
MySpace and Facebook are creating a youth culture of 
digital narcissism… the YouTube generation are more 
interested in self-expression than in learning about the 
outside world… kids are so busy self-broadcasting 
themselves on social networks that they no longer 
consume the creative work of professional musicians, 
novelists, or filmmakers. (Keen, 2007: xiii–xiv)  
These claims can be understood within his broader argument 
that the proliferation of ‘amateur’ content online presents an 
assault on ‘cultural standards’, ‘moral values’ and traditional 
institutions such as newspapers and news magazines (Keen, 
2007: 7). In a 2013 radio interview about selfies, he states that 
they too are an 'extreme form of narcissism in which we’re 
deluding ourselves by falling in love with ourselves and 
endlessly photographing ourselves’ (Keen, quoted in The 
Current, 2013: 04:40) 
I did not intend Selfie Portrait to illustrate an evaluative 
position on whether selfies are vehicles for narcissism. 
However, my affective response to them was informed by my 
response to Keen’s view, which I strongly reject. His argument 
implies that all forms of self-expression are narcissistic, which 
is incorrect. His accusations of narcissism appear to ignore 
the social motivations for self-expression online – selfies are 
not inwardly directed acts of self-admiration, but are created 
and shared as part of a techno-social process of producing 
subjectivities. As Jason Read notes, the subject is a social 
individual ‘not just in the sense that he or she lives in society, 
but in the sense that individuality can only be articulated, can 
only be produced, within society’ (Read, 2010: 119). Even if 
selfies were narcissistic, as Gram notes: 
Keen’s moral condemnation of the selfie as an act of 
narcissism is plainly unencumbered by any 
consideration that narcissism, as a personality trait, 
may not only be what capital expects but also demands 
from young girls, in order that they be legible as girls 
at all. (Gram, 2013: n.p italics in original)  
Rejecting Keen thus encouraged me to see selfies as the 
result of agential forms of image making and self-
representation that take place in a techno-social context, 
rather than as acts of narcissism. This in turn influenced the 
aesthetic development of the work, discussed further in the 
following section. 
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The expressive properties of Selfie Portrait 
In order to explore my intentions in the work, I tried to 
engender certain expressive properties through pace, 
duration, and the aesthetic reframing of selfies ‘outside’ 
Instagram. 
As noted above, the selfies are displayed at a contemplative 
pace that allows the viewer to attend to the variations and 
subtleties of the images. This contemplative pace can be 
contrasted with another selfie-related project, Selfeed.com, 
created by Tyler Madsen, Erik Carter and Jillian Mayer. 
Selfeed.com displays Instagram photographs tagged with 
#selfie in real time,76 resulting in a rapid succession of images 
that emphasizes the ‘transient superabundance’ of millions of 
selfies on Instagram (Brager, 2014: n.p). The project was 
featured on the dazeddigital.com website with the headline: 
‘Watch a livestream of every #selfie posted on Instagram; at 
last, a bearable way to look at selfies – really, really quickly’ 
(Gorton, 2014: n.p). The article states: ‘With this constant flow 
                                                
76	  ‘Real	  time’	  is	  not	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  Selfie	  Portrait.	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  of	  
technical	  limitations	  that	  forced	  us	  to	  store	  the	  selfies	  in	  our	  server.	  More	  
importantly,	  however,	  I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  foreground	  rapidity	  as	  Selfeed.com	  
does.	  
of photos you don’t get the opportunity to waste time 
lamenting about someone’s annoying selfie – just blink and 
you'll miss it’ (Gorton, 2014: n.p). The sentiment that selfies 
are an annoying waste of time is contrasted in Selfie Portrait, 
where the flow of photos is slowed down, allowing the viewer 
enough time to look at the selfies and the biographical 
information individually. The focus on attention and 
contemplation is a key part of the affect the work creates, 
presenting selfies as instances of agential image-making that 
deserve attention as a form of social self-representation 
rather than dismissal as narcissism. 
Alan Kirby’s concept of ‘onwardness’ was helpful for thinking 
through the durational aspect of the work. He contends that 
onwardness is a dominant feature of the digimodernist text, 
and describes it as follows: 
Onwardness: The digimodernist text exists now, in its 
coming into being, as something growing and 
incomplete. The traditional text appears to almost 
everyone in its entirety, ended, materially made. The 
digimodernist text, by contrast, is up for grabs: it is 
rolling, and the reader is plunged in among it as 
something that is ongoing. For the reader of the 
traditional text its time is after its fabrication; the time 
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of the digimodernist text seems to have a start but no 
end. (Kirby 2009: 52, italics in original) 
There is a sense of onwardness in Selfie Portrait, as it presents 
an endless, rolling stream of selfies in serial formation. This 
was an essential part of the work, as it highlights the fact that 
selfie-taking is an effectively endless, ongoing practice. Like 
Kirby’s digimodernist text, Selfie Portrait seems to have a start, 
but no end – it embodies a sense of something being set in 
motion, and the locus of my authorship is at this starting 
point. This does not, however, imply that myself or the 
artwork are ‘generators’ in Bourriaud’s sense: ‘The 
contemporary work of art does not position itself as the 
termination point of the “creative process” (a “finished 
product” to be contemplated) but as a site of navigation, a 
portal, a generator of activities’ (Bourriaud, 2002a: 13). 
Selfie Portrait does not ‘generate’ selfies, selfie-taking, or a 
particular kind of viewer activity, but rather absorbs or 
aggregates and reflects the selfies back, outside their original 
socio-technical context. As in Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending 
a Staircase, my authorial agency is enacted by creating an 
algorithmic framework through which images are re-
presented, rather than by selecting or modifying any 
particular images themselves. This marks a distinction 
between what I am doing and what Bourriaud describes as 
the role of the DJ or programmer, ‘both of whom have the 
task of selecting cultural objects and inserting them into new 
contexts’ (Bourriaud, 2002a: 7, my italics). Although I do 
clearly insert cultural objects (selfies) into a ‘new context’, I 
defer the process of selection to a programmatic command: 
‘include anything tagged #selfie’. By using the Instagram API, 
the work is opened up to whatever is happening on 
Instagram, and the selfies are shown in their original form 
with no editing, cropping or other image processing. 
Selfie Portrait gives a new view of selfies by dissociating them 
from their original context in Instagram and combining them 
with the users’ profile information. The images and profile 
information are not normally displayed in such direct 
proximity, or outside the platform. This new aesthetic context 
reconfigures the meaning and interpretation of the selfies, 
highlighting the role of visual and textual self-representation, 
and presenting selfies as agential instances of image making. 
Presenting the selfies and biographical information simply on 
a black screen, outside Instagram, draws attention to the fact 
that they are images of others, whether or not they have a 
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narcissistic origin. Thus, affect is created by allowing the 
viewer to encounter the selfies and the biographical 
descriptions as part of the artwork, rather than as part of 
Instagram. This also distances the work from the ‘economy’ of 
Instagram, providing reflection on, rather than complicity with 
it. 
Selfie Portrait: gallery version 
Selfie Portrait was exhibited as part of an exhibition and 
seminar Thinking in Space: Experiments in Presenting Practice-
Led Research in the Cookhouse Gallery, Chelsea College of Art, 
in March 2014. It was displayed on a wall-mounted iPhone 
fixed to the wall in landscape format using Velcro (see Fig. 
4.9). I wanted to explore how the expressive qualities of the 
work would be affected by it being displayed on an iPhone, a 
device on which Instagram selfies are often created and 
viewed. I used an iPhone 4, whose screen is 3.5 inches across 
diagonally, with a 960 x 640 pixel resolution at 326 ppi (Apple, 
2016: n.p). This created an intimate relationship between the 
work and the viewer, who had to stand close to the iPhone to 
see the images. The iPhone was presented as a constitutive 
part of the work, and – as a display device in a gallery – an art 
object, as well as the ubiquitous, everyday device it usually 
functions as. Dissociating the phone from its ‘everydayness’ 
and its personalized mobility created a discordant fixity for 
the object.77
                                                
77	  Alexander	  R.	  Galloway	  and	  Eugene	  Thacker	  state	  that	  ‘Digital	  media	  seem	  
to	  be	  everywhere,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  esoteric	  realms	  of	  computer	  animation,	  but	  
in	  the	  everydayness	  of	  the	  digital	  (email,	  mobile	  phones,	  the	  Internet)’	  
(Galloway	  and	  Thacker,	  2007:	  10,	  italics	  in	  original).	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Fig. 4.9 Selfie Portrait, installation view.
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There was also a discordance created by the fact that what is 
normally such a personal device, not designed for group 
viewing, became something that people had to gather round 
and queue up to see. The instinctive physical swiping and 
zooming in and out we perform on mobile phones was not 
possible. Whereas the projection of Flickr Nude or Noodle 
Descending a Staircase scaled up the work from the 
dimensions of a personal computer or mobile device, this 
installation scaled Selfie Portrait down, since the relative 
dimensions of the phone seemed to shrink when its display 
screen was on a wall being viewed by multiple people, rather 
than in someone’s palm being viewed just by them. 
Fixing the iPhone to the gallery wall raised the question of 
how it signifies in an art (as opposed to an everyday) context. 
Allowing the work to be viewed on a mobile phone outside 
the gallery raises very different questions: How can the work 
function as art if it is viewed in the context of mobile media? 
How does viewing the work on a mobile device affect the 
contemplative properties I attempted to create in the work? In 
the context of mobile media, one could claim that the phone’s 
‘everydayness’ increases the proximity of the artwork to other 
forms of content that might be consumed or produced 
through the phone. However, I contend that it is ‘discursive 
contextualisation strategies and presentational models’ 
(Hochrieser et al., 2009: 48) that designate the work as art, 
over and above its mode of display. For this exhibition, I was 
physically present in the Cookhouse Gallery to talk about the 
work, it was presented within the context of practice-based 
research in a university setting, and had been described in an 
email invitation about the seminar. This kind of discursive 
contextualization could also have been enacted if I had 
wanted people to view the work on their individual mobile 
devices. This was what I attempted (though with limited 
success) in Infinite Violets (see Practice 2) where I used the 
context of an exhibition to instruct the viewer to view the 
work outside the exhibition, on a mobile device. 
Part of the discursive contextualization and presentational 
strategy of a web-based work is determined by other 
websites that link to it. If someone clicked a hyperlink to Selfie 
Portrait from a webpage that contextualized the work, their 
encounter with it would be different than if they had arrived 
on the page without it. If an institution such as Rhizome 
‘hosted’ the work, this would create further contextualization 
and framing of the work that could have an effect on how it is 
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read. In a gallery setting it is perhaps easier to determine the 
physical conditions under which the work is viewed, and 
therefore to have a higher degree of control over how its 
expressive properties are encountered. In the gallery space 
the work can be viewed only as it is presented, whereas on a 
mobile device in everyday circumstances it can be viewed 
whilst rushing down Oxford Street, in a dark room with 
nothing else going on, or in any other environment. Rather 
than trying to control these contingencies, I accept them as 
part of web-based practice. As noted in the Practice Review, it 
is necessary for the artist to negotiate different versions of 
their work for different contexts. In this case, the work ‘works’ 
on mobile devices, where the viewer is likely to have an 
intimate, personal encounter with it. I do not see this as 
precluding the need for exhibiting the work in other formats, 
just as I do not see exhibiting the work in a gallery as 
precluding the potential for it to be viewed on a mobile 
device. 
At the time of the exhibition, none of the selfies were 
hyperlinked, so there was no way for the viewer to find out 
anything about the people who had posted them. This 
created a metaphorical and literal distance between the 
viewer and the selfie-takers by rendering the latter 
anonymous and de-emphasizing their authorship. Following 
my investigations into the copyright implications of the work 
(discussed further in Chapter 4), each selfie was hyperlinked 
to the user’s profile page on Instagram. When viewed in a 
browser, the viewer could then click on any selfie to find out 
more about the person who posted it. This re-emphasized the 
authorship of the selfie-takers. 
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Selfies in art and media visualization 
In February 2014, media scholar Lev Manovich and a team of 
co-researchers launched Selfiecity, a project exploring the 
nature of selfies in five cities across the world (Manovich et al., 
2014).78 The almost simultaneous publishing of Selfiecity and 
Selfie Portrait provided an opportunity to compare the use of 
selfies in the contexts of web-based art and media 
visualization. For Selfiecity, the researchers collected 656,000 
Instagram photographs shared in Bangkok, Berlin, Moscow, 
New York, and São Paulo, 4–12 December 2013, by querying 
Instagram using the social media data provider GNIP.79 The 
researchers did not want to limit their sample to images 
tagged #selfie, as there are large numbers of untagged selfies 
on Instagram. 
                                                
78	  Lev	  Manovichh	  coordinated	  the	  Selfiecity	  project	  in	  collaboration	  with	  
Moritz	  Stefaner,	  Mehrdad	  Yazdani,	  Dominikus	  Baur,	  Daniel	  Goddemeyer,	  
Alise	  Tifentale,	  Nadav	  Hochman	  and	  Jay	  Chow.	  
79	  GNIP	  is	  a	  service	  that	  offers	  ‘complete	  access	  to	  real	  time	  streams	  of	  public	  
data	  from	  the	  top	  social	  networks’	  (GNIP,	  2015:	  n.p).	  Yoree	  Koh	  notes	  it	  
accesses	  data	  from	  platforms	  like	  Twitter,	  analyzes	  it,	  and	  then	  ‘resells	  it,	  
primarily	  to	  businesses	  interested	  in	  how	  consumers	  view	  them’	  (Koh,	  2014:	  
n.p).	  Twitter	  purchased	  GNIP	  in	  2014	  for	  $134.1	  million	  (Koh,	  2014:	  n.p).	  
Instead they used a combination of algorithmic and human 
analysis to narrow down their dataset. Of the initial set of 
photos, 120,000 (20,000–30,000 per city) were randomly 
selected and posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, where two 
to four workers tagged each photo to establish which of them 
could be classified as selfies.80 Caitlin Dewey (2014: n.p) notes 
that for each city, 1000 photos identified as selfies by two or 
more workers were selected and submitted again to Amazon 
Mechanical Turk’s more skilled ‘master workers’, who 
estimated the age, gender and mood of the subjects based on 
their expressions. Facial recognition software was used to 
analyze the resulting set in order to elicit ‘algorithmic 
estimations of eye, nose and mouth positions, [and] the 
degrees of different emotional expressions’ (Selfiecity.net, 
2014: n.p). Finally the selfiecity team examined the photos 
manually to identify any anomalies, and selected the final 
3200 images, with 640 from each city. Selfiecity presents 
                                                
80	  Amazon	  Mechanical	  Turk	  is	  an	  online	  labour	  market,	  where	  workers	  can	  
complete	  a	  range	  of	  ‘Human	  Intelligence	  Tasks’	  for	  small	  amounts	  of	  money	  
(Amazon	  Mechanical	  Turk,	  2016:	  n.p).	  The	  use	  of	  Amazon	  Mechanical	  Turk	  
has	  been	  criticized	  by	  Losh,	  who	  notes	  that	  ‘many	  scholars	  see	  the	  work	  
arrangements	  for	  labour	  in	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk	  system	  as	  exploitative,	  
and	  find	  their	  contracts	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  with	  academic	  values’	  (Losh,	  no	  
date:	  n.p).	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findings on the demographics, poses and expressions of 
people who have taken selfies. 
For example: ‘there are significantly more women selfies than 
men selfies (from 1.3 times as many in Bangkok to 1.9 times 
more in Berlin). Moscow is a strong outlier – here, we have 4.6 
times more female than male selfies!’ (Selfiecity.net, 2014: 
n.p). Selfiecity also contains a ‘selfiexploratory’ section, where 
viewers can filter the dataset by demographics, pose, features 
and mood, which encourages viewers to ‘experiment’ with the 
data. 
Selfie Portrait and Selfiecity both automatically collect and re-
present large collections of selfies, but their approaches to 
doing this are distinct. Selfiecity uses a technique defined by 
Lev Manovich as ‘media visualization’, which enables 
researchers to map and study massive sets of media objects 
such as digital images or videos. The availability of massive 
media collections has resulted from the digitization of 
analogue media collections such as the Office of War 
Information photographs owned by the Library of Congress, 
the rise of mobile devices, user-generated content, social 
media and globalization (Manovich, 2011b: 2). 
Due to their scale, they cannot be apprehended in their 
totality, and methods that may have been suitable for 
researching small collections of media objects – ‘see all 
images or video, notice patterns, and interpret them’ 
(Manovich, 2011b: 2) – are no longer practical or effective. 
Manovich argues that researchers need a visual overview of 
media collections, whilst also seeing the individual media 
objects in order to see patterns and relationships: 
These techniques have to compress massive media 
universes into smaller observable media ‘landscapes’ 
compatible with the human information processing 
rates. At the same time, they have to keep enough of 
the details from the original images, video, audio or 
interactive experiences to enable the study of patterns 
in the data. (Manovich, 2011b: 4) 
Manovich states that media visualization is distinct from 
information visualization, because it plots and displays actual 
images on graphs rather than representing them through the 
use of ‘graphical primitives’ such as points, bars or lines (see 
Fig. 5.0).
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Fig. 5.0 Software Studies Initiative, ‘Cultural analytics chart selection 2’, 2010. Permission to reproduce this image was granted by Dr. Lev Manovich. 
Selfiecity presents the selfies as ‘imageplots’ – in grids or as 
thumbnail images along graph axes, which the viewer can 
hover over to enlarge (see Fig. 5.1). Selfie Portrait does not try 
to ‘see everything at once’, or to plot the selfies in a geo-
spatial manner that enables the identification of patterns. 
Rather, it invites the viewer to apprehend selfies in a new way 
through its durational nature, which implies a vast quantity of 
information. There are categorical distinctions between media 
visualizations and artworks because these practices have 
different contexts, purposes and functions. As a piece of 
digital sociology, Selfiecity is fundamentally oriented towards 
‘findings’.
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Fig. 5.1 Lev Manovich et al., Bangkok imageplot Selfiecity project, 2014. Permission to reproduce this image was granted by Moritz Stefaner on behalf of the 
Selfiecity project.
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As an artwork, Selfie Portrait is oriented differently. One might 
ask a ‘so what?’ question in relation to findings if their 
meaning or implications have not been fully articulated. 
However, art engenders the proposition ‘as if’ rather than the 
question ‘so what?’ It is useful to turn to Simon O’Sullivan to 
articulate this. He states: 
Art, then, might be understood as the name for a 
function: a magical, an aesthetic, function of 
transformation. Art is less involved in making sense of 
the world and more involved in exploring the 
possibilities of being, of becoming, in the world. 
(O’Sullivan, 2001: 130) 
Similarly, Selfie Portrait attempts to engender a 
transformation by reimagining selfies within the social realm, 
rather than by presenting ‘findings’ about them. 
Selfies as data 
An Instagram selfie (or any other Instagram photograph) has 
a variety of data associated with it. This includes personal 
information and metadata the user knowingly provides such 
as the image itself and any hashtags or geotags they add. It 
can also include metadata added by other users, such as 
comments, or by Instagram, such as location data.81 Other 
data associated with a user’s account can be retrieved 
through the API, such as the user’s ID, location data, filters 
used, profile picture and biographical description. This 
information is a fundamental part of the selfie’s materiality 
and medium specificity, and an artist accessing selfies 
through the Instagram API is therefore not only appropriating 
the images, but also the information associated with them. 
Some of this information is created intentionally, specifically 
in relation to the image, such as any tags the user has added. 
Some is created intentionally, but in relation to the user’s 
account, such as their profile picture and biographical 
description. Some is not created intentionally, such as 
location data and user ID. To put this in Andrejevic’s terms, 
appropriating selfies also involves appropriating ‘non-
authored’ information appended to or embedded in the 
‘authored’ image. The copyright implications of ‘non-authored’ 
information are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
                                                
81	  For	  details	  of	  all	  the	  information	  Instagram	  collects,	  see	  their	  privacy	  policy	  
(Instagram,	  2013a).	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My involvement with the DMI enabled me to see content 
made available through APIs as ‘digital objects’ that can be 
manipulated or repurposed. For example, Selfie Portrait 
repurposes three kinds of digital object: Instagram 
photographs, the hashtag ‘#selfie’, and users’ biographical 
descriptions. The original functions of these objects – 
enabling users to categorize, share and find digital 
information (the hashtag) or to communicate about their 
identities (the biographical description) – were repurposed in 
order to produce new temporary formations of the digital 
objects within the artwork. The hashtag is the primary digital 
object that enables these temporary formations to be created 
through a programmatic command: ‘display all images tagged 
with #selfie’. In this sense, the selfies and the information 
associated with them were seen as ‘data’. 
However, as noted earlier in this chapter, one intention for 
Selfie Portrait was to reflect (on) my understanding of selfies 
as representations of human subjectivities, as opposed to 
‘just’ digital objects or data. In this work, it was helpful to think 
of them as digital objects, data and representations of human 
subjectivities. This is perhaps another manifestation of the 
‘both’ or ‘and’ logic of extra-subjectivity. 
Summary 
Selfie Portrait re-focused my attention on the production of 
subjectivities, and the term ‘extra-subjectivity’, as selfies are 
representations of selves. I had several intentions in making 
the work: to present selfie-taking as a shared, techno-social 
process of producing subjectivities that highlights the 
tensions between sameness and individuality, exemplarity 
and exceptionality, structure and agency; to counter Keen’s 
argument that selfies are narcissistic, and to reflect (on) 
selfies as representations of human subjectivities rather than 
‘just‘ digital objects or data, as may be implied by digital 
methods researchers. These intentions were addressed 
through the work’s expressive properties: its contemplative 
pace, duration and the aesthetic reframing of selfies outside 
Instagram. I contend that selfies are events as well as objects, 
since they take place and are shared temporospatially, which 
highlights their social, as well as material properties.  
The work was displayed on an iPhone fixed to a gallery wall as 
part of an exhibition, rendering the phone as an art object as 
well as a ubiquitous everyday device. This highlighted the 
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different levels of control the artist has over the viewing 
conditions of web-based work when displaying it in a gallery 
as opposed to on mobile media. However, I contend that 
discursive contextualization plays a more significant role than 
the mode of display in influencing how the work is 
encountered. Rather than trying to ‘control’ the contingencies 
of the work being viewed in multiple settings, I accept this as 
part of web-based art practice. 
Selfiecity, a project led by Lev Manovich, provided an 
opportunity to compare the collection and re-presentation of 
large collections of selfies in the contexts of art and media 
visualization. I suggest that as a digital sociological endeavour, 
media visualization is oriented towards ‘findings’, whereas art 
is oriented towards reimagining the social realm. 
Selfie Portrait allowed me to experiment with using the 
Instagram API, developing methods learned at the DMI Winter 
School. The personal information and metadata associated 
with a selfie, some of which is intentionally authored and 
some of which is not, is part of its materiality and medium 
specificity. This has copyright implications, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
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Context – copyright and digital cultural 
production 
In 2010, David Cameron commissioned Professor Ian 
Hargreaves to write an independent review of the UK’s 
intellectual property framework, to address the question of 
whether current laws are fit for purpose (Hargreaves, 2011). 
According to this, the purpose of Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) is to ‘support growth by promoting innovation through 
the offer of a temporary monopoly to creators and inventors’ 
(Hargreaves, 2011: 10). IPRs (of which copyright, patents, 
design rights and trade marks are the major rights) help 
reduce risks and costs that may be a disincentive to 
innovate.82 This report provides a UK/European perspective, 
but global debates about the increasing scope and reach of 
copyright law have been growing for over a decade, with 
academics such as Boyle (2008) and Weinstock Netanel 
(2008), and activists such as Lessig (2004; 2007; 2008; 2010) 
                                                
82	  These	  can	  include	  ‘lost	  earnings	  while	  writing	  a	  book	  or	  Research	  and	  
Development	  (R&D)	  investment	  in	  drug	  research’	  and	  ‘the	  risk	  that	  new	  
products	  will	  fail’	  (Hargreaves,	  2011:	  11).	  Moreover,	  ‘once	  created,	  innovative	  
output	  may	  cost	  very	  little	  to	  reproduce:	  drugs	  or	  books	  may	  be	  cheaply	  
copied	  by	  others’	  (Hargreaves,	  2011:	  11).	  
and Cory Doctorow (2008; 2011; 2014) arguing that copyright 
law has become oppressive and extreme as a result of 
developments in digital culture. 
In Free Culture Lessig argues that the web has radically 
transformed how culture is made, enabling new forms of 
competition from a ‘more diverse range of creators’ who can 
‘produce and distribute a much more vibrant range of 
creativity’ (Lessig, 2004: 9). Powerful corporations, or ‘big 
media’, threatened by this competition, have ‘united to induce 
lawmakers to use the law to protect them’ (Lessig, 2004: 9). 
He distinguishes between commercial culture – ‘that part of 
our culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold’ 
and non-commercial culture – ‘all the rest’ (Lessig, 2004: 7). 
Non-commercial culture – ‘telling stories, reenacting scenes 
from plays or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, 
making tapes’ (Lessig, 2004: 8) – used to be unregulated and 
was not the focus of the law, which was primarily concerned 
with commercial creativity. Lessig argues that the Internet has 
erased the divide between the free (non-commercial, 
unregulated) and the controlled (commercial, regulated) 
aspects of cultural production. 
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The oppressive copyright regulations arising from this benefit 
big media, not individuals who want to engage in ‘free’ 
cultural production. 
Lessig here sets us a power struggle between individual 
creators and ‘big media’. He implies that because the 
distinction between non-commercial and commercial culture 
has been erased, amateur activities are constrained by laws 
designed to protect the interests of big media. However, it 
could be argued that this does not sufficiently acknowledge 
the interests of smaller individual commercial artists, who are 
damaged by weakened copyright laws. In this research, 
consideration of the relations between ‘commercial’ and ‘non-
commercial’ artists was useful. By commercial artist, I refer to 
someone who mainly trades in their copyright and is 
interested in reproducing their work in the mass media rather 
than selling originals – for example commercial 
photographers, photojournalists or graphic designers. A non-
commercial artist (although they can make vast sums of 
money from selling their work) does not provide a 
commercial service, such as working to a brief for advertising 
agencies. Instead, their work is self-initiated and generates 
value through being exhibited and contextualized in a certain 
way. The significance of this dichotomy lies both in the power 
relations between the groups – Richard Prince is not typically 
sued by corporations, but by individual commercial and fine 
artists, such as Patrick Cariou and Donald Graham (Kinsella, 
2016: n.p) – and in the way that ‘authorship’ functions 
differently for them.  
In the USA, Fair Use policy offers defences against claims of 
copyright infringement.83 However, Lessig argues that it is 
slow, expensive and inadequate:  
Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use 
provides adequate ‘breathing room’ between 
regulation by the law and the access the law should 
allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal 
system has become that anyone actually believes this. 
(Lessig, 2004: 187) 
                                                
83	  ‘Fair	  Use’	  is	  a	  US	  concept;	  in	  the	  UK,	  we	  have	  ‘Fair	  Dealing’	  copyright	  
exceptions	  (DACS,	  2016:	  n.p).	  Although	  the	  majority	  of	  social	  media	  
companies	  are	  based	  in	  the	  US,	  users	  are	  based	  across	  the	  world.	  
Infringement	  cases	  involving	  the	  web	  thus	  require	  a	  careful	  consideration	  of	  
applicable	  jurisdiction	  and	  the	  law.	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He suggests that Creative Commons licences offer a way for 
people to  
establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of 
copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go 
beyond traditional fair use. And most importantly, they 
express these freedoms in a way that subsequent 
users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a 
lawyer. (Lessig, 2004: 283) 
Lessig does not condone commercial piracy – ‘the 
unauthorized taking of other people’s content within a 
commercial context’ – but states that other more ambiguous 
forms of ‘taking’ should be considered carefully before being 
judged to be wrong (Lessig, 2004: 62). These forms of taking 
embody principles of building on and transforming existing 
work rather than simply taking and selling it, and are referred 
to as ‘remix’ by Lessig, who made the term ‘remix culture’ 
popular when he founded Creative Commons in 2001 (Navas 
et al., 2015: 1). Remixing is essentially a form of quotation. 
Although it originates in quoting in written texts, its dominant 
form today is in other forms of media: 
remixed media may quote sounds over images, or 
video over text, or text over sounds. The quotes thus 
get mixed together. The mix produces the new creative 
work—the ‘remix.’ (Lessig, 2008: 69) 
Aram Sinnreich notes that Lessig’s ‘remix culture’ and Sonvilla-
Weiss’s ‘mashup cultures’ (Sonvilla-Weiss, 2010) are based on 
‘the observation that the classifications defining traditional 
cultural forms have blurred, and that these forms themselves 
are now amalgams of other media’ (Sinnreich, 2015: 227, 
italics in original). Rather than cultural forms, some scholars 
focus on the fact that ‘cultural actors themselves no longer 
occupy fixed roles’, and have attempted to articulate these 
roles through the terms ‘prosumption’ and ‘produsage’ 
(Sinnreich, 2015: 227, italics in original).84 Others try to 
capture both aspects, with Henry Jenkins using the term 
‘convergence culture’ (Jenkins, 2006), and Sinnreich using 
‘configurable culture’ (Sinnreich, 2010). The strategy adopted 
in Selfie Portrait is not one of ‘remixing’ cultural artefacts 
owned by ‘big media’. As I use images created by Instagram 
users, the copyright questions the work raises do not turn on 
the power relations between commercial and non-
commercial culture that Lessig describes. 
                                                
84	  These	  terms	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  via	  Van	  Dijck,	  2009.	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Rather, the relations in play are between Instagram, its users 
and me, raising the question of whether it is ethical to use a 
fair dealing exemption under the 1988 Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act when dealing with large numbers of individuals, 
who may have different intentions and interests when 
creating and sharing their work.  
By accessing selfies through the Instagram API, I also 
accessed pieces of metadata associated with them, including 
user IDs, biographical information and the hashtag #selfie. 
Thus, the work raises questions about the ownership of 
personal information as well as images, and whether both 
should be considered a form of intellectual property. In 
Authoring User Generated Content, Andrejevic asks: ‘Why 
shouldn’t our personal information be considered a form of 
intellectual property subject to copyright protection?’ 
(Andrejevic, 2013: 124, italics in original). Whilst original 
videos, photos, music or text are copyright protected, 
what about other forms of user-generated content 
such as the details of our activity online, our expressed 
preferences, even our time-space paths throughout 
the course of the day? These may not meet 
conventional understandings regarding the 
expenditure of effort or the creation of expressive 
content, but they have surely become an important 
source of value and information about the world. 
(Andrejevic, 2013: 124)85 
At the same time as copyright law is being extended in scope 
and reach in the digital age, large amounts of personal 
information are being exploited for commercial gain.86 The 
‘data driven economy’, Andrejevic states, 
comes to rely heavily on carving out a space for what 
might be described in legal terms as non-authored 
information – information that is subject to capture, 
collection, mining and sorting. The capture and use of 
this information is predicated precisely on the claim 
that this information is not ‘authored’ in the 
conventional sense, and therefore does not deserve 
the type of copyright protection mobilized for original 
and creative works… We may author our emails, but 
we do not in the same sense ‘author’ the information 
about when we send them, how often we check our 
messages, where we are when we do so, and so on. 
(Andrejevic, 2013: 125) 
                                                
85	  As	  such,	  perhaps	  this	  personal	  information	  is	  more	  like	  a	  commercial	  
artefact	  than	  a	  selfie	  itself.	  
86	  Such	  exploitation	  is	  only	  regulated	  by	  data	  protection	  legislation	  such	  as	  the	  
Data	  Protection	  Act,	  1998	  in	  the	  UK	  or	  Act	  8	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights,	  which	  is	  enforced	  in	  the	  UK	  through	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act,	  
1998.	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Andrejevic notes that copyright protection may be mobilized 
once personal information is ‘deliberatively collected and 
stored – at which point it becomes the intellectual property 
not of those who have created it, but of those who have 
captured it’ (Andrejevic, 2013: 125). Similarly, a post on the 
Osborne Clark legal blog notes that copyright law protects 
aspects of the layout, structure or format of databases rather 
than their contents (Osborne Clark, 2015: n.p). As a 
consequence, ‘copyright protection for databases provides 
fairly limited protection for the underlying data (unless that 
data is a literary work that attracts copyright protection)’ 
(Osborne Clark, 2015: n.p). A traditional concept of authorship 
serves certain discourses that rely on it to designate what is 
‘not authored’, and therefore beyond the reach of copyright 
protection:  
If popular and scholarly discourses have, in the 
postmodern era, called into question the authority of 
the author, economic, commercial, and legal 
discourses are working hard to secure the notion of 
authorship as a bulwark against the affordances of 
digital media. (Andrejevic, 2013: 125) 
Thus for Andrejevic, the paradox of authorship in the digital 
era is that 
the generation of personal information remains 
excluded from the realm of authorship proper for all 
practical purposes, even as its generation is greeted as 
a form of self-expression, participation, and 
empowerment – as well as a source of value. 
(Andrejevic, 2013: 126) 
Andrejevic’s distinction between authored and ‘non authored’ 
information was useful for considering the ethics of accessing 
selfies and metadata through the Instagram API. As he notes, 
We can distinguish between two categories of so called 
‘user-generated content’: that which is consciously and 
deliberately crafted by users… and that captured by 
applications that monitor user activity, such as details 
about users’ computers, their location, the sites they 
visit, the links they click on, and so on. The second 
category of harvested data is not intentionally created 
by users, and they are often unaware they are 
generating it. (Andrejevic, 2013: 131)87 
Selfie Portrait only uses content that is consciously and 
deliberately crafted by the selfie-takers: the selfies, the #selfie 
hashtag and the biographical description available on their 
public profile. 
                                                
87	  Although	  all	  websites	  now	  have	  to	  ask	  users	  to	  read	  their	  cookie	  policy	  and	  
accept	  that	  such	  data	  is	  stored	  and	  used	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  users	  may	  not	  be	  
aware	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  acceptance.	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I do not make use of personal information that the user may 
not be aware of having generated, as described in the above 
quote. Futhermore, I am not harvesting any such data for 
commercial gain or to monitor activity. Thus, I distinguish my 
use of metadata from the kinds of uses Andrejevic objects to. 
Legal considerations 
To explore the legal status of my actions in making this work, I 
consulted Instagram’s terms of use, privacy policy and API 
terms of use. The terms of use specify what both Instagram 
and its users are permitted to do with content posted on or 
through the platform.88 The privacy policy explains 
how we [Instagram] and some of the companies we 
work with collect, use, share and protect information 
in relation to our mobile services, website, and any 
software provided on or in connection with Instagram 
                                                
88	  Instagram	  gained	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  media	  attention	  in	  December	  
2012,	  when	  they	  proposed	  to	  amend	  their	  terms	  and	  conditions	  such	  that	  
users	  would	  have	  to	  agree	  that	  ‘a	  business	  or	  other	  entity	  may	  pay	  us	  to	  
display	  your	  username,	  likeness,	  photos	  (along	  with	  any	  associated	  
metadata),	  and/or	  actions	  you	  take,	  in	  connection	  with	  paid	  or	  sponsored	  
content	  or	  promotions,	  without	  any	  compensation	  to	  you’	  (Instagram,	  quoted	  
by	  Michael	  Rundle,	  2012:	  n.p).	  A	  backlash	  amongst	  Instagram	  users	  led	  to	  the	  
company	  reverting	  to	  their	  original	  terms	  and	  conditions,	  as	  noted	  in	  a	  blog	  
post	  by	  Instagram	  co-­‐founder	  Kevin	  Systrom	  (2012:	  n.p).	  
services (collectively, the ‘Service’), and your choices 
about the collection and use of your information.’ 
(Instagram, 2013a)  
The API terms of use define the legal use of the Instagram 
APIs (Instagram, 2014b). After consulting these documents, I 
understood that under general copyright law, Instagram 
users own the copyright of their photographs: ‘Instagram 
does not claim ownership of any Content that you post on or 
through the Service’ (Instagram, 2013b). However, to gain a 
more thorough understanding of the legal risks associated 
with using them, I sought advice from Own-it, University of 
the Arts London’s intellectual property advice service (see 
Appendix 2). Own-it offered some initial guidance, but 
recommended that I obtain further advice from an 
experienced lawyer, given the complexity of the query. On 
Wednesday, 28 May 2014, I attended a 45-minute intellectual 
property ‘clinic’ with solicitor Angus McLean from London-
based law firm, Simmons & Simmons.89 
                                                
89	  The	  clinic	  was	  provided	  for	  free	  by	  UAL	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Own-­‐it	  service,	  which	  
offers	  support	  given	  on	  a	  pro-­‐bono	  basis	  by	  local	  solicitors.	  The	  service	  was	  
discontinued	  with	  effect	  from	  22	  June	  2016.	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A diagram of my interpretation of the initial legal advice is 
provided at the end of this chapter (see Fig. 5.3).90 
The meeting was audio recorded, and the transcript can be 
found in Appendix 3. Mr. McLean provided a report 
summarizing the discussion, which can be found in Appendix 
4. The discussion was based around the question of ‘whether 
the work infringed the copyright of the owners of the 
Instagram photographs, and if so, whether there were any 
ways to work around this or whether any defences would be 
available to (me)’ (McLean, 2014: 1). I also asked for 
clarification about whether Selfie Portrait made acceptable use 
of Instagram users’ content with regard to the requirements 
and restrictions referred to in the API terms of use. Mr. 
McLean stated that the advice given was done so only from a 
UK perspective, and that the Instagram terms of use are 
governed by the law of California. As a result, any defences 
available to me would only apply in the UK. 
                                                
90	  Subsequent	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  diagram,	  Silvia	  Baumgart	  alerted	  me	  to	  
the	  fact	  that,	  according	  to	  Attorney	  General	  Wathelet,	  it	  is	  immaterial	  if	  the	  
content	  linked	  to	  was	  published	  without	  permission	  of	  the	  rights	  holder	  (IPKat	  
2016:	  n.p).	  
I was advised  
As you are currently accessing photographs through 
the Instagram API and are displaying them without 
asking the permission of the photograph takers, you 
are, subject to any defences that are available to you… 
infringing their copyright. You are also in breach of 
Instagram’s Terms of Use and the API Terms of Use. 
Instagram has given you access to its API and as a 
result you are bound by the API Terms of Use, which 
creates a contractual relationship between you and 
Instagram. (McLean, 2014: 1) 
The optimum position to mitigate the risk of copyright 
infringement would be to access the photographs without 
going through the API, so that I would not be bound by the 
API terms of use. If I did not use the API I could link to freely 
accessible content, which according to recent EU case law is 
not deemed an infringement of copyright. The European 
Court of Justice (CJEU) in Svensson and others (Case C-466/12) 
considered whether hyperlinking to copyright protected 
material on another website infringes copyright.91  
                                                
91	  For	  a	  short	  analysis	  of	  the	  Svensson	  case,	  see	  Graham	  Smith	  et	  al.	  (2014).	  
For	  a	  summary	  of	  recent	  cases	  regarding	  hyperlinking	  see	  IPKat	  (2015),	  which	  
notes	  that	  the	  Svensson	  judgement	  ‘perhaps	  raised	  more	  questions	  than	  
answers.’	  Most	  recently,	  Attorney	  General	  Melchior	  Wathelet	  advised	  the	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The case was dependent on the interpretation of Article 3 (1) 
of the InfoSoc Directive, which states: 
Member States shall provide authors with the 
exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or 
wireless means, including the making available to the 
public of their works in such a way that members of 
the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. (Council Directive 
2001/29/EC: Article 3, para 1) 
The Svensson ruling depended on whether providing 
hyperlinks to copyright protected material that is freely 
available on another website constitutes ‘an act of 
communication to the public’ (Case C-466/12 Svensson v 
Retriever Sverige AB [2014] All E.R. (EC) 609, para 14). An act of 
communication to the public would require permission from 
the copyright holder. The concept of a communication to the 
public requires ‘two cumulative criteria, namely, an “act of 
communication” of a work and the communication of that 
work to a “public”’ (para 16). In paragraph 20 of Case C-
466/12, the CJEU held that ‘the provision of clickable links to 
protected works must be considered to be “making available” 
                                                
CJEU	  to	  depart	  from	  Svensson	  (Case	  C–160/15,	  opinion	  of	  AG	  Wathelet).	  For	  
an	  analysis	  of	  Wathelet’s	  opinion,	  see	  IPKat	  (2016).	  
and, therefore, an “act of communication’’, within the 
meaning of the provision’ given in Article 3 (1) of Directive 
2001/29 (para 20). The CJEU also held that ‘by the term 
“public”, that provision refers to an indeterminate number of 
potential recipients and implies, moreover, a fairly large 
number of persons’ (para 21). Hyperlinking to copyright 
protected works therefore does constitute an act of 
communication. However, in order for the copyright holder to 
be covered by this concept of an act of communication, the 
communication must be ‘directed at a new public, that is to 
say, at a public that was not taken into account by the 
copyright holders when they authorized the initial 
communication to the public’ (para 24). If a hyperlink allows 
users to circumvent restrictions put in place by the original 
website owners, such as the requirement to log in or pay to 
access the content, or if the content has been removed from 
the original website, it would be considered to be directed to 
a ‘new public’ and therefore require authorization from the 
copyright holder.  
To summarize, consider this scenario: website (a) publishes a 
copyright protected article, and website (b) links to this article. 
If users of website (b) could have accessed the article from 
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website (a) without restriction, and without the involvement 
of the manager of website (b), then the manager of website 
(b) is not infringing copyright, because they are not making 
the article available to a new public. If users of website (b) 
could not have accessed the article from website (a) without 
restriction – i.e. if they would have had to log in, subscribe or 
pay to access it, website (b) would be infringing copyright, 
because they are making the article available to a new public. 
The implications of this for me were that if I did not access the 
selfies through the Instagram API, I would not infringe 
copyright, as long as the selfies linked to their original 
location on the users’ Instagram page, where they are freely 
available to the public.92  
As stated, using the Instagram API was a key methodological 
part of the work, so it was undesirable to avoid using it.93 By 
accessing the photographs through the API, I was bound by 
                                                
92	  Any	  member	  of	  the	  public	  can	  access	  Instagram	  photographs	  through	  third	  
party	  websites	  such	  as	  Iconosquare.com	  and	  Websta.me,	  without	  having	  an	  
account	  or	  following	  a	  particular	  user.	  The	  exception	  would	  be	  if	  the	  user	  had	  
set	  their	  account	  to	  private.	  Selfie	  Portrait	  does	  not	  include	  images	  set	  to	  
private.	  
93	  Although	  websites	  such	  as	  Iconosquare.com	  and	  Websta.me	  make	  all	  
Instagram	  photographs	  publicly	  available,	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  publicly–
available	  APIs,	  so	  photographs	  cannot	  be	  automatically	  extracted	  through	  
those	  sites.	  
the Instagram API terms of use and subject to a contractual 
relationship with the service. The Instagram API terms of use 
state that anyone using the API must 
Comply with any requirements or restrictions imposed 
on usage of User Content by their respective owners. 
Remember, Instagram doesn’t own User Content – 
Instagram users do. Although the Instagram APIs can 
be used to provide you with access to User Content, 
neither Instagram’s provision of the Instagram APIs to 
you nor your use of the Instagram APIs override User 
Content owners’ requirements and restrictions, which 
may include ‘all rights reserved’ notices (attached to 
User Content by default when uploaded to Instagram), 
Creative Commons licenses or other terms and 
conditions that may be agreed upon between you and 
the owners. In ALL cases, you are solely responsible for 
making use of User Content in compliance with 
owners’ requirements or restrictions. (Instagram, 
2014b: n.p) 
In addition to this, no one should use the Instagram API ‘in 
any manner or for any purpose that violates any law or 
regulation, or any rights of any person, including but not 
limited to intellectual property rights, rights of privacy, or 
rights of personality’ (Instagram, 2014b: n.p).  
I was advised: ‘If it is not possible or desirable to access the 
data without going through the Instagram API, you will need 
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to ask the permission of the copyright holder before 
displaying the photo to avoid infringement’ (McLean, 2014: 1). 
As a PhD student engaged in ‘research or private study’, there 
is a fair dealing defence available to me under Section 29 (1) 
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), 
provided the work I produce is strictly non-commercial and 
sufficiently acknowledges its source materials.94 I was advised 
that sufficient acknowledgement could be provided by 
displaying the Instagram users’ user names and/or via 
a link to the photo as displayed on their Instagram 
account... It is important to give the acknowledgement 
equal prominence (e.g. same font size) to the other 
text that you are displaying as part of the artwork. 
(McLean, 2014: 2) 
The stipulation to display the username at the same font size 
as the rest of the biographical text was aesthetically and 
conceptually undesirable. I deliberately chose not to display 
the usernames so as to create a contemplative, uncluttered 
visual space. Conceptually, not including the usernames was 
                                                
94	  The	  CDPA	  states:	  ‘Fair	  dealing	  with	  a	  literary,	  dramatic,	  musical	  or	  artistic	  
work	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  research	  for	  a	  non-­‐commercial	  purpose	  does	  not	  
infringe	  any	  copyright	  in	  the	  work	  provided	  that	  it	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  
sufficient	  acknowledgement’	  (Copyright,	  Designs	  and	  Patents	  Act,	  1988:	  n.p).	  
important because I wanted to present the images ‘outside’ 
Instagram, rather than adopting its language. Not including 
the usernames was also part of the work’s provocation about 
the acceptability of automatically accessing and displaying 
other people’s images. 
I therefore chose not to amend the work, which meant the 
CDPA defence would not be available to me in the event of a 
claim of copyright infringement. Even if I had been willing to 
amend the work in order to use the CDPA defence, I wanted 
to understand what the situation would be if it was not 
available, since future artworks will not necessarily be made 
in a research context. Although technically Selfie Portrait was 
produced as ‘research’, it is also conceived of as an artwork, 
available online, that may not necessarily be viewed in a 
research context. 
In summary, notwithstanding the CDPA defence, I was 
advised that by using the API and agreeing to the API terms of 
use, I was subject to contractual law as well as copyright law. 
This imposed a higher level of sanction on me than if I was 
accessing the photographs without the API, and meant that I 
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would need to seek permission from the selfie-takers to avoid 
copyright infringement. 
Mr. McLean noted that the legal advice given was ‘the black 
letter law’ and should be ‘balanced against practical 
considerations and the likelihood of enforcement’ (McLean, 
2014: 2). My financial liability for copyright infringement was 
deemed to be low. An individual whose copyright has been 
infringed is entitled to an injunction requiring the infringer to 
take down the content, as well as damages. If copyright had 
been infringed through Selfie Portrait, and I had refused to 
comply with a take down notice, damages could potentially be 
claimed to a value ‘equivalent to the amount that you would 
have to pay for using a photograph in question’ (McLean, 
2014: 2). It was not clear how much this would actually be: 
whatever financial damage there is, is probably going 
to be appointed to some sort of – the amount you’d 
have to pay them in return for consent to use their 
photograph which, depending on whose photograph it 
is would probably be a range. If you’re using a 
celebrity’s photograph then it may be that they’re a bit 
more sanguine about how likely they are to give 
consent, and they might ask for more money than an 
individual user or a non-celebrity, and a non-celebrity – 
I don’t know what sort of money you would have to 
pay to get them to agree to use their photo. (McLean, 
2014: 6)95 
The fact that the discussion did not address the value of the 
metadata associated with the photograph underlines 
Andrejevic’s point that in legal discourse, ‘non-authored’ 
information is not considered to ‘deserve the type of 
copyright protection mobilized for original and creative works’ 
(Andrejevic, 2013: 125).  
Following the IP clinic, I sought further written clarification 
from Own-it about the Instagram terms of use and my 
interpretation of the legal advice given. In particular, by 
agreeing to the terms of use, I understood that users grant 
Instagram ‘a non-exclusive, fully paid and royalty-free, 
transferable, sub-licensable, worldwide licence to use the 
Content that you post on or through the Service, subject to 
the Service’s Privacy Policy’ (Instagram, 2013b). This means 
that once a user has posted a photograph, Instagram has the 
right to sublicense it to any company for a fee without paying 
                                                
95	  Theoretically,	  damages	  may	  be	  available	  for	  a	  breach	  of	  privacy,	  but	  I	  was	  
advised	  that	  an	  expectation	  of	  privacy	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  claim,	  given	  that	  
the	  selfies	  are	  posted	  publicly	  on	  Instagram.	  If	  Instagram	  received	  a	  complaint	  
about	  the	  work	  and	  felt	  it	  had	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  its	  users,	  they	  could	  
terminate	  my	  account,	  but	  it	  was	  suggested	  this	  was	  unlikely	  (McLean,	  2014:	  
2).	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the user (Law Offices of Craig Delsack, LLC, 2012: n.p).96 I was 
uncertain whether this meant that if I paid, I could use an 
Instagram photograph ‘freely’. I sought clarification from 
Own-it about this, and their response can be found in 
Appendix 5. They advised that I would require a sublicence 
from Instagram to use images for purposes outside ‘normal 
browsing’, but they could not comment on the terms on 
which such a sublicence might be granted, or whether I would 
have to pay for it: 
This would be a commercial matter between you and 
Instagram. You also ask whether this would enable you 
to use the Instagram images ‘freely’. If by this you 
mean for any purpose whatsoever, then that would be 
also dictated by the terms of the sublicense granted to 
you by Instagram, which in turn would be limited by 
the privacy settings of the copyright owner, the 
Contributor. (Appendix 5: 6) 
The permission bot 
The issue of permission seeking prompted a new line of 
enquiry in my practice: an attempt to develop a permission 
                                                
96	  Reading	  this	  article	  was	  useful	  in	  that	  it	  led	  me	  to	  seek	  clarification	  from	  
Own-­‐it,	  but	  as	  it	  interprets	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  from	  a	  US	  perspective,	  it	  
was	  not	  as	  relevant	  as	  the	  interpretation	  provided	  by	  Mr.	  Mclean.	  
bot that would automatically request permission to use any 
selfie included in the work. I saw potential for the bot to 
critique the Instagram API terms of use, and to become a 
useful application for individuals wanting to use images 
accessed through the Instagram API. I asked Mr. McLean if 
Instagram was likely to see the bot’s activity as spam, but was 
advised that this would be self-contradictory, as Instagram 
requires me to get permission for the use of images. I was 
advised that the permission bot would have to work such that 
photos for which no permission had been granted were 
excluded from Selfie Portrait.97 Arthur and I applied for an API 
key to build the permission bot, stating: 
The application is an artwork that simply examines 
how people who post images tagged ‘selfie’ on 
Instagram describe themselves. It can be viewed at 
http://otheragents.net/selfieportrait/index.html. The 
intention is to use the comment post endpoint to ask 
permission from users whose images will be included. 
This work has been made for the purpose of PhD 
research and is non-commercial (Webb, C., online 
application, 27 February 2014). 
However, the request was denied: 
                                                
97	  This	  was	  not	  practically	  possible,	  so	  this	  consent	  mechanism	  would	  perhaps	  
have	  been	  legally	  redundant,	  even	  if	  it	  had	  been	  implemented.	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Hello, 
Thank you again for your interest in the comments 
POST endpoint. We have reviewed your application 
and have determined that your request does not 
comply with our requirements for usage of this 
endpoint. Please note that we allow access to this 
endpoint solely for the following use cases: 
1. A business requesting rights to media objects from 
the Instagram Community in order for the media to be 
used for display outside of Instagram. 
2. A business providing customer service to members 
of the Instagram Community by interacting through 
comments. 
3. A business responding to members of the Instagram 
Community that participate in a specific reward or 
coupon campaign. 
Since your app doesn’t appear to be serving any of 
these uses case [sic], we're unable to grant access to 
the endpoint. 
Thanks, 
Instagram Platform Team (Instagram, 2014d) 
If I was a business requesting media rights or providing a 
customer service, I could automate requests for permission, 
but as an individual artist this is not permissible. That 
Instagram is prepared to permit businesses, but not 
individuals, to request media rights for user content 
demonstrates that the terms of use do not always serve the 
interests of the user. By denying me the ability to automate a 
request for permission to the use of the images, Instagram 
was (perhaps inadvertently) reducing my ability to comply 
with their own terms of use. 
Ethical considerations 
I was advised that the black letter law should be weighed up 
against practical considerations and likelihood of 
enforcement. However, my decisions about what constitutes 
a fair use of the selfies were made on the basis of ethical 
reasoning and artistic intent as well as a consideration of legal 
‘risk’. Sinnreich suggests that the legal and regulatory 
apparatuses governing ‘configurable’ cultural forms and 
practices are ‘hopelessly mired in the expectations, 
economics, and ethical frameworks of the mass media era’98   
                                                
98	  Sinnreich	  refers	  to	  both	  configurable	  technologies,	  ‘constituted	  by	  global,	  
digital	  networked	  communication	  systems’,	  and	  configurable	  culture,	  which	  
include	  examples	  ‘from	  mash-­‐ups	  to	  remixes	  to	  machinima’	  (Sinnreich,	  2010:	  
8).	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(Sinnreich, 2015: 240). As a result, ‘people who are not lawyers 
are developing their own ethical frameworks to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of reappropriated 
work in their cultural environments’ (Sinnreich, 2015: 240). He 
notes that 
a range of scholars have observed a variety of different 
ethical considerations brought to bear by various 
communities of practice on the configurable cultural 
forms they produce and reproduce. These include 
aesthetic beauty, self-expression, innovation, labor, 
commercial valence, legality and power relations… 
these and a handful of other ethical criteria are 
consistently invoked by the general public in their own 
efforts to develop a workable ethical framework for 
engagement with digital media and communications. 
(Sinnreich, 2015: 229) 
In 2006 and 2010, Sinnreich and colleagues conducted two 
studies that surveyed American and English-speaking adults 
on ‘their general opinions of configurable cultural practices’. 
The results of these are discussed in a paper by Sinnreich, 
Mark Latonero and Marissa Gluck (2009), Latonero and 
Sinnreich (2014) and Sinnreich (2015). Responses to open-
ended questions in the surveys were examined for 
‘underlying ethical frameworks deployed by respondents to 
establish the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such practices’ 
(Sinnreich, 2015: 229). Eleven ethical themes emerged from 
the data (see Fig. 5.2). I drew on these to inform the process 
of weighing up my ethico-legal position in relation to Selfie 
Portrait. Some of the above themes chimed with my own 
considerations, and provided a benchmark against which to 
measure them.
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Ethical dimensions for configurable culture 
Unethical Criterion Ethical 
For-profit Commercial Nonprofit 
Unpermissioned Legal Permissioned 
Pretension Authenticity Referenced 
Unoriginal Innovation Original 
Easy Labour Hard work 
Bastardization Moral Homage 
Rupture Continuity Evolution 
Useless/harmful Use value Fun/beneficial 
Ugly Aesthetic Beautiful 
Undermining Power relations Empowering 
Meaningless Self expression Expressive 
 
Fig. 5.2 Table ‘Ethical Dimensions for Configurable Culture’, adapted from Sinnreich (2015: 230). 
Commercial 
Sinnreich observed that respondents often saw profiting from 
appropriated content without paying for its use as unethical 
(Sinnreich, 2015: 229). He notes that this emerging ethic 
diverges from the letter of US copyright law, which ‘considers 
most unauthorized appropriations of content to constitute 
infringement, irrespective of a for-profit or nonprofit intention 
or effect’ (Sinnreich, 2015: 229). In my case, the CDPA defence 
would have required that the work be non-commercial, which 
reflects the fact that UK Fair Dealing legislation is different 
from US Fair Use. These differences notwithstanding, it is 
ethically important to me that I do not profit from others’ 
materials without paying for them. This is in contrast to the 
Instagram photographs used in Richard Prince’s 2014 
exhibition New Portraits at Gagosian Gallery, New York. 
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Here, the artist appropriated Instagram photographs without 
permission, scaled them up, made some modifications to the 
comment threads, and printed and hung them in the gallery 
(Gagosian, 2014). The prints were later sold at the New York 
Frieze art fair, for up to $100,000, as noted by Rob Price (2015: 
n.p).99 
Legal 
Although the survey respondents did not exclusively draw on 
an ethical framework rooted in copyright law, legality was a 
central element in their ‘ethical calculus’. There was a 
particular focus on permission seeking and whether the work 
would adhere to legal regulations, ‘specifically the notion… 
that permission from the owner or originator of a piece of 
content is a requisite element for the ethical use of that 
                                                
99	  Various	  news	  sources	  reported	  that	  the	  works	  had	  sold	  for	  up	  to	  $100,000	  
(Price,	  2015:	  n.p;	  Hannah	  Jane	  Parkinson,	  2015:	  n.p),	  whilst	  some	  Instagram	  
users	  specifically	  claimed	  they	  had	  sold	  for	  $90,000	  each	  (Missy,	  2015:	  n.p;	  
doedeer,	  2015:	  n.p).	  Some	  of	  the	  images	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  Instagram	  feed	  
of	  Suicide	  Girls,	  an	  online	  pinup	  site	  and	  message	  board.	  In	  response,	  the	  
Suicide	  Girls	  began	  selling	  the	  same	  images	  for	  $90	  and	  donating	  the	  profits	  
to	  the	  Electronic	  Frontier	  Foundation	  (Missy,	  2015:	  n.p).	  Prince’s	  work	  and	  the	  
responses	  it	  provoked	  thus	  highlighted	  continuing	  contestations	  over	  the	  
ownership	  of	  online	  images,	  and	  the	  power	  relations	  at	  work	  between	  
individuals	  or	  organizations	  with	  high	  degrees	  of	  symbolic	  capital	  and	  ‘normal’	  
people.	  
content’ (Sinnreich, 2015: 230). Permission seeking was a 
significant factor I considered when weighing up the ethics of 
Selfie Portrait, both in a legal and research ethical context (as 
discussed below in ‘Research Ethical Considerations’). 
I deemed that the likelihood of the enforcement of law was 
low, particularly given how unlikely it is that the selfie-takers 
will realize their images are included. Although it is potentially 
unethical to take a ‘what they don’t know won’t harm them’ 
attitude, in this case I felt the users’ lack of conscious 
participation in and awareness of the work reduced the 
potential for the work to either cause harm or confer a 
benefit. This does not mean that using other people’s work 
without permission is ethical in principle, but rather that such 
uses need to be considered in their specific contexts. 
Thinking beyond the black letter law, I asked Mr. McLean 
whether it was ethical to wait to receive complaints of 
copyright infringement and then respond immediately, rather 
than actively making provisions to avoid infringement.100 
                                                
100	  In	  the	  interview	  I	  used	  the	  term	  ‘moral’	  rather	  than	  ‘ethical’,	  but	  on	  
reflection,	  ‘ethical’	  is	  more	  appropriate,	  since	  it	  implies	  standards	  imposed	  by	  
my	  social	  and	  institutional	  contexts,	  rather	  than	  on	  a	  personal	  sense	  of	  right	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He advised that this was a decision for me to make, but 
suggested the availability of the fair dealing exemption of 
section 29 (1) CDPA may ‘put a gloss’ on my decision. As noted 
above, this exemption was not available to me, and even if it 
had been, deploying a defence on the grounds that Selfie 
Portrait was ‘research’ seemed disingenuous, since it is also 
conceived of as an artwork that may not necessarily be 
viewed in a research context. 
In the first iteration of Selfie Portrait the selfies did not link to 
the users’ profile pages on Instagram, as I wanted to make a 
work without any interactive aspects, in contrast to Flickr Nude 
or Noodle Descending a Staircase (see Practice 3). Considering 
the legal advice, I decided that linking to users’ profile pages 
was both legally advisable and (more importantly) ethically 
responsible, so I added this feature to the work. This 
demonstrates how the artwork was modified in light of my 
growing understanding.101 This modification had practical and 
conceptual implications. Practically, if the work were 
                                                
and	  wrong.	  For	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  ethics	  and	  
morality	  see	  Carneades.org	  (2015:	  n.p).	  
101	  This	  chimes	  with	  Ruthellen	  Josselson’s	  statement	  about	  good	  research,	  
which	  is	  ‘conducted	  inductively,	  modifying	  procedure	  in	  light	  of	  growing	  
understanding’	  (Josselson,	  2007:	  557).	  
displayed in an exhibition setting, a device such as a mouse 
enabling the viewer to click on the links would be needed to 
avoid infringing copyright.102 As a result, the work could no 
longer just be shown as a projection, for example. 
Conceptually, the links created a more open experience for 
the viewer, who could go ‘in and out’ of the work to visit 
Instagram. 
Labour 
Sinnreich suggests that the notion of labour often has an 
impact on whether an act of creative reappropriation is seen 
as ethical or not. ‘Specifically, easier mixes, mashes and hacks 
are insufficiently original to be accorded respect, while more 
challenging or taxing appropriations may achieve legitimacy’ 
(Sinnreich, 2015: 236). This notion of labour as expenditure of 
effort or technical mastery is not part of my ethical calculus. 
Rather, I was concerned with whether I was complicit in 
exploiting the ‘labour’ of the production of subjectivities, as 
posited by Gram (2013.  
                                                
102	  I	  sought	  clarification	  on	  this	  during	  a	  follow	  up	  IP	  clinic,	  and	  was	  advised	  
that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  give	  the	  audience	  the	  ability	  to	  click	  the	  links	  in	  order	  
for	  the	  work	  not	  to	  infringe	  copyright.	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Gram suggests that selfies are a form of labour under capital 
– they are ‘the product of work, both on the body and on the 
representation of the body’ (Gram, 2013: n.p). I contend that 
Selfie Portrait is not complicit in the exploitation of this kind of 
labour, since it does nothing to encourage the production of 
selfies and is not ‘part of’ the social media attention economy. 
The artwork and the thesis highlight rather than reproduce 
the exploitative aspects of the production of selves online. 
Morality 
Sinnreich notes: ‘A work that pays homage or does justice to 
its source may be perceived as legitimate, whereas one that 
disrespects, insults or bastardizes the original may be seen as 
illegitimate’ (Sinnreich, 2015: 234). This criterion chimed with 
my artistic intentionality not to ‘judge’ selfies as simply acts of 
narcissism (see Practice 4). Although I did not seek permission 
from the selfie-takers, there are certain characteristics of the 
work that balance its ethics: I do not make use of any 
personal information the user may not be aware of having 
generated; I do not claim the images as my own; I do not 
make money from the images; I try to ‘do justice’ to the selfies 
through the aesthetics of the artwork; I do not include any 
images that are marked as ‘private’. The fact that the images 
are tagged #selfie suggested to me that the selfie-takers were 
unlikely to have high expectations of privacy in relation to 
these images. Saltz asserts that the primary purpose of selfies 
is ‘to be seen here, now, by other people, most of them 
unknown, in social networks. They are never accidental: 
Whether carefully staged or completely casual, any selfie that 
you see had to be approved by the sender before being 
embedded into a network’ (Saltz, 2014: 2). Saltz’s observation 
is true for the most part, although there may be cases where 
selfies are taken under duress, or contain images of people in 
the background who are not aware they have been 
photographed. For example, Jonathan Jones notes that there 
was a case of a selfie taken on Brooklyn Bridge, which 
inadvertently captured a man about to commit suicide (Jones, 
2013: n.p). However, since the use of hashtags does not prove 
that a user understands Instagram’s privacy policy, I would 
not use this assumption alone to justify the use of the selfies 
without permission. 
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Research ethical considerations 
Selfie Portrait prompted research ethical considerations as well 
as the broader ones outlined above. Ruthellen Josselson’s 
work on the ethics of narrative research was useful for 
thinking about my use of ‘selves’ or subjectivities in this PhD. 
For Josselsson, an ethical attitude towards research involves 
adopting a stance that considers 
how best to honor and protect those who participate 
in one’s studies while still maintaining standards for 
responsible scholarship. Like issues of ethics in life, 
often there are contradictory goods, and an ethical 
stance involves taking responsibility for choosing 
among them, minimizing harm. (Josselson, 2007: 538) 
In narrative research there are both explicit and implicit 
‘contracts’ between a researcher and a participant. The 
implicit contract is determined by what both parties think 
constitutes respect and compassion (Josselson, 2007: 539). 
The explicit contract is often realized through the consent 
form, which usually says that the participant is willing to take 
part in the study and is free to withdraw participation at any 
time (Josselson, 2007: 541). Josselson states that ‘consent has 
to be regarded as a continuing process, and the participants 
must be accorded the human right to bestow or withdraw the 
use of their material’ (Josselson, 2007: 544). Since I did not 
asked for permission to use the selfies, there is neither an 
explicit nor implicit contract between myself (the researcher), 
and the ‘participants’ (the selfie-takers). The only means of 
them expressing discomfort or dissatisfaction would be by 
requesting that their material is removed, and there is no 
obvious means for them to do this. I am therefore unable to 
reach a shared understanding of what constitutes respect 
and compassion. Seeking permission would be a step 
towards this, but it was impossible to do manually, and not 
permissible (by Instagram) programmatically. I therefore had 
to engage in ethical reasoning that considered the possible 
effects the work might have on the selfie-takers, and be 
prepared to deal with the consequences in an ethically sound 
way. 
Whereas in a legal context, ‘risk’ is conflated with the 
likelihood of the enforcement of the law, in a research ethical 
context, ‘risk’ is conflated with the potential for harm to 
participants. According to the UAL Code of Practice on 
Research Ethics: 
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The principle of justice obliges the researcher to 
distribute equally the risks and benefits of 
participation in research. Any risks to persons 
participating in research must be weighed against any 
potential benefits – to the participants or the 
researchers, and also the wider benefits to society of 
the knowledge gained. (UAL, 2015/16: 92) 
The selfie-takers’ lack of conscious participation minimizes the 
risk of both harm and benefit, and as such, the consequences 
of using the selfies is difficult to assess. However, overall, I 
contend that the benefit to the art and research community 
of me making and reflecting on this work outweighs the 
unlikely possibility that someone might become distressed as 
a result of it. If this should come about, I would remove their 
image from the work immediately, seeing this as necessary as 
a matter of both research ethics and my social responsibility 
as an artist.103 
                                                
103	  I	  was	  guided	  here	  by	  Josselson:	  ‘I	  believe	  that	  the	  benefit	  science	  can	  
derive	  from	  studying	  whole	  human	  beings	  in	  context	  outweighs	  the	  highly	  
unlikely	  possibility	  that	  someone	  might	  become	  severely	  distressed	  as	  a	  direct	  
result	  of	  participation.	  If	  such	  an	  eventuality	  should	  come	  about,	  I	  would	  think	  
it	  morally	  necessary	  that	  the	  researcher	  offer	  that	  person	  consultation	  (even	  
pay	  for	  his	  or	  her	  psychotherapy)	  to	  try	  to	  contextualize	  whatever	  felt	  
insulting	  or	  wounding	  and	  help	  that	  person	  recognize	  that	  all	  truths	  are	  
partial	  and	  situated	  and	  that	  researchers	  distort	  unintentionally	  or	  
misunderstand’	  (Josselson,	  2007:	  560).	  This	  also	  accords	  with	  the	  UAL	  Code	  of	  
Practice	  on	  Research	  Ethics,	  which	  states	  that	  researchers	  should	  comply	  with	  
The discussion in this chapter shows that as Marcus Boon 
suggests, it is necessary to think beyond a framework of ‘right, 
property, ownership and copyright’, and to consider ethics in 
the context of practice: 
It is a matter of value and competence, rather than 
right. One does not need to own in order to practice; if 
anything, a practice owns us, reshapes and 
reconfigures us, and inserts us in a dynamic 
collectivity. Practice has its own ethics—and this ethics 
is worked out in the configuration of practice itself, 
and in relation to other practices and practitioners. 
(Boon, 2010: 247) 
It was certainly my experience that the ethics of practice were 
worked out in the configuration of the practice itself, and in 
relation to other practices and practitioners. 
Summary 
The legal advice I sought to clarify whether Selfie Portrait 
infringed copyright covered my legal position and any 
defences available to me. I was advised that, because I 
accessed the images through the API, I was infringing 
                                                
‘the	  principle	  of	  neither	  doing,	  nor	  permitting,	  any	  foreseeable	  harm	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  research	  activities’	  (UAL,	  2015/16:	  92).	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copyright and breaching Instagram’s terms of use, and would 
need to ask permission of the copyright holders to avoid 
infringement. The optimum position to mitigate the risk of 
copyright infringement would be to avoid using the API, so 
that I would not be bound by its terms of use. If I did not use 
the API, recent changes in European copyright legislation 
meant I would not infringe copyright as long as the selfies 
linked to their original location on Instagram. As a PhD 
student, there was a fair dealing defence available under the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, provided the work 
was non-commercial and sufficiently acknowledged its source 
materials. However, ‘sufficient acknowledgement’ meant 
including users’ usernames in the work, which I did not want 
to do for aesthetic and conceptual reasons, which meant the 
CDPA defence was unavailable to me.  
I drew on Andrejevic’s distinction between authored and ‘non-
authored’ information to consider the ethics of accessing the 
metadata associated with the selfies. As I only use personal 
information that is consciously created and shared, and do 
not use it to monitor user activity or for commercial gain, I 
distinguish my use of non-authored information from the 
kinds of commercial uses he objects to. 
I was advised to balance the ‘black letter law’ against practical 
considerations and the likelihood of enforcement. However, 
my decisions about what constitutes a fair use of the selfies 
were made on the basis of ethical reasoning and artistic 
intent as well as a consideration of the law. 
This ethico-legal approach is understood in the broader 
context of online communities and individuals who have 
begun to develop their own ethical frameworks for 
determining legitimate uses of other people’s cultural 
productions in the face of a legal and regulatory framework 
that is not equipped to deal with the affordances of digital 
cultural production. 
My request to develop a permission bot was denied by 
Instagram on the basis that it did not comply with their API 
terms of use. This demonstrates that these terms of use are 
not equipped to deal with the affordances of digital cultural 
production. Furthermore, they do not always serve the 
interest of the user, and in this case even reduced my ability 
to comply with Instagram’s own general terms of use. 
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I drew on Ruthellen Josselson to consider the research ethical 
considerations the work raised. Since I did not seek 
permission to use the images, I could not reach a shared 
understanding with the selfie-takers of what constitutes 
respect and compassion. I therefore had to engage in ethical 
reasoning to assess the consequences of the work on the 
people whose selfies it incorporates. I contend that the 
benefits of making the work as a contribution to the artistic 
and research community outweighs the potential harm it may 
cause, since the selfie-takers are unlikely to be aware of or 
become distressed by the inclusion of their selfies in the 
work.  
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Fig. 5.3 Diagrammatic summary of legal advice. 
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This practice-led research is an extended investigation into 
the complexities of artistic authorship under the production 
conditions of the web. It offers several significant 
contributions to knowledge: the introduction of the term 
‘extra-subjectivity’ to explore the artist’s authorial agency, an 
extended account of the legal contexts surrounding web-
based art practices that are entangled socially, ethically and 
legally with the web’s evolving production conditions, the 
presentation of digital methods and ways they can be 
repurposed for art practice, and the development of a 
distinctive approach embodied in the artworks. The 
conclusions presented below are a series of final reflections 
on these areas of contribution. 
Extra-subjectivity and authorship 
The neologism ‘extra-subjectivity’ took on varying degrees of 
conceptual stability throughout the research, particularly as 
my understanding of ‘subjectivity’ shifted. Its usefulness 
waxed and waned, and the wrangle over its efficacy continued 
from the very beginning to the very end. As noted in the 
thesis, with reference to Bruno Latour’s reflections on ANT, at 
times it felt there were three problems with ‘extra-
subjectivity’: ‘extra’, ‘subjectivity’, and the hyphen. Despite its 
problems, however, the term has proved to be a generative 
tool that offers a way for myself and other researchers in the 
future to probe the complexities of authorship in web-based 
art practice. It has come to imply a form of production in 
which ‘extra’ subjectivities, entities and processes can enter 
the authorial sphere of the artwork with varying degrees of 
authorial intentionality. As a result, the artwork’s ultimate 
manifestation often exceeds the artist’s intentionality, 
implying a form of ‘surplus’. Thus, the ‘surplus’ connotations 
of extra-subjectivity were particularly useful when exploring 
the relations between the artist and other agents that can 
contribute to an artwork’s production. It is clear that many 
non-human agents are involved in cultural production on the 
web, where digital objects and devices, algorithmic processes, 
and automation abound. However, I have rejected ANT’s anti-
essentialist approach to agency, as employing a single 
explanatory frame when interpreting human and non-human 
agents in my work was not desirable; it was necessary to shift 
registers when considering human and non human entities, 
since the former have different ‘rights’ that needed to be 
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considered when investing a socially responsible ethic into my 
practice. 
The degrees of intentionality involved in extra-subjective 
authorship depend on the nature of the artwork, the role 
each ‘author’ takes in its production, and whether it invites 
viewers to knowingly author component parts. In Flickr Nude 
or Noodle Descending a Staircase, individuals can knowingly 
contribute to the overall artwork, and thus the work produces 
individually authored ‘results’ or outputs. Selfie Portrait does 
not have ‘results’ in the same sense, as here individuals 
author component parts (selfies) without knowing they are 
being incorporated into the work. Different legal and ethical 
implications ensue, depending on these variants, as is 
discussed below. Extra-subjective authorship could describe 
any multifarious form of authorship, but here it has been 
used to describe a techno-social form of production specific 
to the web. 
Extra-subjectivity is characterized by a ‘both’ or ‘and’ logic, 
which reflects the theoretical armature that evolved during 
the research. According to this armature, the process by 
which a person becomes a subject is experienced in a 
culturally regulated social sphere. The structures of this 
sphere have the potential to both enable and constrain the 
subject, who is both productive and produced. Following this, 
‘extra-subjectivity’ implies that the artist can operate on an 
individual and a collective basis, be productive and produced, 
and be potentially empowered and exploited.  
In practice, extra-subjective authorship can involve producing 
and apprehending a surplus of material that is both a result 
of the artist’s intentionality, and of something that exceeds it. 
In the early computer-generated text works, the 
computational generation of material that was ‘beyond’ me, 
both in its quantity and unpredictability, created a distancing 
effect between my intentional inputs to and the unintentional 
outputs of the systems I had inaugurated. Although there was 
a shift in my practice away from offline computational 
processes, generativity has remained a feature throughout, 
playing a significant role in creating the playfulness and 
humor that characterizes my work. As the techno-social 
production conditions of the web continue to change, 
generative methods deployed in art practices will also 
continue to change, reflecting back these production 
conditions and the possibilities they enable.  
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As well as ‘extra-subjectivity’, the terms ‘authorship’ and 
‘agency’ presented a terminological wrangle. At the end of the 
research, they remain contestable, slippery, and highly 
entangled. This thesis traces a shift from wanting to subvert 
my authorial role, to embracing it as part of my artistic 
agency. Initially, I saw using computational processes as a way 
of avoiding responsibility for what the work ‘produced’. I 
thought that by deferring authorial control to a system, I 
could claim that the work wasn’t ‘made by me’, and this 
seemed to offer a kind of artistic freedom. However, whilst 
computational generativity loosened the grip of authorial 
control, I found that my intentionality remained fully intact, 
even when the artistic outcomes exceeded my intentions. 
Furthermore, I understood myself as accountable for the 
works and identifiable as their primary author. Although I do 
not ‘control’ the images that appear in Flickr Nude or Noodle 
Descending a Staircase and Selfie Portrait I am responsible for 
ensuring that the use of other people’s images is undertaken 
with an appropriate consideration of the work’s ethico-legal 
implications. My agency is enacted through the intentional 
construction of my lack of control, and the ways I account for 
this as the artist by reflecting on, talking and writing about, 
and exhibiting the works. Ultimately, claiming authorship over 
my artworks, or negotiating how my authorship should be 
expressed, is an enactment of my agency.  
I have come to see the assertion of my ‘proper name’ as 
playing an inevitable, necessary, even desirable role in the 
existence, circulation and reception of my works. On one 
hand I acknowledge that there are many subjectivities, 
entities and processes that contribute to their production. On 
the other, it is important (to me) for the works to signify as ‘by’ 
Charlotte Webb, because they are part of the production of 
my subjectivity and identity as an artist and researcher, and 
because I understand myself to be accountable for them. 
In an interview with MK Harikumar, Alan Kirby states that 
digimodernist authorship is 
plural, social, and anonymous… distributed across 
varying levels of decisiveness, an unknowable number 
of contributors, and an unpredictable range of 
locations. The site of a swarming and uncontainable 
creativity and energy, it seems ubiquitous, dynamic 
and acute, and simultaneously nowhere, 
pseudonymous and untraceable. (Kirby, quoted in 
Harikumar, 2009: n.p)  
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My research has shown that although the artworks are plural, 
social and involve varying levels of decisiveness (which I refer 
to as authorial intentionality), the people involved in their 
production are more ‘knowable’ than Kirby implies. By 
programmatically accessing and using images from social 
media platforms, the numbers and locations of contributors 
are knowable, as this information is easily calculable or 
included in the images’ metadata. The contributors are 
absolutely not pseudonymous and untraceable, though they 
may be unmanageable in number. This implies that a focus 
on ubiquity, pseudonymity and untraceability might actually 
eclipse the artist’s ethical accountability to the people whose 
productions are included in their work. Extra-subjectivity thus 
implies more accountability – there are more subjectivities 
involved, so more care needs to be taken. 
Initially, my transition towards the web instilled a desire to 
resist the category  ‘artist’ and join a broader field of cultural 
production independent from the validating mechanisms of 
the art system. I saw the web as a terrain in which I could 
hybridize or operate between various modes, such as ‘artist’, 
‘prosumer’ and ‘user’. Acknowledging the tensions between 
these modes and the identities they signify was an important 
part of coming to terms with my agency as an artist. Having 
undertaken the research, I am more willing to recognize 
myself as an artist engaging critically with the web within a 
specific field of knowledge and expertise. The desire to 
operate ‘outside’ the field of art fell away as I realized that 
being engaged with relevant institutions and artists who 
define the field provided a meaningful context for my 
practice. Concurrently, I realized that the web does not offer 
refuge from the conventions of validation, but imposes 
different ones. Presenting an artwork on Tumblr rendered it 
subject to the conventions of likes, reblogs and comments. 
The artist’s agency is always enacted in relation to a validating 
structure, whether it is the art system or the logics of a social 
media platform. The ‘art’ is to understand, negotiate and 
mobilize across these structures, rather than be defined or 
absorbed by them. 
The recursive relationship between structure and agency 
presented in sociological theory informed how I see the web 
as the medium for and outcome of my practice, which entails 
a recursive relationship between technological infrastructures 
(including those established by me ‘as’ the artworks, and 
those that the artworks appropriate), and processes of 
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human social interaction. I thus understand my art practice as 
part of the human communicative part of the web that 
reproduces its technological structure. To put it another way, 
the web acts on my practice and my practice acts on the web. 
Extra-subjective labour and appropriation  
Discussions about how capitalist society and corporate 
companies extract value from techno-social activities 
performed by people online also provided a context for the 
research. Whilst I acknowledge that day-to-day activities such 
as creating online images, blogs or other content, and 
interacting on social media sites can be rendered 
economically valuable, I want to hang on to a distinction 
between these kinds of activities and reflexive art practice, 
from which capital cannot extract value by the same 
processes. As Tiziana Terranova puts it, ‘The Internet does not 
automatically turn every user into an active producer, and 
every worker into a creative subject’ (Terranova, 2000: 35). 
This is, of course, not to say that artistic activity is not 
commodifiable at all – as artistic (and academic) reputations 
can be and are still commodified. 
Current discourses about the production of subjectivity in 
digital culture are often framed by debates about immaterial 
labour, which are invested with the legacy of Marxist thinking. 
This post-Marxian orientation, in which capital is seen to 
extract value from all social relations, was something I 
attempted to come to terms with throughout the research. 
Although it usefully highlights the potential for very real forms 
of exploitation, I remain resistant to the ways in which post-
Marxian thinking minimizes forms of agency outside 
capitalism. Olga Goriunova seems to offer a more hopeful 
vision when she argues it is important to re-think freedom 
from outside the post-Marxian and liberal theoretical 
framework in order to see what is actually taking place in 
culture and art that can ‘extend and disrupt the dominant 
modes of operation’ (Goriunova, 2012: 29). Engaging with this 
discourse posed a gnawing question of whether I am 
complicit in the exploitation of people’s affective labour by 
appropriating social media content. Although my artworks 
incorporate the labour of people who produce their 
subjectivity by creating and sharing images on social media 
platforms, they, along with this thesis, highlight rather than 
reproduce the exploitation of this labour. Whilst it is 
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impossible to operate completely ‘outside’ capitalism, I see art 
practice as offering a chance to stand back from and reflect 
on its effects. Just as varying degrees of authorial 
intentionality can exist within the authorial sphere of my 
works, varying degrees of labour can too. My own and 
Arthur’s labour in producing and accounting for Selfie Portrait 
was almost certainly greater than the labour involved in 
producing an individual selfie (though perhaps not greater 
than the collective labour involved in selfie-production). As 
with agency, failing to ‘shift registers’, as a Latourian might, 
when thinking about my own labour in relation to that of 
others was inappropriate. Just as laying claims to authorship 
is an enactment of my artistic agency, so too was laying claim 
to the labour of producing the artwork. 
The appropriation of other people’s cultural productions 
raised the question of whether there has been a paradigm 
shift from the appropriation strategies adopted by the 
Pictures Generation artists of the 1980s to those adopted in 
current web-based practices. In light of the ‘de-differentiating 
forces’ (Andrejevic, 2013: 125) of the web, which have 
problematized the distinction between mass and 
interpersonal communication and amateur and professional 
cultural production, there has been a paradigm shift in the 
nature of appropriation. It is no longer a discipline–specific 
gesture enacted by a group of artists with the intention of 
defining an historically contingent form of post-modernist 
criticality. Rather, it is a gesture enacted by a broad range of 
cultural producers – artists and non-artists alike. Web-based 
appropriation often involves taking user-generated material 
on commercial and social networking sites rather than just 
mass media imagery or artworks circulating in the art system. 
As demonstrated through my own and other contemporary 
artists’ work, web-based appropriation can be undertaken 
programmatically. As with generativity, appropriation is an 
artistic operation that shifts in light of techno-social 
production conditions.   
The concept of extra-subjectivity can perhaps be extended to 
social media platforms themselves, which could be seen as 
forms of extra-subjective authorship, since they are authored 
systems that draw many subjectivities into their authorial 
sphere. The ‘results’ these systems produce are 
representations of the production of these subjectivities, which 
recursively re-produce the system. It was not in the scope of 
the research to fully explore the processes by which 
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representations of subjectivity are commodified. Rather, the 
artworks offer critically reflective distance from social media 
platforms, adopting some of their language while remaining 
outside them. 
Ethico-legal considerations 
The ‘Copyright Episode’ that followed the production of Selfie 
Portrait offers an extended account of the legal contexts 
surrounding web-based art practice. By documenting my own 
work and sharing case studies, I have demonstrated that 
artists face distinct ethico-legal issues when using the web as 
a medium and location for their practice. Artists accessing 
user-generated content through social media APIs are subject 
to their terms and conditions as well as copyright law. 
Understanding social media terms of use is thus necessary 
for critically engaging with the ways platforms exercise 
control over the artist’s freedom to produce work. I have 
demonstrated, through practice, that the current legal and 
regulatory framework is not always well equipped to deal with 
the affordances of web-based art. Instagram denied my 
request to develop a permission bot on the basis that it did 
not comply with their requirements for usage of the API. If I 
was a business requesting media rights or providing a 
customer service, I could automate requests for permission, 
but as an individual artist I cannot. Instagram’s API terms of 
use reduced my ability to seek permission from users, in 
compliance with its own general terms of use. 
In light of a legal and regulatory framework that struggles to 
‘keep up’ with changing practices of web-based cultural 
production, artists need to engage in ethical reasoning that 
considers the possible effects their work might have on 
others, and be prepared to deal with the consequences in an 
ethically sound way. Recourse to fair use policy and the use of 
materials licensed under Creative Commons licences may be 
useful for artists, but as I have demonstrated, both may 
impose undesirable aesthetic and conceptual limitations, and 
defending the right to use the former may be prohibitively 
expensive. Questions of ethics and copyright are highly 
context-specific. Whilst useful as a case study, my assessment 
of the ethics of Selfie Portrait pertains to that work only, 
demonstrating that ethico-legal issues need to be considered 
on a case-by-case basis. In future works, it may be 
inappropriate to access and display images through an API 
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without permission, depending on the nature of the work and 
its audience. The use of the #selfie hashtag implies a certain 
ethical context - if a work presented Instagram images tagged 
with #schizophrenia for example, or something else 
associated with potentially vulnerable users, the ethical 
considerations for the work would be different. 
Current discourses around copyright have emphasized the 
way the web has enabled large numbers of amateur 
producers to create new competition for ‘big media’. The 
discourse is framed in terms of power relations between 
(often amateur) individuals and powerful corporations. 
Prominent news stories have highlighted copyright disputes 
between famous ‘fine’ or ‘non-commercial’ artists and 
‘commercial’ artists, as demonstrated in the case of Richard 
Prince and Patrick Cariou. However, forms of artistic 
appropriation that involve user-generated content from social 
media APIs complicate these dichotomous power relations, 
expanding them to include the artist, the platform and a 
multitude of users, who may have different intentions and 
interests when creating and sharing their work. 
In a legal sense, the author function serves to identify authors 
in order to regulate the circulation and commodification of 
their work. As Andrejevic (2013) notes, legal discourses also 
rely on a traditional concept of authorship to designate what 
information is ‘non-authored’, and therefore beyond the 
reach of copyright protection. Taking a digital methods 
approach to selfies, I have shown that an artist appropriating 
them has a responsibility to consider the implications of using 
both the ‘authored’ material (selfies) and ‘non-authored’ 
material (metadata) that they contain. Oppressive copyright 
regulations can clearly pose a threat to artistic freedom in the 
digital age, and questions about the protection of personal 
information as intellectual property are pressing. Challenges 
to conventional notions of authorship have been part of an 
ideological project in the development of web-based art 
practices, and this is to be celebrated. However, when faced 
with issues of copyright and ethical accountability, particularly 
in relation to Selfie Portrait, I felt it was important to re-assert 
my authorship. I perpetuated the author function by 
accepting my authorial role in order to invest a socially 
responsible ethic into my practice. For me, authorship is thus 
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a question of responsibility as well as ‘ownership’, which is 
why ethics are as important as the law.  
Richard Prince’s recent appropriation and selling of other 
people’s Instagram photographs demonstrates that the art 
system carries on being invested in certain kinds of 
reputations that can be commodified. The questions ‘Who 
made this? Who owns this? Who profits from this?’ still matter 
in this context, and the economic value of artworks is 
contingent on the symbolic capital of the artists that make 
them – even if the making appropriates the cultural 
productions of others. My emphasis on responsibility rather 
than ownership, however, allows me to retain at least a 
degree of critical distance from the commodification of the 
artist’s name. For commercial artists like photographers or 
designers who make money from reproductions of their 
works, the ‘original’ artwork is not paramount. For non-
commercial artists whose work is self-initiated and generates 
value through being exhibited and contextualized in a certain 
way, the ‘original’ is paramount and they make money 
predominantly out of their reputation (authorial signature), 
rather than reproductions. Copyright law thus functions 
differently for the commercial and the non-commercial artist. 
For the commercial artist, copyright law ‘incentivizes’ 
production by protecting the right to a temporary monopoly 
on their work, and the ability to make money from 
reproductions of it. For the non-commercial artist, copyright 
law may function in this way, but it can also function as a set 
of relations, even a ‘medium’, that can be engaged with 
critically to question and challenge the kinds of sanctions 
imposed on their means of production. 
Ultimately, I saw the law as a secondary concern when 
thinking about the ethics of Selfie Portrait. In part, this was 
because the real legal risks were low, but also because 
developing and enacting my own ethical ‘calculus’ in the 
specific context of my practice was more useful than a legal or 
regulatory framework for weighing up the potential benefits 
and harm arising from the work. I am not suggesting that the 
law is unimportant by any means, but that, as Marcus Boon 
suggests, it is necessary to think beyond a framework of 
‘rights, property, ownership and copyright’ and to consider 
ethics in the context of practice. This ethics is ‘worked out in 
the configuration of practice itself, and in relation to other 
practices and practitioners’ (Boon, 2010: 247). It was certainly 
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my experience that the ethics of practice were worked out, 
relationally, in the configuration of the practice itself. 
Digital methods 
I have presented an account of how the adoption of digital 
methods was fundamental to developing my distinctive 
approach to making art. Digital methods offer a set of 
techniques and, perhaps more importantly, a way of thinking 
about the web that enable artists to treat it as a medium, 
rather than a platform for dissemination. For those who want 
to make work with the web, it might be useful to take a cue 
from the digital methods invitation to ‘think along with’ online 
devices, in order to understand the web as an evolving 
medium. My aspiration to create ‘natively digital’ artworks was 
fulfilled, to an extent, through Flickr Nude or Noodle 
Descending a Staircase and Selfie Portrait. These works could 
be understood as ‘born’ of the web – appropriating and 
repurposing its objects and devices. However, they are also 
born of human subjectivities that contribute to producing the 
work and the medium of the web itself. Although digital 
methods enabled me to understand and handle user-
generated content as digital objects, I have resisted the 
tendency within digital sociology to overlook the subjects who 
produce such objects. In Selfie Portrait, for example, selfies 
had to be handled as digital objects in order to 
programmatically access them through the Instagram API. 
However, they were also understood as representations of 
human subjectivities, an understanding which manifests the 
‘both or ‘and’ logic of extra-subjectivity. Subjects produce 
digital objects, which in turn produce subjects, and extra-
subjectivity encompasses the experience of both being 
productive of and produced within this process. The very 
notion of the natively digital, which is applicable to non-
human entities, collapses when applied to human subjects, 
who are not only ‘born of’ but give birth to the web.  
My participation in the DMI Summer and Winter Schools, Hack 
the Space, and Glasshouse Collective involved working with 
people from various disciplinary backgrounds including 
sociology, computer programming, data science, and 
information design. This reflects the fact that new, cross-
disciplinary working dynamics are needed for artists and 
other practitioners to come to terms with our techno-social 
world. There is clearly generative potential in hybridizing 
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conceptual frameworks, methodological outlooks and 
techniques, and my experience of working in these teams was 
that they did generate more than the sum of their parts. By 
adopting a digital methods approach, I have demonstrated a 
certain form of mobility across disciplinary terrains. However, 
my disciplinary context did also determine how my agency 
was enacted. As an artist, my approach to user-generated 
content is distinct both from digital sociologists at the DMI 
and those behind the Selfiecity project. Whereas digital 
sociologists present ‘findings’ – typically in the form of data 
visualizations – in order to make sociological claims, as an 
artist, I present phenomena in other perhaps less determined 
ways, in order to re-imagine the social realm. 
Artworks as contribution 
The artworks themselves represent a distinctive approach 
characterized by humour, playfulness and the adoption of 
digital methods. Their poetic qualities, surprising results, and 
‘uncontrollable’ formations result from the way I adopt 
generative processes and expand the authorial sphere of the 
works to include the productive capacities of others. By 
marshalling these capacities, I inevitably create something 
that contains more than the sum of its parts. This perhaps 
opens the opportunity to use the adverbial form of extra-
subjectivity to designate the ‘extra-subjective artwork’. 
As well as driving the research and affecting my own thinking, 
the artworks continue to function in the world in various 
ways, and have the potential to affect how others think. The 
expressive properties of Selfie Portrait operate to critique the 
narcissistic framing of selfies, presenting them instead as 
instances of agential image-making and social self-
representation. By allowing the viewer to encounter the 
selfies and the biographical descriptions as part of the 
artwork, they are distanced from the economy of Instagram, 
providing reflection on, rather than complicity with it. 
Adopting a simultaneous proximity to and distance from 
activities carried out on social media is something the works 
‘do’ to develop thought about the production of subjectivities 
on the web. 
Each of the artworks raised challenges and questions of 
display, and clearly, artists working with the web have to 
negotiate the display of their work in various online and 
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physical spaces. We can return to digital methods to think 
about this as an issue of how artworks might be ‘grounded’. 
Digital methods question whether it is necessary to ‘calibrate’ 
or compare findings with offline datasets or studies, 
questioning the status of the web as a ‘potential grounding 
site’ for research (Rogers, 2013: 5). Although I am not 
presenting ‘findings’ I have been faced with an analogous 
question about the status of the web as a potential grounding 
site for my artworks. When using Tumblr to create 1000 Truly 
Original Ideas, I wrangled over whether it was more important 
for Tumblr users to like or reblog my work than for a curator, 
gallerist or other authoritative figure or institution to validate 
it. Initially, I was resistant to showing web-based works in a 
gallery setting as this seemed at odds with the opportunity 
the web offered to circumvent conventional forms of 
dissemination. However, it now seems reasonable to suggest 
that my task as a web-based artist is to negotiate multiple 
forms of attention and spaces of reception in relation to my 
work, depending on the contexts in which it is produced and 
disseminated. At the end of the process, it appears that 
discursive contextualization, rather than any particular device 
or platform functions to ground the work.  
Future research 
 
This research has opened up rich lines of enquiry for both my 
art practice and further theoretical investigation. Selfie Portrait 
and the Copyright Episode raised more questions than I have 
answered in this PhD, particularly about what kinds of 
copyright protection should be developed for personal 
information, and whether it is ethical to use fair dealing 
exemptions in relation to individuals as opposed to 
corporations. It has also opened up fertile territory for further 
artworks. I intend to pursue the development of an Instagram 
permission bot, and to explore the performative potential of 
permission seeking. My recent participation in a short course 
in ‘Legal Aesthetics’, led by artist Jack Tan (2016) has 
consolidated my interest in questions of copyright, ownership 
and authorship in web-based art practice. 
The notion of identity was bracketed in this research, but the 
entanglement of identity and subjectivity is an area for future 
investigation. Theoretically, further research into the 
recursive relationships between the production of identity 
and the production of subjectivity would be valuable. There is 
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also much potential for art practice here, and I am particularly 
interested in developing works that engage with and reflect 
on the production of identity as an aspect of extra-
subjectivity. Perhaps ‘performing’ the concept of extra-
subjectivity will become part of the production of my own 
artistic and/or academic identity. Questions of copyright are 
likely to bleed into this area, as they pertain to the ownership 
and protection of identity as well as of artefacts. To what 
extent can I ‘own’ the concept of extra-subjectivity? 
Questions about the role of affective labour in the continuing 
evolution of the web remain pressing, and I anticipate there 
being a convergence between these and the work undertaken 
for The Work We Want project. What role will creative cultural 
production play as forms of work are transformed by 
technological developments? How will artists and others 
resist the aggressive commodification of the production of 
subjectivities, understood as a form of labour on the body?  
During the research, the ‘outside or beyond’ sense of extra-
subjectivity became problematic as subjectivity came to be 
understood as involving the experience of being a subject. I 
rejected this ‘outside or beyond’ sense on the basis that extra-
subjectivity, as an experience, could not take place outside 
the subject, since experience is part of human consciousness. 
As the research concludes, however, it seems that ‘extra-
subjectivity’ could refer to the experience of being a subject in 
relation to other subjects, without it implying an extra-
ontological state. Although I focused on the ‘surplus’ sense of 
extra-subjectivity, other researchers could usefully take up 
the ‘outside or beyond’ sense of the term. Further work could 
be done to situate extra-subjectivity as part of a ’distinctive 
ontology or theory of the subject that exceeds the 
explanations of power/discourse/history’ (Blackman et al., 
2008: 8). Recourse to the notion of excess seems a fitting way 
to conclude given that it is homonymous to the abbreviated 
form of extra-subjectivity: ‘ex-s’.
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Appendix 1 
Flickr Nude or Noodle Descending a Staircase – main page iterations 
 
Version Functionality 
1.01–1.02 Keyword field 
Number of Pictures field 
Start Button 
‘Here’ (this tested whether the code was working) 
1.03 Keyword field 
Start button  
1.04–1.06 No available buttons 
1.07 Pause button (becomes resume button when paused) 
1.08–1.09 Pause button as above, but moved position on page 
1.10  Pause button 
Stats button 
2.00 Pause button 
Stats button  
Snapshot button (allows viewer to take a screenshot of their staircase) 
2.01 Pause button 
Stats button 
Slower button 
Faster button 
Capture Staircase button  
‘To create a staircase enter your keyword below and click “Go”’ 
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Keyword field 
Go button 
2.02 Pause button 
Stats button 
Slower button 
Faster button 
Capture Staircase button 
‘To create a staircase enter your keyword below and click “Go’” 
Keyword field 
Go button 
View Archive button (allows viewer to see screenshots) 
2.03 Slower button 
Faster button 
Pause button 
Stats button 
Capture Staircase button 
‘To create a staircase enter your keyword below and click “Go’” 
Keyword field 
Go button 
View Archive button 
New keyword displayed in top right in red, with ‘descending a staircase’ in 
black 
2.04   Slower button 
Faster button 
Pause button 
Stepback button when paused 
Stats button 
‘To create a staircase enter your keyword below and click “Go’” 
Keyword field 
Go button 
View Archive button 
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New keyword displayed in top right 
2.5–2.6 Pause button 
Stepback button when paused 
Stats button 
Slower button 
Faster button 
Capture Staircase button 
Dialog for capture with name and comment 
New keyword and Go in the top right 
Title block in the top right 
Advanced button 
Menu moved along top and colour introduced 
2.7 Pictorial buttons introduced (all with hover over descriptive texts) 
Keyword field 
Slower icon 
Play/pause icon 
Faster icon 
Step back icon 
Stats icon 
Capture icon 
Advanced/settings icon 
Refresh icon 
Archive icon 
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Version 1.01 
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Version 2.01 
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Version 2.02 
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Version 2.03 
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Version 2.04 
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Version 2.05 
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Version 2.7
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Appendix 2 
Correspondence between Charlotte Webb and 
Own-it, 31 March–15 April 2014 (submitted 
through Own-it’s online enquiry system) 
 
Use of Instagram API in artwork  (Submitted at 10:28) 
 
Dear Own-it 
I have recently made an artwork that accesses data from the 
Instagram API and displays it on a web page: 
http://www.otheragents.net/selfieportrait/selfieportrait.html 
(It is displaying any photo tagged with the word ‘Selfie’ in 
Instagram, along with the profile information of the person 
who posted it). 
I have consulted the Instagram Terms of Use, API Terms of 
Use and Privacy Policy, and while I am confidant that I have 
complied with the API terms of use,  I would like to double 
check whether this work makes fair use of Instagram User 
Content in compliance with ‘owners’ requirements or 
restrictions. 
The IG Privacy Policy states that: 
‘other Users may search for, see, use, or share any of your 
User Content that you make publicly available through the 
Service, consistent with the terms and conditions of this 
Privacy Policy and our Terms of Use.’ 
and 
‘Subject to your profile and privacy settings, any User Content 
that you make public is searchable by other Users and subject 
to use under our Instagram API. The use of the Instagram API 
is subject to the API Terms of Use which incorporates the 
terms of this Privacy Policy.’ 
(http://instagram.com/legal/privacy/) 
The API terms of use state that API users shall 
‘Comply with any requirements or restrictions imposed on 
usage of User Content by their respective owners. Remember, 
Instagram doesn’t own User Content – Instagram users do. 
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Although the Instagram APIs can be used to provide you with 
access to User Content, neither Instagram’s provision of the 
Instagram APIs to you nor your use of the Instagram APIs 
override User Content owners’ requirements and restrictions, 
which may include “all rights reserved” notices (attached to 
User Content by default when uploaded to Instagram), 
Creative Commons licences or other terms and conditions 
that may be agreed upon between you and the owners. In 
ALL cases, you are solely responsible for making use of User 
Content in compliance with owners’ requirements or 
restrictions.’ (http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/api/) 
Can you advise whether I am failing to comply with content 
owners’ requirements or restrictions by displaying their 
Instagram photos and profile information on a web page? Am 
I right in thinking that as long as I do not display private 
photos, this is OK? 
Many thanks 
Charlotte 
 
Own-it replied at 10:05 
 
Dear Charlotte 
Instagram user photos and videos are owned by the users 
and not by Instagram (clause 1 API terms). This is repeated in 
point 1, heading: ‘Rights’ of the Terms of Use: ‘Instagram does 
not claim ownership of any Content that you post on or 
through the Service’. Accordingly, Instagram does not have 
the right to grant you permission to use user content. This 
must be sought directly from the copyright owner (this is 
usually the person that took the photograph – 
http://www.own-it.org/knowledge/who-owns-the-copyright-
in-the-photograph).  
This is reinforced by the API terms where it states that you 
must: ‘Comply with any requirements or restrictions imposed 
on usage of User Content by their respective owners’ (clause 
1, second bullet point – API terms). Moreover, you agree not 
to: ‘Use the Instagram APIs in any manner or for any purpose 
that violates any law or regulation, or any rights of any 
person, including but not limited to intellectual property 
rights, rights of privacy, or rights of personality’. Copyright (a 
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form of intellectual property right) subsists in certain artworks 
e.g. photographs, regardless of whether the copyright owner 
imposes any restrictions on his content (e.g. by affixing a 
copyright notice). Therefore, you may be infringing copyright 
by using photographs without permission from the 
rightsholder. 
The licence users grant to Instagram is limited by the purpose 
for which Instagram is acquiring it, and is described in its 
Privacy Policy.  
• Instagram does not rent or sell your information, which may 
include your content and your personal data, to third parties 
unless the other party is affiliated with Instagram, which 
means it is part of the same group of companies (e.g. 
Facebook) or will be part of the same group of companies in 
the future.  
• Instagram only shares certain information with third parties, 
who help it to provide the services to you. This information is 
unlikely to include your content in its material form but is 
limited to information gained from cookies, metadata of your 
content (technical information about formatting or data, you 
yourself associated with your content such as hashtags, 
location information), log files and device identifiers. Access 
will be given only to the extent which is reasonably necessary 
to provide the services – please note that in this context you 
are a third party and therefore your use of user content is 
restricted unless you either get permission from the user or 
Instagram (which is very unlikely). 
• If Instagram is transferred to another company or subject of 
a merger, your rights are protected. You will still own your 
content and any buyer or resulting new company needs to 
adhere to these terms. 
• While Instagram allows other service providers (such as 
Twitter, Facebook etc.) to access its API (Application 
Programming Interfaces – a library that determines how 
software components interact), it emphasizes that users’ 
content is owned by Instagram users. It therefore doesn’t 
allow such service providers to override users’ restrictions or 
requirements, which may include ‘all rights reserved’ notices. 
Such ‘all rights reserved’ notices are attached to each photo 
by default if uploaded to Instagram. 
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• Content will be shared with other users depending on your 
privacy settings (as above). 
We suggest that if you want to use user content then you 
should request permission from the copyright owner (we 
appreciate that this may not be feasible considering the 
method of data extraction and the immediacy at which the 
image may appear on your site). You should be prepared to 
respond promptly to takedown requests if you do not have 
requisite permission to use certain content. To comply with 
the API terms you must remove user content from your 
application within 24 hours of receiving a complaint from the 
user (clause 1, fourth bullet point – API terms). If the images 
displayed on your website are refreshed every day (having 
accessed your website we believe this to be the case) then 
you may consider that the risk of content owners noticing 
their work on your website is perhaps minimal. However, the 
temporary nature of your use of images would probably not 
exonerate you, however minimal the use of such content, and 
if a copyright owner were to become aware of your use of 
their images then you may be liable to pay a retrospective 
licence fee for use of the work. 
We are aware that this may cause you considerable difficulty 
in displaying your work and you are welcome to discuss this 
with an experienced lawyer (which we are not). We will 
therefore invite you to book an IP clinic – please note that we 
are fully booked until mid-May and the next available clinic is 
on Wednesday, 28 May – there are only two slots left so 
please book quick before they are gone. Alternatively, if you 
need advice from a qualified solicitor earlier we can ask one 
of our partners to look at your query and give us an opinion.  
Please let us know. 
Kind regards 
The Own-it Team
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Appendix 3 
IP clinic transcript 
This is a transcription of a meeting between Charlotte Webb 
and Angus McLean, which took place at University of the Arts 
London on 28 May 2014 as part of Own-it’s IP clinic service.  
Angus McLean: So we’ve got an idea about the background – 
it seems to be that – it seems to be that the advice they gave 
you – I don’t know what the date is – setting out your position 
as far as the use of the content, the use of the photographs… 
I don’t know whether you have specific questions on that or 
whether you’d like to go over that advice again, or you’ve got 
any questions on the back of that advice. One of the things I 
thought might be quite helpful – we tried looking for the site 
actually – I don’t know whether you’re able to access it? 
Charlotte Webb: Yeah – I’ve got it – I’ve got it running now, I do 
have a list of questions. This is the site, so as described, it’s 
displaying Instagram photographs, which have been tagged 
with the word ‘selfie’, and the profile description of each user 
whose photo is being displayed. 
AM: Yep. 
CW: That’s— 
AM: Interesting selfie. 
CW: Yes, people strategically tag images with the word ‘selfie’ 
because they know it’s a popular hashtag. So essentially, 
that’s it – I understand that the copyright belongs to the 
people that post the photographs, not to Instagram, and so… 
AM: Yep. 
CW: Essentially – I also understand Own-it’s advice, which is 
that – their recommendation is that I should seek permission 
from each user. 
AM: Yep. 
CW: I can look into ways of possibly automating that process, I 
was also considering testing that process manually, but I 
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wanted to get your – you guys’ advice on if I was to seek 
consent, what that would need to actually contain. 
AM: OK. 
CW: Because basically the only way I can think of doing it is to 
put a comment on the photograph, because I can – I can find 
– I have their user information so I can direct message them, 
but you know, would I have to have a webpage that says 
exactly what I’m asking and what would that webpage need to 
contain? So that’s one of my questions, but I guess my 
overarching question is ‘does what I’m doing infringe the 
copyright of the Instagram photograph owners, and then all 
of the other questions are— 
AM: Flow from that. 
CW: Yeah, if so— 
AM: OK, so I think the starting point is – I don’t know whether 
it’s worth just going through the email but I think – your 
request – I think understandably you’ve looked at some of the 
Ts and Cs that apply to Instagram use – I think the Own-it 
response focuses principally on the API terms, and just to be 
clear – your site is – well it’s a question – does your site rely on 
actually being connected to the – to Instagram – using the API 
in order to get access to the data?  
CW: Yes, I get all the data through the API. 
AM: OK, and have you ever looked into how easy or possible it 
would be to access and be able to extract those photographs 
without going through the API?  
CW: Well you could search for the hashtag ‘selfie’ on 
something like Statigram or Webstagram, but I mean anyone 
can do that – and you can also search for any user now in 
Instagram directly without having to have an account. To use 
Webstagram or Statigram I think you have to have an 
account. 
AM: Yep. 
CW: So— 
AM: You can search for a user but would you be able to 
extract the photographs in the same way? 
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CW: I don’t think so – I think it’s – I think using the API is the 
only way you can automate the process of putting the 
information onto a web page. 
AM: OK – extracting it – OK. Because the first question is – 
well, my first question is that: is there a way round doing – or 
is there a way to achieve what you want to achieve without 
actually signing up to – using the API – which means that by 
default you have had to sign up to the API Ts and Cs basically, 
and the reason for that I think, is that as the Own-it advice 
said, despite some slightly sort of misleading, maybe 
misleading or confusing references elsewhere, particularly in 
the privacy policy, I think it’s pretty clear that the API Ts and 
Cs say that you can’t use – you’re not free to use photographs 
or user content without liability, and the main liability is for 
copyright infringement essentially, without getting permission 
from the users, now there seems to be an exception – one 
exception to that – and again if it’s possible to automate the 
process it might – if it’s possible  possibly to automate a 
process for seeking consent, then it may be possible say to do 
this in an automated way – if it is then great, and that is 
there’s a reference in the API Ts and Cs, to the fact that as a 
default the Instagram photos that are uploaded are noted as 
all rights reserved, or have all rights reserved notices applied 
to them. Is that something you’ve come across previously?  
CW: No. 
AM: Well it’s in the section that the Own-it guys have flagged 
already, so – and this is the clause that causes you the 
problem in the first place, saying you’re not free to use user 
content without permission, and it actually refers expressly to 
the requirements and restrictions which ‘may include all 
rights reserved notices attached to user content by default 
when uploading to Instagram’. So – I’m afraid I’ve got it on my 
iPhone but I’ve never posted an Instagram photograph, but I 
assume that– I infer from that it is possible that as a default 
when you upload a photograph it’s noted as all rights 
reserved, which is effectively in theory the content owner, the 
photographer, saying you’re not allowed to use it without my 
express permission, which is why Own-it have suggested that 
you do need to go and seek their permission. If there is a way 
automatically or manually depending on how much time and 
energy you’ve got to search selfie tagged photographs with – 
against whether they have had that default setting removed, 
so that they don’t have the all rights reserved notice, then that 
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is I think that puts you in a good position basically. Does that 
make sense?  
CW: It does. 
AM: I assume that somewhere in the metadata for the 
photographs there is that there, so if you’re signed up to the 
APIs and you’re accessing the content through the APIs that 
someone clever might be able to work out how to search and 
refine the photographs that you’re using in that way. On a 
practical level, if that’s a default setting - how likely it is – and 
the number of people that will click the default setting off, I’m 
afraid is questionable. 
CW: Yes. 
AM: But that would be the optimum, well there are two – the 
optimum position is if you can find the content without, 
access the content without going through the APIs, then 
you’re not bound by the API Ts and Cs, because actually at the 
moment on a purely copyright position, the law has recently 
changed such that if you’re using content that is publicly 
available without restriction, then if you’re linking to that – 
and that’s one of the questions I had for your tecchie guy – I 
don’t know whether that’s something you know the answer to 
– but if what you’re doing is simply linking to the photograph 
itself such that if that photograph was removed from 
Instagram you can no longer show that photograph, then 
there was a European case earlier this year that says that that 
in theory if it’s publicly available without restriction is 
permissible. 
CW: OK, so in answer to that question, yes we are effectively 
just linking to the photograph, so what we actually – we don’t 
store any images, we just store a URL that points to the 
images, so when the image is displayed we’re getting it from 
Instagram from the URL, we don’t copy them or anything like 
that, and it is – at the moment these (the photos) aren’t links 
but we could make this a link to that person’s Instagram feed. 
AM: Well the case itself actually says that even if you’re 
allowing the photograph to appear on your site such that it 
looks as though it appears on your site but it’s based 
technologically on a link to the original site then that’s 
permissible. 
CW: Wow. 
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AM: So it wouldn’t actually have to be a hyperlink it could just 
be the photograph itself, so long as it’s based, or appearing – I 
have to admit I don’t know technologically how you achieve 
that. 
CW: Just this. 
AM: OK, well that’s based on a link. 
CW: Where is the documentation – where should I refer to for 
that particular— 
AM: The case? I’ve got a copy here. It’s actually a remarkably 
short European Court of Justice judgment, but if you plug in 
that case reference there – it’s referred to by everyone as 
‘Svensson’. 
CW: OK, so can I just clarify though – because – how does the 
API change that position?  
AM: Good question. OK, so there are basically – there are 
three strands to this as I see it. The first strand is if you can 
access that information or get access to that content without 
going through the IG effectively, particularly going through 
the APIs, then a) you’re not bound by the Ts and Cs that apply 
to the use of the APIs. 
CW: But I am still bound by the privacy policy, which basically 
says the same thing. 
AM: Well it refers to the APIs, but if you’re not accessing that 
content through using the APIs then you’re not bound – I 
would say, certainly arguably, you’re not bound by the 
contract that applies by the use of those APIs. Does that make 
sense? 
CW: Yes. 
AM: The difference in position is because you’re using the 
APIs to access the information, there’s an additional level of 
restriction that applies to you which is not just copyright law, 
it’s contractual law because you’ve actually chosen to accept 
those Ts and Cs, so Instagram are able to impose a higher 
level of sanction on you than they are if you’re able to access 
that content without going through the APIs. Does that much 
make sense?  
CW: Yes, that makes sense. 
 288
AM: And in fact that’s one of the key bits to this case – I’ll tell 
you the paragraphs that might help put your mind at rest. 
That – the way that this distinguishes – I have to say I’m not 
entirely convinced I agree with the reasoning they gave for – 
but it’s European law – it’s European wide law at the moment 
so – what they say is that if the content itself is available to 
the public, then so long as all you’re doing is making the same 
content available to the same public, then you’re not doing 
anything that infringes copyright. The key there is – and this is 
why I ask the question of whether it’s possible to access that 
content without going through Instagram – that if you can 
access it in that way, so can anybody else, so arguably you’re 
just referring it on to the same public that can already access 
it. 
CW: Anybody could get an Instagram API key. 
AM: Yes, well they can, but they have to sign up to the Ts and 
Cs – so you can’t unilaterally access that data without going 
through a couple of steps. 
CW: Yes. 
AM: But if you can – if you could find a way to access that data 
in a way that other people could, then arguably you’re falling 
within the – not defence, but clarification this case provides. 
Does that make sense? 
CW: Got you, yes. 
AM: Now, that’s the theoretical possibility at the moment, 
which it’s worth speaking to your tecchie person about. If it’s 
not possible to do that – and I envisage that it might be 
possible to do that in some cases but you probably won’t be 
able to access the same pool of selfies that you’re able to 
access if you go through the APIs. So the second tier is if you 
choose – if you decide that you could do that but it’s not 
giving you access to the same pool of content that you would 
like to be able to have access to, and therefore it’s important 
to, or it’s necessary to go through the API route, then as I said, 
the problem lies in that you’re not only bound by copyright 
law, you’re also bound by contractual law because you agreed 
to the Ts and Cs, and those Ts and Cs preclude you from 
using or redistributing user content without permission, 
unless you’re able to search for content that has had the 
default setting – all rights reserved – removed. Make sense?  
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CW: Yeah – totally makes sense – I’m not sure if there’s even a 
functionality within Instagram that lets you do that. 
AM: Well, as I say, I’d be surprised if somewhere in the 
metadata that sits within Instagram, that I assume you’re able 
to access, maybe not completely readily, but more readily 
than you would be if you were just searching and trying to 
access that information without being connected to the 
website itself and the API, that you might well be able to work 
out how to refine your searching in that way or by using that 
as a factor.  
CW: Yeah. 
AM: That may be optimistic but again, the problem with that – 
in the same way as the problem of searching without going 
through the API is that I imagine that that’s going to give you a 
very restricted pool of content to use. So that brings you back 
to the third position which is the position I think you were 
already told about which is based on the Own-it advice you 
have at the moment, which is in theory you shouldn’t be 
accessing or using that content without getting permission 
from the users. It’s interesting that you say it is – you think it 
might be possible to automate that permission request 
process, and I could see a situation in which, if I understand it 
correctly, what you would do is – in order to use their content 
you know which account you’re getting that content from, if 
you are automatically able to message that person through 
their account – is that what you’re envisaging? 
CW: Yes. 
AM: To say ‘are you happy – I’d like to use your content in my 
– on my website – and are you happy to do that?’ – I can see – 
even if you did that in an automated way, I can see you 
putting yourself in a position where I think your risk of getting 
a complaint is very small – certainly a valid complaint is very 
small. The one problem with that is – and I think you 
envisaged this with one of your supplementary questions – is 
if you have asked for consent and you haven’t received that 
consent, then I think you would need to make sure your 
program is working – the algorithm or the program that 
you’re using to extract the content is working in such a way 
that it excludes any photographs that you’ve asked for 
consent in relation to and haven’t received that consent. Does 
that make sense?  
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CW: Wow. Yes – I wondered if there was a thing of – if you’ve 
asked it’s OK – because I mean can I really expect every single 
person to click the link, read the information and decide? 
AM: Well, I’m not sure necessarily you need to provide that 
much information. Is there a character restriction like Twitter 
on the number of characters you can use? 
CW: Yes, I can’t remember what the total is but I thought the 
comment itself would have to be very small and could include 
a link maybe? 
AM: Yes, I mean I think – there’s no reason why you would – I 
think in principle there’s no reason why you would need to set 
out a very fulsome request or information, I think you could 
literally just say ‘I like your photo I’d like to share it on my 
website’ – attach a hyperlink – ‘please can you confirm that 
you’re happy for me to do that’?  
CW: Yeah. 
AM: And the reason I’m slightly relaxed about the wording for 
that and the extent of the wording is all of this advice – up 
until now – all of this advice is black letter advice based on 
technically your – the application of the law as it technically 
sits. All of this sits against the practical backdrop of what is 
your – what’s the risk to you of ignoring this advice? And I 
think in a way that’s touched on a little bit by the Own-it 
advice, which is so long as you have a system in place which 
means you are also in compliance with one of the parts of the 
API Ts and Cs - that you’re taking down content that you get 
complaints in relation to – then what is the real risk to you of 
effectively ignoring the API Ts and Cs that apply to the use of 
the APIs? And certainly as far as UK law is concerned, the 
financial liability and risk to you I think is fairly low. 
Technically, if you used somebody’s content in breach of their 
copyright rights then they’re entitled to a number of things – 
one is an injunction, which would get you to force you to take 
down their content, which – our advice would be definitely do 
this, which you have the facility to do anyway, and do it 
expeditiously, and also technically they’d be entitled to 
damages. What the damage would be to an individual user by 
using the content that you’re using in the way that you’re 
using (it), I’m not sure – it’s going to be questionable whether 
there is actually any financial damage to them, but whatever 
financial damage there is is probably going to be appointed to 
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some sort of – the amount you’d have to pay them in return 
for consent to use their photograph which, depending on 
whose photograph it is would probably be a range. If you’re 
using a celebrity’s photograph then it may be that they’re a bit 
more sanguine about how likely they are to give consent, and 
they might ask for more money than an individual user or a 
non-celebrity, and a non-celebrity – I don’t know what sort of 
money you would have to pay to get them to agree to use 
their photo. 
CW: Yes, that was one of my questions – how much would I 
have to pay someone if they really wanted me to? 
AM: Well, at the moment, as far as I can see, the main risk is a 
damages claim – the financial risk appears to be a damages 
claim under – for copyright infringement. You might think in 
these sorts of situations there’s a privacy risk and in theory 
there are damages available for breach of privacy as well – I’m 
not sure I could see an English court saying there’s any breach 
of any individual’s privacy here – they’ve already posted the 
photograph online, albeit to Instagram users but, maybe not 
quite with the freedom we’d like to be able to do it, but I’m 
fairly sure it’s possible to access Instagram content even if 
you’re not an Instagram user, so actually is there really any 
expectation that that photograph is private? I think that’s 
going to be a very tough argument to make, so I think the 
principle liability is damages for copyright infringement, and 
in the circumstances unless there’s somebody that could 
command a massive royalty fee for the use of their image 
then I think it’s questionable how much if any money they 
could claim from you. So the most likely risk for you is that 
you have to take down their content, basically, which you may 
feel is a risk that you’re happy to take, I said, in a lawyerly way. 
The other – that’s the direct risk between you and the user. 
The other risk of effectively ignoring the API Ts and Cs is that 
Instagram could pull your account or pull your access to the 
APIs which – one of the things we haven’t talked about is the 
background to this and the key objectives is – is it a project 
you’re working on? 
CW: Yes, it’s an artwork – it’s part of my PhD research, which is 
about examining what the artist’s agency is in producing web-
based artworks. 
AM: What do you mean ‘artist’s agency’? 
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CW: As in their capacity to produce – what happens to your 
authorship when you use stuff from the web? Whose content 
is it? Who is the author? Who is producing something? Who 
owns what’s being made? 
AM: So a copyright challenge might be quite effective for the 
purposes of the research. 
CW: Yes, that’s the thing it’s really interesting and this is very 
valuable for what I’m trying to understand. 
AM: Well Svensson – you should be referring to Svensson in 
your thesis I would say, because it’s a landmark decision.  
CW: OK, great. Can I just check we’ve covered all my 
questions?  
AM: Yes. 
CW: So, the answer to ‘do I infringe their copyright?’ – yes. Can 
I use a fair dealing argument in light of recent changes to 
copyright exception law?  
AM: Well technically this isn’t a fair dealing argument. Is that 
right? Yes, technically, the way I read Svensson is that it’s – the 
way they’ve argued it – the way the European court has 
argued it, which as I say I’m not necessarily sure I agree with 
the logic and there are other people, commentators that have 
had questions about the logic they’ve use, but the principle 
focus or the intellectual justification that they’ve gone through 
is that if what you’re doing is only communicating or re-
communicating the work in question to the same public that 
it was initially communicated to, then what you’re doing is no 
different to what the original publisher did. 
CW: Got you, yes. 
AM: So, and that‘s why it’s important to be clear on what – 
who the public is, and to give the example, if you’re able to 
access publicly that content, without signing up to the 
Instagram Ts and Cs, then I would say that you’re only doing 
what the original user had done, or the original content 
owner has done. If you can only access it through the 
Instagram Ts and Cs and then you’re re-publishing it, then I’d 
say that the public in question that you’re re-publishing to is 
different to the original public, if that makes sense. So I don’t 
think technically it’s – you’re relying on a fair – I mean fair 
dealing is things like use for purposes of review, criticism or 
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news reporting and I thought about it a little bit in relation, 
when I initially saw your question, and I don’t think – I mean 
the fact that it’s a PhD project might change that slightly – we 
very rarely do this, but for this question in particular, I 
thought I’d bring our statute book along. Let me just see. 
CW: I would argue that the public doesn’t change, because I 
mean the content is content that the web public could look at 
when it’s originally posted and it’s still content the web public 
can look at when I post it. 
AM: If what you’re doing is – if you’re extracting the content 
without going through the APIs— 
CW: But the content would be the same. 
AM: The content is the same but the public is different 
because if you have to go through the APIs to get access to 
the content, then the public for the purposes of the original 
publication is those users of Instagram that signed up to 
Instagram. If you’re then taking that content and applying it, 
or publishing it via a website that you can access without 
signing up to the Instagram’s Ts and Cs then your public is – 
the Instagram public is that, and you’re publishing it via your 
website which is – has no Ts and Cs attached and anyone can 
access it – is exponential, all web users. 
CW: But all web users could see the Instagram content as it’s 
originally posted. 
AM: Do you know for a fact that they can?  
CW: Yes. 
AM: So you know that in relation to every single photograph 
that you re-publish, a member of the public could access— 
CW: Yes. 
AM: Definitely? 
CW: I’m pretty sure yes, because you could go to webstagram 
without logging in, I think, and just access it through that. 
AM: OK, well it may be that – if that is possible then there 
might not be a copyright infringement issue in relation to 
what you’re doing, but there’s still – if you’re having to access 
through the APIs, you’re still bound by the contract.  
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CW: But also the risk of Instagram actually caring is very low, 
right? 
AM: Well, actually the risk of Instagram caring is probably 
quite high, because if they got a complaint about what you 
were doing they would care because of the sort of principle 
on which they base your access to or anyone’s access to the 
APIs and they’ll be more concerned about a user’s concerns 
than they will about somebody who is accessing their content 
and then making the most of it or using it for their own 
purposes, so I suspect they would be concerned if they 
received a complaint – but probably the biggest issue is how 
likely a user would be to be concerned about it or ever find 
out about it.  
CW: OK, you don’t think – the risk of them caring is high but 
you don’t think that they’d— 
AM: Well as far as I’m aware they don’t monitor this, so the 
only situation in which they’d be made aware of this would be 
if a user complained about having discovered what you were 
doing with their content and the fact that their selfie had 
appeared on your website – is if they raised that to Instagram, 
and if that was reported to Instagram I can see them being 
unhappy about that. I don’t know what recourse they would 
take but as I say there are two levels of risk to you – there’s 
one the risk as to you and the user, and as I say I think the 
main issue there is your liability under copyright law, but your 
position between – the position between you and Instagram, 
if you’re using the process of getting access to the 
photographs via their API is the contractual position you have 
with them under their Ts and Cs, and the ultimate sanction 
there would be the – maybe not the ultimate sanction – but 
the biggest practical problem for you is if they pull your 
access to the API. Out of interest have you received any 
complaints? 
CW: No. 
AM: How long has the site been up?  
CW: Since December. 
AM: OK. I mean the one thing – and I suspect this is part of 
the thesis – the one thing that I hear very often in these 
surgeries as well as with highly sophisticated in-house lawyers 
at big investment banks and things like that is ‘everyone else 
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is doing this, so is there a problem? Surely there’s no problem 
if everyone else is doing it?’ And the answer to that I’m afraid 
– the legal answer to that – is just because everyone else is 
doing it doesn’t mean it’s OK. Also you never know the basis 
on which people are making that content available – have 
they come to some sort of separate arrangement with 
Instagram – have they sought permission from users? 
CW: OK I have one question just going back to the automated 
permission. I have a concern that Instagram would take what I 
do there as spam – as me spamming people because they say 
you can’t use the Instagram (API) to create unwanted 
comments or anything. 
AM: So they say, section 2 – that seems to be the biggest risk, 
the second bullet point ‘use the Instagram API to spam or 
otherwise harass users with unwanted likes, comments and 
other actions.’ The issue there is that— 
CW: Do they actually use the word spam? 
AM: Yes ‘spam or otherwise harass users with unwanted likes, 
comments and other actions.’ And I think what you’re talking 
about here is ‘other actions’ I don’t think it’s spam, and I don’t 
think it’s unwanted likes – it’s not comments – it’s other 
actions. I don’t think – I’m not sure that clearly – I don’t think 
that clearly precludes you from sending a message to ask 
whether they’re happy for you to re-use their content, so I 
don’t think under my reading it could definitely prevent you 
from doing that. 
CW: Great. 
AM: The one thing that I should say in relation to all this 
advice is that it’s UK law advice. Unhelpfully I’m afraid as with 
all these social media sites, Instagram’s Ts and Cs are based 
under and expressly stated to be governed by Californian law 
so it may be that Californian law would have a slightly 
different interpretation to that but I think as far as UK law is 
concerned, I don’t think what you’re intending to do – if all 
you’re talking about is an automatically generated request for 
permission…   
CW: And it’s only one – you’d only get one message per user. 
AM: Yes, exactly – I think that’s important – as long as you’re 
not pestering them with – if you haven’t heard within 24 
hours you’re not sending them another one. I think it should 
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be a one shot only. I don’t think you – you definitely – what’s 
the right way to put this. I don’t think you definitely fall within 
that restriction, i.e. it might be that you fall outside that 
restriction, and in fact you could argue that the fact that 
you’ve got an obligation under the second bullet point which 
is the one that causes you a problem, to comply with their 
rights, which you could say arguably imposes an obligation on 
you to seek their permission, I would say, certainly if anyone 
complains about that your response should be, or would be 
‘well I’ve got a competing obligation here to comply with the 
users’ rights and what I’m trying to achieve is exactly that. I 
didn’t think it was spam or harassment I just sent them an 
email saying do you mind me re-using your content?’ 
CW: OK. So, I can’t use a fair dealing argument. When I was 
reading about that at the weekend I wondered if I could say 
that if there was any element of caricature or parody or 
pastiche of Instagram— 
AM: Well, no that’s out of date now anyway. 
CW: Oh really!? I was looking at the updated ones. 
AM: Is that under UK law?  
CW: Yes, IPO.gov 
AM: It got pulled about 2 weeks ago. 
CW: Oh did it? God.  
AM: Yes, another thing for your PhD – it got pulled at the last – 
it was due to be— 
CW: Yes, because I thought it was June? 
AM: Yes, it got pulled.  
CW: OK, does the context of it being research have any 
impact? 
AM: Well I was just looking at that – section 29. Do you 
acknowledge where it’s come from? Do you acknowledge 
which user… OK so say which user it came from?  
CW: No, not on the web page, but I could do.  
AM: Fair dealing with a, in this case artistic work for the 
purposes of research, but a non-commercial purpose – you’re 
not generating any money out of this? 
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CW: No. 
AM: ‘Does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that 
it is accompanied by sufficient acknowledgement’, Section 29 
1, of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act – CDPA, 1988. 
CW: Is this available?  
AM: Yes, you can find that through legislation.gov.uk – if you 
put ‘section 29 CDPA’ in Google I suspect it will come up 
straight away. 
CW: So that might be…  
AM: Yes, so thinking that through, if – this is UK – this is where 
the jurisdictional scope of our advice is quite important, 
because what you’re, I guess – there’s an argument – probably 
quite a strong argument that if what you’re doing is really 
confined to non-commercial research and you acknowledge – 
there is an exception to acknowledgement if it’s not 
practicable to do that then you don’t have to, but I think in the 
circumstances there’s no practical reason why you couldn’t 
acknowledge where it’s come from.  
CW: Yes, and that acknowledgement could be – could that just 
be either by saying the username or linking to the user’s feed?  
AM: I would say you should display the username, actually. 
You could do both. I mean one way to do it would be to 
display the username with a hyperlink embedded in that to 
the user account. 
CW: And how do we determine what is ‘reasonable’ there? 
Would it be, you know down there [points to laptop] or would 
it have to be massive? How prominent would it have to be? 
AM: ‘A sufficient acknowledgement’ – well, I’m not aware off 
the top of my head the case law, whether there is actually any 
case law of what ‘sufficient’ means in that context, but I mean 
for a starting point I would say that it should – you should 
probably be giving it equal prominence to the other text that 
you’re including and if you – again all these are very – this is 
applying the black letter of the law to what you’re doing, and 
should be taken against the commercial practical 
considerations of how likely it is that somebody might be 
willing or minded to complain, but I think to comply with the 
sufficiency requirement there I’d recommend that the text is 
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at least the same font size as the other text that you’re using 
and given equal prominence, so in the section underneath 
the photograph where you’ve got text displayed I’d say put it 
there. 
CW: OK. So you just answered my next question about non-
commercial, and we’ve also discussed whether linking would 
help, and it would. 
AM: Yes, linking helps because of Svensson. 
CW: I have a quote here, which I think may be the Svensson 
thing – ‘The court of Justice of the European Union rules that 
Internet users should be free to share links to material for 
example photos or videos.’ 
AM: Yes.  
CW: Ok, could I put text on the front page that would help, 
e.g. ‘If you see your selfie in this work and don’t want it to be 
here please email…’ 
AM: On the front page of the website?  
CW: Because they have to enter the work via a sort of landing 
page – they have to click here to see the stream so I could put 
a sentence there giving people… 
AM: That helps, but that only helps you comply with your 24-
hour obligation under the API. It doesn’t affect your liability or 
your potential liability I don’t think. If what you’ve done does 
infringe copyright – I think having looked at the defence – and 
it is a fair dealing defence – research and private study – I 
think in the UK I can see some strong arguments to say given 
the circumstances we’re talking about here, as long as you 
don’t in due course turn this into a commercial entity where 
you’re getting advertising or something, then you fall within 
the scope of section 29. Technically therefore what you’re 
doing in the UK, even if you’re accessing it through the APIs, 
doesn’t infringe the rights of the users, so you’re not doing 
anything that infringes the API Ts and Cs. The issue there is 
whether there are any other laws that apply, because 
presumably your website is accessible around the world. 
CW: Yes, but my server is in the UK. My IP address is here. 
 299 
AM: Well, I think the issue is that if it’s displayed – if you’re 
displaying a photograph in the US or Canada or China, then 
technically, or certainly there’s an argument that the law in 
that jurisdiction would apply, I’m afraid. 
CW: OK. We’ve covered what kind of damages people could 
claim for. What risk is there that someone would a) notice b) 
mind? And I don’t know – what’s your summary response to 
that? 
AM: The best example I can come up with in response to that 
– and you may want to refer to this in your PhD – is that there 
was a dispute – not a case – it didn’t get that far I don’t think 
but there was an issue that arose around the time of the riots 
– the summer riots, so 2011 was that or 2012?  
CW: I think it was 12. 
AM: Well, whenever the August riots were, and the BBC 
published a photograph from a blogger’s website without 
giving an acknowledgement of where that photograph was 
from, and the blogger then saw that – how he saw that I don’t 
know – and then complained to the BBC, and the BBC – 
someone at the BBC who I’m not sure was in their job for very 
long afterwards wrote back saying that any content that is 
publicly available on the Internet is free to use, which at the 
time wasn’t an accurate reflection of the law, and basically he 
told the blogger to go away and the blogger republished that 
response and that resulted in certainly enough press to result 
in me hearing about it. So again if you put that into Google I’m 
sure there’d be some references to that issue. Actually as it 
currently stands, the law has now been clarified, updated by 
Svensson. The BBC’s use in that context would have been 
permissible in that context provided they had applied the 
correct acknowledgment, which is what they didn’t do in the 
first place, which is what caused the complaint. So people do 
find out and certainly in that example I’m aware that 
somebody has complained about it. The irony obviously being 
that the BBC is one of the largest content owners in the world 
and at the time they should have been aware of what they 
had to do with other people’s content, so… I spoke to a senior 
lawyer at the BBC about that in relation to a talk I was giving 
using that as an example where she was in the audience and I 
wanted to make sure that she was OK with me talking about it 
and she said, yes it’s a bit embarrassing but [inaudible]. 
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CW: Yes. OK, so I guess that morally it’s not good to make any 
decisions based on ‘they might not notice’, because they 
might notice, and also that wouldn’t really be moral, it would 
be just risk.  
AM: It’s a risk assessment, yes. 
CW: And then whether they would mind what I’m doing – 
that’s another risk assessment. 
AM: Yes – as I say I think on balance, I imagine – you never 
know, obviously different users are different so in the 
population you may find that someone that does mind, but I 
imagine that Instagram are probably going to be more 
exercised about you doing that if it does technically breach 
their Ts and Cs than a user might be.  
CW: Yes. But they wouldn’t know unless the user complained 
– therefore risk is low.  
AM: Well certainly based on as it currently stands – I’m not 
aware that they have any facilities for checking those things, 
and the number of people that must be using their content 
having signed up to their APIs I imagine is enormous, so… 
CW: You also have to tell them what you’re using it for when 
you get your key. We didn’t specify exactly but said it was for 
an artwork, so… OK, as a student of UAL am I still liable if 
there are any damages?  
AM: That would be a matter for – did you have to sign any – 
did you have to sign any separate agreement with UAL when 
you got taken on to do your PhD? 
CW: I don’t think so. I’m not sure about whether when you 
enroll you sign anything that covers that – I didn’t read it. 
AM: Well, the starting point is it depends whether there’s any 
agreement in place with UAL. Technically you’re not an 
employee of UAL… 
CW: In this capacity no, I mean I am one, but I’m not doing this 
under the conditions of my employment. 
AM: Then I think the likelihood is that it’s unlikely that there’s 
any – it may be that – again, technically – it may be that 
somebody who wanted to complain took issue with UAL as 
well because they’re the body that is overseeing the thesis, 
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but I think you’re the primary target for liability in that 
context. 
CW: Yes. I think you’ve covered this – is it morally acceptable 
to wait for complaints and respond immediately should they 
arise?  
AM: I think that’s a question for you isn’t it? My only comment 
would be you wouldn’t be the only person that does that. I 
suspect. It’s more about the population’s morals and how 
they use the Internet than anything else I suspect. I mean 
actually – the technical – to add a layer to that – the technical 
position that you’re in because of the particular 
circumstances you’re in under section 29, mean that in the 
UK, I think you’ve got good arguments that you’re free to do 
what you’re doing, so whether it’s morally acceptable to do 
what you’re doing having checked with a lawyer who said that 
in the UK it’s OK to do what you’re doing, but it might not be 
outside the UK puts a slight gloss on that moral question. 
Again I’m afraid that’s for you to determine. 
CW: OK – this may also be a question for UAL, but I’m just 
going to – I’ve only got 3 more. This work needs to be 
available to external examiners in one year’s time. What 
should I do if there was a cease and desist notice? Could I 
password protect the site and make it accessible for only 
those that need to see it and in this case argue for private 
study? So if something went horribly wrong – I mean I don’t 
think that would happen – but if I password protected this site 
and said only my external examiners were going to see it – I’m 
not going to do that, but if I did – would all of these problems 
go away? 
AM: If they were in the UK technically I think they would do 
yes. Technologically that might not help you because if it’s 
only a link, and the link is taken down they can’t post the 
content – you can’t see the content anymore presumably. 
CW: The thing is if it’s just a link that’s not indexed by search 
engines, nobody is going to know it’s there.  
AM: So that – in terms of risk management, whether you do it 
by only allowing IP addresses that tell you they’re based in the 
UK to access the site, or you restrict it by user control, more 
specific user control – passwords etc., then if what you’re 
doing is ensuring that it’s only accessible in the UK, then I 
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think you can be confident that you fall within the scope of 
the fair dealing defence.  
CW: OK – we’ve discussed what the consent would need to 
contain – you said it needs to be very simple. And my 
supervisor asked me to ask what the difference was between 
copyright and IP. Is that quite a big question? As I understand 
it copyright is a form of intellectual property. 
AM: Yes, it’s a subset of IP. Intellectual Property covers five or 
– depending on how you qualify it – five or six broadly 
understood types of intellectual property, of which copyright 
is one. 
CW: I have another work, which is very similar, and I wanted 
to know if it was subject to the same things, but I think 
basically it probably is.  
AM:  Well certainly the fair dealing exception, as long as you’re 
researching as part of study would apply – if there’s no 
commercial use. So yes. 
CW: If I wanted to look at the – say for example – the US 
equivalent – is there a US equivalent to that?  
AM: Yes, there is. 
CW: Because the [inaudible] said the same thing – that I was 
covered in the UK and the US. 
AM: Yes, so the US have fair use defences, and actually my 
understanding of those is they’re – partly because of the first 
amendment – they’re perhaps broader than the fair dealing 
exceptions that you have in the UK, so there’s a bit more 
latitude as I understand it in the US than there is here, for use 
for private purposes. Not necessarily this is private purposes 
but that’s a defence so, something to have a look out I’m sure 
there will be a site you can find that will give you some 
guidance on that. 
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Appendix 4 
Report written by Angus McLean, following Own-
it IP clinic 
Own-it IP clinic 
Date: Wednesday, 28 May 2014 
Times: 10.45–11.30 
Participant: Charlotte Webb 
Background:  
 
You contacted Own-it for advice in relation to an artwork that 
you have recently made, as part as your PhD, which accesses 
data from the Instagram application programming interface 
(API) and displays it on a web page (specifically, any photo 
tagged with the word ‘Selfie’ on Instagram, along with the 
profile information of the person who posted it). You had a 
number of queries including whether or not your artwork 
infringed the copyright of the owners of the Instagram 
photographs and, if so, whether there were any ways to work 
around this or whether any defences would be available to 
you. 
Advice given: 
Intellectual property encompasses broadly 5 types of right 
which result from the expression of an idea, of which 
copyright is one subset. The owner of the copyright of a 
photograph is generally the person who took the photo. As 
you are currently accessing photographs through the 
Instagram API and are displaying them without asking the 
permission of the photograph takers, you are, subject to any 
defences that are available to you (see below), infringing their 
copyright. You are also in breach of Instagram’s Terms of Use 
and the API Terms of Use. Instagram has given you access to 
its API and as a result you are bound by the API Terms of Use, 
which creates a contractual relationship between you and 
Instagram.  It is important to note that the Instagram Terms 
of Use and API Terms of Use are governed by the law of 
California but the advice contained in this note is from a UK 
law perspective only. 
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The optimum position for you in terms of mitigating the risk 
of copyright infringement is to access the content you need 
for your artwork without going through the API so that you 
are not bound by the API Terms of Use. Under the recent 
European Court of Justice decision in Nils Svensson and 
Others (C-466/12), internet users are free to share links to 
material, for example photos or videos, provided the material 
itself has been published freely online with the permission of 
the rights holder. As long as the content you link to is 
available to the public and you are making the content 
available to the same public, this will not constitute copyright 
infringement. 
If it is not possible or desirable to access the data without 
going through the Instagram API, you will need to ask the 
permission of the copyright holder before displaying the 
photo to avoid infringement. It may be possible to automate a 
consent mechanism but in this case it is important that the 
program works in such a way that photos for which no 
permission has been received are not displayed. 
There is a risk that automated permission could be viewed as 
spam under the API Terms of Use, which would constitute a 
breach of contact. In order to mitigate the risk of any message 
being viewed as spam, it is important that only one message 
seeking consent is sent (rather than a series). In addition, you 
could argue that by Instagram mandating you to comply with 
users’ rights, part of the Terms of Use, it imposes an 
obligation on you to seek permission. If Instagram were to 
take the view that your consent mechanism constituted spam 
that would seem to conflict with your obligation to comply 
with users’ rights. 
A further possible approach that might be available to you 
stems from the fact that, as a default, according to the API 
Terms and Conditions, all Instagram photos have the notice 
‘All Rights Reserved’ applied to them. If you were able to 
search for photos where the user has removed this notice 
and only display photos where the user has actively chosen 
not to reserve their rights (thereby arguably consenting to 
third parties reusing their photographs), you would have a 
strong case for arguing that you were not infringing their 
copyright.  However, this may be not straightforward to 
achieve technically and we suspect that it would drastically 
reduce the number of photos you are able to use.   
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Defences to infringement of copyright: 
As it has been recently announced that the proposed fair 
dealing defence to copyright infringement under UK law for 
the purposes of caricature, parody or pastiche that had been 
due to come into force on 1 June 2014, has been delayed, this 
is not currently available. 
You had a query as to whether the fact that you have 
produced your webpage in the context of PhD research could 
provide you with any defence to infringement of copyright.  
As discussed at our meeting, Section 29(1) Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’) provides a fair dealing defence 
for the purposes of research for a non-commercial purpose 
provided that the dealing is accompanied by a sufficient 
acknowledgement of the source.  As long as your research is 
strictly non-commercial and sufficient acknowledgement is 
provided through the displaying of the Instagram users’ 
usernames and/or via a link to the photo as displayed on their 
Instagram account, there is a strong argument that this 
defence applies in your case. It is important to give the 
acknowledgement equal prominence (e.g. same font size) to 
the other text that you are displaying as part of the artwork.  
However, this is a defence under UK law and there may not 
be an equivalent defence in other jurisdictions.  The US also 
have fair dealing exemptions – some of which are broader 
than those under UK law – however as UK lawyers, we are 
unable to advise on US law on this point. 
You had a query as to whether you could escape liability by 
putting text on the landing page of the site such as: ‘If you see 
your selfie in this work and do not want it to be here, please 
email c.webb@arts.ac.uk’.  This would not mitigate your 
liability but would only assist you as a take-down policy to 
prevent you continuing to infringe the owner’s copyright.  
That and if you are happy to include such a statement in your 
webpage we can see no reason not to do so from a legal 
perspective. 
Level of risk: 
As discussed at our meeting, the advice given above is the 
black letter law and this does need to be balanced against 
practical considerations and the likelihood of enforcement. 
As far as UK law is concerned, your financial liability for 
copyright infringement is low.  If you have used someone’s 
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content, that person is entitled to an injunction to require you 
to take down the content.  The person whose copyright is 
infringed is also entitled to damages – the key financial risk in 
your case – which is likely to be the equivalent to the amount 
that you would have to pay for using a photograph in 
question.  In theory, there may also be damages available for 
breach of privacy but in this situation it would be difficult to 
argue that the photograph-takers had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy given that they have posted their 
photographs on a social networking site with no privacy 
settings. 
There is also a risk that Instagram will find out about your 
project and be unhappy with the impact on its users, which 
could result in Instagram terminating your account.  However, 
the only way Instagram is likely to find out about the project is 
if a user (or users) complains to it.  
You also had a query as to whether you or University of the 
Arts London would be liable if any legal claims were made as 
a result of the work. The answer to this depends on the 
contract that you signed with University of the Arts London on 
starting your PhD. 
You had a query as to whether it is morally acceptable to wait 
for complaints of copyright infringement to come in and then 
respond immediately, rather than making provisions to avoid 
infringement as a starting point.  This is a question for you to 
answer, but as you could argue that you are free to use the 
photographs in the way you are doing under the fair dealing 
exemption of section 29(1) CDPA discussed above, this may 
put a gloss on the moral question. 
As this work needs to be available for view by external 
examiners in one year, you had a query as to whether the site 
would need to be removed should a cease or desist notice or 
similar be issued by an Instagram user.  In this situation, the 
site could be password-protected and only accessible by the 
examiners, which, assuming that the examiners access the 
site from the UK, should ensure that that you fall squarely 
within the section 29(1) CDPA fair dealing defence discussed 
above.
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Appendix 5 
Correspondence re: Instagram terms of use, 
between Silvia Baumgart (Own-it) and Charlotte 
Webb, 29 March–27 April 2016 
Enquiry to Own-it, made by Charlotte Webb, 29 March 
2016 
Dear Own it 
I have a query regarding the Instagram terms of use, which 
state: 
‘Instagram does not claim ownership of any Content that you 
post on or through the Service’ (Instagram, 2013). However, 
by agreeing to the Terms of Use, users grant Instagram ‘a 
non-exclusive, fully paid and royalty-free, transferable, sub-
licensable, worldwide licence to use the Content that you post 
on or through the Service, subject to the Service’s Privacy 
Policy’ (Instagram 2013).  
According to a legal blog (Law Offices of Craig Delsack, LLC), 
this means that once a user has posted a photograph, 
Instagram has the right to sublicense it to any company for a 
fee without paying the user (see 
http://www.nyccounsel.com/business-blogs-websites/who-
owns-photos-and-videos-posted-on-facebook-or-twitter/). 
Does this mean that if I were to pay, this would enable me to 
use Instagram images ‘freely’? 
Many thanks, 
Charlotte 
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Response from Own-it, received 27 April 2016 
Dear Charlotte,  
Thank you for your query dated 29 March 2016 with regard to 
Instagram’s Terms of Use; more specifically, whether you 
would be able to use the images on Instagram by paying a fee 
or [if] such access is limited only to companies, and if so 
would the latter have actual free access to those contents. 
This advice is limited to matters of English law.  We are unable 
to give advice as to legal matters pertaining to any other 
jurisdiction, and in particular we are not able to advise as to 
copyright law subsisting in the United States of America. It is 
of note that copyright law in the USA has numerous ‘fair use’ 
provisions that do not have equivalents in English law. 
It can sometimes be difficult to assess where any 
infringement of copyright law has taken place, and therefore 
which jurisdiction’s copyright law is applicable in the 
circumstances. The analysis of the relevant jurisdiction may 
be very complicated, especially when acts take place on the 
internet, and detailed discussion of the applicable law is 
beyond the scope of this advice. For the purposes of this 
note, we assume that all acts are intended to take place in the 
United Kingdom. 
We understand your enquiry to relate to the use that you 
might be able to make of images posted on Instagram. As to 
the rights that you might be able use, the following issues 
arise: 
The rights that the individual contributor of the image (the 
‘Contributor’) has in relation to the image; 
The rights that the Contributor grants to Instagram when 
posting the image on Instagram, under the Terms of Use of 
Instagram; 
The rights that any user of Instagram (the ‘User’), viewing the 
image posted by the Contributor on Instagram in normal 
browsing circumstances, has in relation to that image; 
Any additional rights that Instagram might grant to the User 
by further agreement. 
Rights of the contributor  
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Section 4(1)(a) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(the ‘Act’) provides that copyright may subsist in a 
photograph, being an artistic work, as long as it is original. 
The creator of a photograph is the ‘author’ for the purposes of 
the Act, and the author of a work is the first owner of 
copyright in that work (section 11(1) of the Act).  The rule in 
section 11(1) is subject to section 11(2) of the Act, which 
provides that where an employee in the course of his 
employment makes an artistic work, his employer is the first 
owner of any copyright in the work. Alternatively the rule in 
section 11(1) is subject to any agreement to the contrary, for 
example, provision for vesting of copyright in a subcontractor 
agreement. 
The owner of copyright has the exclusive right to copy the 
work protected by copyright, subject to any licence or 
agreement by the owner otherwise. 
When considering the rights that Instagram may have, and 
may be able to sublicense to third parties, it should always be 
borne in mind what rights are licensed to Instagram in the 
first place. It would normally be safest to assume that the 
Contributor is owner of the copyright in the photograph in 
question, although this may not necessarily be the case. 
Licence from the Contributor to Instagram when 
uploading photos 
As you have noted in your query, when a Contributor uses 
Instagram, he or she agrees to the Terms of Use of Instagram, 
which provide that the Contributor grants Instagram ‘non-
exclusive, fully paid and royalty-free, transferable, sub-
licensable, worldwide license’ to use the image/photograph 
(‘Rights’ clause 1).  
This licence is unlimited in scope for Instagram and, as clause 
2 of the ‘Rights’ section of the Terms of Use makes clear, 
Instagram is permitted to use an image/photograph in 
conjunction with advertising and promotions, and indeed 
sublicense an image/photograph to a third party for whatever 
purpose, including advertising and promotions. 
However, this licence is subject to the Service’s Privacy Policy, 
which provides, amongst other things, for you to choose to 
some degree who can view your image/photograph. We 
understand the Privacy Policy to circumscribe the scope of the 
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licence granted by the Contributor to Instagram and 
depending on the privacy settings available to the 
Contributor, he or she may be able to prevent Instagram from 
using an image/photograph for advertising and promotional 
purposes. 
The following appear to us to be the key limitations on 
Instagram in relation to the Contributor’s image/photograph 
set out in the Instagram Privacy Policy (dated 19 January 
2013), at section 3: 
They may share ‘User Content’ (which includes any 
image/photograph) with businesses that are legally part of 
the same group of companies that Instagram is part of; 
They may share ‘information’ (which does not appear to 
include User Content, but is of the nature of cookies, log files 
and device identifiers) with third party organisations; 
The Contributor may choose to share User Content with the 
public, in accordance with the privacy settings set by the 
Contributor. 
Therefore, insofar as the image/photograph is available 
online to the public, to the extent chosen by the Contributor, 
Instagram has a royalty free and sub-licensable licence to that 
image/photograph. 
Note that the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy of Instagram 
are governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of 
the State of California. For these purposes, we have assumed 
that enforceability of those terms is the same as under 
English law, although that may not be the case. 
Normal rights of a User in relation to photos on 
Instagram  
It is unclear from Instagram’s Terms of Use what a User of 
Instagram is permitted to do with content, for example, 
images and photographs, in normal circumstances. 
All that is said by Instagram in its Terms of Use is that the 
User of Instagram agrees (at ‘Basic Terms’ clause 7): 
‘to comply with all laws, rules and regulations (for example, 
federal, state, local and provincial) applicable to your use of 
 311 
the Service and your Content (defined below), including but 
not limited to, copyright laws.’ 
Insofar as a User of Instagram is required to copy a 
Contributor’s image/photograph, if it is simply done for the 
purposes of browsing the photos on the Instagram website, 
then this will be permitted either because the Contributor, 
through the selection of his or her privacy settings has 
granted such a licence directly, or such a sublicence is implied 
in the Instagram Terms of Use. We would not expect such a 
licence granted to the User to extend to, for example, free 
commercial use of a Contributor’s image/photograph. 
Additional rights that might be granted  
Since, as described above, Instagram has a right to sublicense 
a Contributor’s content, to the extent of the privacy settings 
set by that Contributor, a third party may be granted a licence 
to that content, within the scope of the Contributor’s privacy 
settings. Indeed, Instagram grants such licences to third 
parties for use through their own APIs. 
Therefore, if you wished to use images posted on the 
Instagram website, presumably for uses outside normal 
browsing of the website, you would be required to obtain a 
sublicence to such images for those uses from Instagram. 
Simply because such images are publicly available does not 
mean that the Contributor or Instagram consent to any use of 
such images.   
We cannot comment on the terms on which such a sublicence 
might be granted, and whether you would have to pay for 
such a sublicence. This would be a commercial matter 
between you and Instagram. You also ask whether this would 
enable you to use the Instagram images ‘freely’.  If by this you 
mean for any purpose whatsoever, then that would be also 
dictated by the terms of the sublicence granted to you by 
Instagram, which in turn would be limited by the privacy 
settings of the copyright owner, the Contributor. 
Alternatively, you could ask the Contributor directly for a 
licence to use the images for whatever purpose required. 
As to the position of companies, they are treated in law as any 
real person. Therefore a company would be required to 
obtain a licence to images found on Instagram, if it wished to 
use those images for anything other than normal browsing 
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use. Again, such a licence from either Instagram or the 
Contributor might or might not incur a royalty depending on 
the commercial terms negotiated.   
We hope this information has been able to answer all your 
queries. 
Yours sincerely 
The Own-it Team 
BPP Disclaimer  
This advice has been prepared on behalf of Own-it by law 
students in BPP Pro Bono Centre’s Intellectual Property Pro 
Bono Group. Please note that this is general advice and is not 
a substitute for legal advice from a qualified professional. 
